Protest in Postcommunist Democracies

The Legacies of Repression and Mobilization

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Summary

This thesis examines the conditions that favor or hinder the spread of nonviolent protest in postcommunist democracies. Nonviolent protest—that is, the involvement in extra-representational activities such as demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts—is an indicator of the vitality of civil society in democracies. This type of activism complements conventional forms of political participation such as voting. More spontaneous and less institutionalized, protest raises awareness about new issues, gives a voice to marginalized groups, and allows people to influence policy-making between elections. Many studies have shown that citizens of Central and Eastern European countries are less active in protest activities than their peers in Western Europe. Yet, the extent of and causes underlying the East-West participation gap are still debated in the literature. Using repeated cross-national survey data stretching over 16 years in a large number of new and old European democracies, the thesis sheds new light on the sources of the European protest divide. It argues that, to better understand the development of protest activism in postcommunist democracies, scholars have to shift their attention from current contextual determinants of political participation to biographical trajectories. Inspired by theories of political socialization, the project examines how early exposure to (1) repression and (2) mobilization during the transition to democracy has shaped the protest behavior of different generations in Central and Eastern Europe. The thesis develops new approaches to measure these types of exposure and examines their effect on protest using multilevel age-period-cohort models. The empirical analysis is structured around three chapters, consisting of two cross-national studies and a comparison of East and West Germans. The results reveal that early exposure to repression has a lasting effect on demonstration attendance but not on petition signing nor on participation in boycotts. Furthermore, the type of repression experienced by citizens determines the direction of the effect on demonstrations. Citizens exposed to civil liberties restrictions during their youth tend to participate more later in life; the opposite is true for citizens exposed to personal integrity violations. From a micro perspective, only exposure to the most extreme form of repression, political violence, depresses participation in the long term. At the same time, there is little evidence that exposure to mobilization during the transition to democracy moderates the East-West protest gap. A close look at East Germans' protest behavior shows that, even in a society that went through massive mobilization during the collapse of communism, current participation is better explained by a legacy of repression than by a legacy of transitional mobilization. By generating new insights into the relation between regime change and civil society, this project bridges and contributes to the fields of political behavior, social movements, and democratization.

Zusammenfassung

Diese Arbeit untersucht die Bedingungen, die eine Verbreitung von gewaltfreiem Protest in ehemals kommunistischen Ländern begünstigen oder behindern. Gewaltfreier Protest, d.h. die Beteiligung an außerparlamentarischen Aktivitäten wie Demonstrationen, Petitionen und Boykotts, ist ein Indikator für die Vitalität der Zivilgesellschaft einer Demokratie. Diese Art des Aktivismus komplementiert konventionelle Formen politischer Beteiligung, wie z.B. Wahlen. Spontaner und weniger institutionalisiert schärft politischer Protest das Bewusstsein für neue Themen, gibt marginalisierten Gruppen eine Stimme und erlaubt auch zwischen den Wahlen eine Einflussnahme auf das politische Geschehen. Viele Studien haben gezeigt, dass die Beteiligung an Protestaktivitäten in mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern geringer ausfällt als in Westeuropa. Dennoch werden das Ausmaß und die Ursachen dieser Ost-West-Partizipationslücke in der Literatur immer noch debattiert. Anhand wiederholter länderübergreifender Umfragedaten, die sich über 16 Jahre in einer großen Zahl neuer und alter europäischer Demokratien erstrecken, wirft diese Arbeit ein neues Licht auf die Gründe dieser Protest-Lücke. Es wird argumentiert, dass Forschende ihre Aufmerksamkeit von den aktuellen kontextuellen Determinanten politischer Beteiligung hin zu den biografischen Werdegängen der Menschen verlagern sollten, um die Entwicklung von Protestverhalten in postkommunistischen Ländern besser zu verstehen. Inspiriert von den Theorien politischer Sozialisation untersucht diese Arbeit, inwiefern ein frühes Erleben von (1) Repression und (2) Mobilisierung während der Transition zur Demokratie das Protestverhalten verschiedener Generationen in Mittel- und Osteuropa geprägt hat. Die vorliegende Dissertation entwickelt neue Ansätze, um diese Art des frühen Erlebens zu messen und untersucht ihren Effekt auf Protestverhalten unter der Verwendung von mehrebenen Alters-Perioden-Kohorten-Modellen. Die empirische Analyse gliedert sich in drei Kapitel, bestehend aus zwei länderübergreifenden Studien und einem Vergleich von Ost- und Westdeutschen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ein frühes Erleben von Repression einen dauerhaften Effekt auf die Teilnahme an Demonstrationen hat, nicht jedoch auf das Unterzeichnen von Petitionen oder die Teilnahme an Boykotts. Darüber hinaus beeinflusst die Art der erlebten Repression die Richtung des Effekts auf die Teilnahme an Demonstrationen. Personen, deren Bürgerrechte während ihrer Jugend eingeschränkt wurden, scheinen in ihrem späteren Leben häufiger an Demonstrationen teilzunehmen. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall für Personen, die Verletzungen persönlicher Integrität erlebt haben. Aus der Mikro-Perspektive betrachtet, mindert also nur das Erleben der extremsten Form der Repression, die politische Gewalt, langfristig das Protestverhalten. Gleichzeitig gibt es nur wenig Belege dafür, dass das Erleben der Mobilisierung während der Transition zur Demokratie diese Ost-West-Protestlücke moderiert. Ein genauer Blick auf das Protestverhalten der Ostdeutschen zeigt, dass selbst in einer Gesellschaft, die während des Zusammenbruchs des Kommunismus massiv mobilisiert wurde, das gegenwärtige Protestverhalten besser durch ein Erbe der Repression als durch ein Erbe der Mobilisierung während der Transition erklärt werden kann. Durch diese neu gewonnen Erkenntnisse zum Verhältnis von Regimewechsel und Zivilgesellschaft, verbindet und bereichert diese Dissertation die Forschungsfelder zu politischem Verhalten, sozialen Bewegungen und Demokratisierung.

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Supplementary Material

Replication files for this thesis (data, R scripts, and Stata do-files) are available at https://github.com/jolyphil/thesis

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Acknowledgments

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The transitions from communism in Central and Eastern Europe were one of the most extraordinary democratic achievements of the twentieth century. This wave of democratization was remarkable not only because of its speed and geographic diffusion but also because of the key role played by peaceful protesters in ousting communist leaders. While the democratic transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s had been dominated by elite pacts, the collapse of communism restored faith in "the force from below" (Teorell, 2010, 100; see also Geddes, 1999). From the Peaceful Revolution in East Germany to the Singing Revolution in the Baltics, the mobilization in the former Eastern Bloc demonstrated that ordinary citizens had the power to change the course of history. During the three decades that followed, many postcommunist countries—in particular, those in the European Union's sphere of influence—completed their double and, in certain cases, triple transition to democracy, capitalism, and national sovereignty (Offe, 1991). Eleven postcommunist democracies became full members of the EU from 2004 to 2013 (Fish, Gill, & Petrovic, 2017; Vachudova, 2005). Although Central and Eastern Europe has recently shown signs of democratic erosion, most of the democratic gains made since 1989 have been preserved so far.

1.1 The Intriguing Persistence of the East-West Participation Gap

Surprisingly, while East and West European countries converged towards democratic rule, they diverged in terms of political participation. Since the beginning of the 2000s, many

studies have found that political participation is lower among citizens of democracies in Central and Eastern Europe than in democracies of Western Europe. Voter turnout statistics and data from cross-national surveys indicate that this participation gap extends to both participation in elections and in protests (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007; Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014; Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002; Karp & Milazzo, 2015; Kostadinova, 2003; Kostelka, 2014).

The low level of protest participation in Central and Eastern Europe is particularly intriguing given the region's rich history of contention. Postcommunist populations have repeatedly demonstrated their capacity to oppose abuses of power and electoral fraud using a rich repertoire of political actions. Since 1998, five authoritarian or semi-authoritarian national governments have been replaced in postcommunist Europe following mass mobilization in hardly disputed elections (presidential and legislative): in Slovakia (1998), Croatia (2000), Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), and Ukraine (2004) (Beissinger, 2007; Bunce & Wolchik, 2011; Kuzio, 2006; Tucker, 2007). The Orange Revolution in Ukraine was followed 10 years later by the Euromaidan Revolution, which led to the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych (Onuch, 2014). More recently, large peaceful protests have erupted to prevent democratic backsliding in certain EU member states. In Hungary, thousands of people took to the streets to oppose Viktor Orbán's decisions to impose an internet tax and shut down the Central European University (Than & Dunai, 2014; Thorpe, 2017). In Poland, civil society strongly opposed the judiciary reforms enacted by the PiS government (Reuters, 2018). In Romania, a record number of citizens joined demonstrations to ask for more monitoring of corruption (Domonoske, 2018). However, according to survey research, these events have not been translated into ordinary and routine protest. Even if postcommunist citizens have occasionally taken part in protests—sometimes massively—protest as a day-to-day practice is still not as widespread as in Western Europe. In other words, protest in Central and Eastern Europe has not been *normalized* to the same extent as in older democracies of the West.

1.2 The Hollowing-Out of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe?

The low level of political participation in Central and Eastern Europe might signal a "hollowing-out" of democracy in the region (Greskovits, 2015 ; see also Mair, 2013). Democracies require citizens' active involvement "for setting goals, choosing priorities, and deciding what resources to commit" (Verba & Nie, 1972, 4). The efficient distribution of public goods in a

democracy depends on broad participation by the people (Dalton, 2017, 209-228). Furthermore, as many authors in the tradition of Rousseau and Mill have argued, political participation is "intrinsically valuable" (Norris, 2002, 5): it functions as a school of democracy by training citizens to become actors of change and gives people "a sense of political efficacy" (Finkel, 1985, 892; see also Barber, 1984; Pateman, 1970). In the absence of an engaged citizenry, democracy might survive in its minimal, procedural form, but it will not thrive. Political apathy is expected to lower the legitimacy of democratic institutions, reduce the accountability of public officials, and increase political exclusion.

Among all forms of political participation, protest activities are particularly important for the development of a strong civil society. They complement conventional forms of participation by giving citizens a more spontaneous and direct way to express their dissent (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Dalton, Scarrow, & Cain, 2004; Norris, 2002). Protest raises awareness about new issues, gives a voice to marginalized groups, and allows people to influence policymaking between elections. It bypasses elite-controlled channels and strengthens civil society's capacity to monitor government action (Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

In light of the key functions performed by political participation (and, in particular, protest), the demobilization observed in Central and Eastern Europe might have serious implications for the consolidation of democracy in the region. Disengaged democracies are more vulnerable to re-autocratization (Bernhard, Hicken, Reenock, & Lindberg, 2020). Without an engaged citizenry, political leaders might feel free to infringe the rule of law and centralize power. Ruling elites might ignore the concern of minorities and turn democracy into a "tyranny of the majority." Clientelism, corruption, and bad governance might spread without opposition. Finally, if citizens lack the tools to express and articulate their demands, alternative and constructive visions of the future might never find a way into policies.

1.3 Contributions

Against this backdrop, this thesis examines the conditions that favor or hinder the spread of nonviolent protest in postcommunist democracies. I am interested in *nonviolent protest*, that is, legal extra-representational activities used by citizens to influence political outcomes.[1] This definition covers political actions such as attending lawful demonstrations, signing peti-

[1] This definition is inspired by Brady (1999), Ekman and Amnå (2012), and Teorell, Torcal, and Montero (2007). Chapter 3 explores conceptual debates surrounding the study of protest in more detail.

tions, and boycotting certain products. I focus on *postcommunist democracies*, that is, former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (including Eastern Germany) that have adopted political systems meeting procedural standards of democratic rule. This excludes former Soviet and Yugoslav republics that did not complete their transition to democracy.

So far, research on protest in postcommunist democracies has been limited in two ways. First, from a theoretical perspective, few scholars have tried to explain protest in new democracies after the ousting of autocratic leaders and, when they did, they usually applied theories developed in and for Western democracies. These theories have paid little attention to the distinct historical background of new democracies. Second, from an empirical perspective, longitudinal and nationally representative studies have remained rare beyond the West. Research on extra-representational participation in postcommunist democracies has usually focused on specific protest events rather than on the gradual evolution of political action repertoires over time. This dissertation attempts to fill some of these gaps in the literature.

1.3.1 Theoretical Contributions

This thesis contributes to three bodies of literature: studies on protest in democratization processes, studies on the normalization of protest, and studies on historical legacies in postcommunist countries. Democratization research has traditionally treated protest as a disruptive element in the transition period and ignored its development in the aftermath of founding elections. Most scholars in this field have treated protest as a double-edged sword for democratization. Faced with popular mobilization, autocratic leaders could either initiate reforms or crack down on the opposition (Bermeo, 2003, 7-20). Inspired by experiences of democratization in Latin America and Southern Europe, actor-centered theories suggested that the safest road to democracy was the negotiation of transition pacts among elites (e.g., Colomer, 1991; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). In this strategic approach, mass protest was sometimes considered a transition spoiler: by asking too much, protesters could disrupt the ongoing dialog among moderate elites (Bermeo, 2003, 11-15). The picture changed somewhat with the massive involvement of ordinary citizens at the end of the third wave of democratization (e.g., Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). Yet, more recently, the partial failure of the Arab Spring brought back a mixed assessment of the role of protest in democratic transitions. With these conflicting findings, the democratization literature has not approached protest evolution systematically. This is particularly true for the consolidation phase where

extra-representational political activism was considered irrelevant once formal democratic participation was made possible.

Studies in the fields of political participation and social movements have contributed to a better understanding of protest normalization in established democracies. Yet, they have not adapted this approach to study new democracies. Two recurrent observations tend to confirm that extra-representational participation is now routine in Western democracies. First, protest is more frequent. Both protest event analysis (e.g., Rucht, 1998) and longitudinal surveys (e.g., Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002) have demonstrated that extra-representational political participation has been on the rise since the Second World War. Second, the population of protesters increasingly resembles the population at large (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2001). Nowadays, the median protester is not very different from the median voter. Political protest has entered the general repertoire of political action in old democracies (Meyer & Whittier, 1994, 4). Different explanations have been advanced to account for this "participatory revolution" (Kaase, 1984). Moving beyond earlier theories of grievances, a first strand of research proposed that the expression of collective protest, understood as a rational act performed in order to achieve defined political goals, was contingent on the availability of resources (Koopmans, 2007, 696-697). At the micro level, this meant that wealthy, educated, and well-connected citizens were the most inclined to protest (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995). At the macro level, the resource mobilization approach suggested that richer societies provided more appropriate social infrastructure for sustaining protest (for example, mass education, communication, and transportation) (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, 1224–1226). Theories of social modernization postulated that material well-being would lead people to reject "bureaucratized and elite-directed" forms of participation in favor of "individually-motivated and elite-challenging" ones (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002, 301; see also Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Welzel and Deutsch, 2012) . The normalization of protest was, in that sense, a product of the development of affluent post-industrial societies. A second set of theories pointed to the role of political opportunity structures (see Kriesi, 2004; Meyer, 2004). Cross-national studies arrived at a minimal consensus showing that open democratic institutions and the rule of law offered favorable conditions for the expansion of extra-representational political activism (Dalton, van Sickle, & Weldon, 2010; Roller & Weßels, 1996). While these approaches have helped contextualizing the phenomenon of protest normalization in the West, they did not consider the particular challenges faced by

new democracies. As we will see in Chapter 2 in more detail, the translation of these theories to countries that recently transitioned from autocracy has remained problematic.

To summarize the previous discussion, many studies have either looked at protest during the collapse of autocracy or at the normalization of protest in countries with a distant autocratic past. In between these two positions lies a space for theoretical reflection on the evolution of protest during democratic consolidation. With their long-term perspective, theories of historical legacies in postcommunist countries are well suited to integrate the aforementioned literature. So far, however, they have not been systematically applied to the study of protest participation. This strand of research initially focused on the institutional dimension of democratization and economic liberalization (Crawford & Lijphart, 1995; Ekiert & Hanson, 2003; Jowitt, 1992; Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, & Tóka, 1999; Kopstein, 2003; Pop-Eleches, 2007). It showed that postcommunist countries' unequal success in implementing political and economic reforms after the Cold War reflected structural conditions already in place during (or even before) the communist era. More recently, a growing number of scholars have used the historical legacies framework to explain political phenomena at the micro level. Using insights from political socialization theory, they have demonstrated that communist regimes had left mark on citizens' political attitudes and behavior. The central argument of these studies is that postcommunist democracies have to overcome legacies of authoritarian socialization. Having grown up in a political environment that repressed civil and political rights, citizens of new democracies have to adjust to the workings of the democratic system. However, since attitudinal and behavioral change becomes increasingly difficult after a certain age, political socialization theory suggests that democratic habituation can only be completed through generational replacement (Mannheim, 1952). This explains why generational differences in political orientations—between the cohorts of citizens socialized under communism and the rest of the population—are still visible today in Central and Eastern Europe. This approach has covered many dimensions of democratic citizenship including support for democracy and the market economy (Mishler & Rose, 2007; Neundorf, 2010; Neundorf, Gerschewski, & Olar, 2020; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2014), trust in parties (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2011), and membership of civic organizations (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2013). Yet, it has paid little attention to extra-representational forms of participation.[2]

[2]One rare exception is the study conducted by Hooghe and Quintelier (2014), which I discuss in more detail in Chapter 2.

This thesis extends theories of micro legacies in postcommunist countries to the domain of protest and, in doing so, attempts to bridge the gap between the literature on protest in democratization processes and the literature on protest normalization. One underlying assumption of this research is that protest has a dual nature: It is both situational and generic. As noted by Norris (2002, 194), protest is situational, if it is a reaction to "specific events and particular circumstances," or generic, if it reflects "distinctive social or attitudinal profiles of citizens." In the first case, protest appears volatile—and, therefore, difficult to explain through the lens of historical legacies—whereas, in the second case, it is more constant. In reality, these two phenomena are always intertwined and separating them constitutes a methodological challenge, as we will see in Chapter 3. This thesis aims at isolating the "signal" of generic protest from the "noise" of situational protest (Silver, 2012).[3] I argue that protest participation, more than a spontaneous expression of political grievances, is a deep-seated political orientation shaped through early formative experiences. I propose that the political context experienced by citizens between mid-adolescence and early adulthood—that is, the age at which citizens' political orientations crystallize—determines their future participation. In other words, the key to explaining the current development of protest in postcommunist countries is to retrace the political environment in which different generations of citizens reached political maturity.

Beyond applying theories of micro legacies to another political outcome, this thesis innovates by examining the effect of exposure to two political contexts: repression and transitional mobilization. While repression was a central feature of communist regimes, few authors have actually studied its distinct long-term effect on political attitudes and behavior. With rare exceptions (Neundorf et al., 2020), the literature on micro legacies has usually looked at the *overall* socializing effect of communism instead of examining the consequences of specific attributes of this political system. This thesis highlights that communist regimes did not always form a coherent bloc. The political context experienced by citizens during communism varied significantly across countries and over time. These differences were rooted in diverse precommunist conditions and were later reflected in a variety of democratic trajectories after the Cold War. Using a more contextualized approach to political socialization in Central and Eastern Europe, I show that the repression experienced by citizens throughout the twentieth century fluctuated along two dimensions: in level (the extent to which repression was systematic) and in kind (whether it was violent or not). I then ex-

[3] Note that the term "noise" is in not used to downplay the importance these events but simply to highlight their irregular character.

amine how this variation impacted citizens' protest participation. I postulate that citizens who experienced intense and, in particular, violent repression during their formative years were less likely to take part in protests afterward.

In a second step, I explore whether exposure to mobilization during the transition to democracy compensated for the micro legacy of repression. The sociohistorical context in which democracies emerge is determinant for their future development. Democratic transitions are critical junctures (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007; Pierson, 2004): they have a lock-in effect on institutions and generate stable coalitions of actors during democratic consolidation. Scholars have suggested that the type of transition—whether it is top-down, negotiated, or bottom-up—affects the quality of the new democratic institutions (della Porta, 2016; Fishman, 2017; Yashar, 1997). The question that remains is whether transitions to democracy also leave a mark on citizens' political participation. This thesis examines whether the mobilization that accompanied the collapse of communism has had a spillover effect on current protest. Inspired by the literature on the biographical impact of social movements (M. Giugni & Grasso, 2016; M. G. Giugni, 2004; McAdam, 1999), I expect citizens who were exposed to high levels of mobilization during their formative years to be more active during the rest of their lives. This implies that the legacy of transitional mobilization might, in certain countries, moderate the East-West protest gap. Even if apathy is in general more frequent in postcommunist democracies than in Western Europe (possibly because of a legacy of repression), there might still be significant between-country variation in the East as a result of different experiences during the transition to democracy.

By considering both the legacy of repression and the legacy of transitional mobilization, the theoretical framework introduced in this thesis reconnects with the first generation of studies on historical legacies (Ekiert & Hanson, 2003; Kitschelt et al., 1999). This literature explained the democratic trajectory of postcommunist countries through the lens of different phases of history: before, during, and after Cold War. Instead of focusing on single historical events, it explored how sequences of interrelated political contexts determined the political development of postcommunist countries. This thesis follows a similar approach. It presents a more comprehensive picture of the political context experienced by Central and East European citizens throughout the twentieth century and shows how this context relates to citizens' current protest participation.

1.3.2 Empirical Contributions

The literature on protest in Central and Eastern Europe has focused primarily on important, but singular episodes of contention. Beyond the protests during the collapse of communism, which have been widely discussed (Beissinger, 2002; Bunce, 1999; J. K. Glenn III, 2001; Joppke, 1995), scholars have been particularly interested in explaining the geographic diffusion of protests during the electoral revolutions in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine (Beissinger, 2007; Bunce & Wolchik, 2006, 2011; Kuzio, 2006; Onuch, 2014; Tucker, 2007). Yet, despite their historical importance, these events are not representative of ordinary forms of protest in quieter times. The protest activities that are typical of transitional moments—for example, massive spontaneous street demonstrations concentrated around public squares—are quite different in their form and aims from the more decentralized, multidimensional, extra-representational political activities in the consolidation period. Mass mobilization during times of transition can give a biased representation of political participation once formal democracy has been established. Few studies have examined protest in postcommunist countries using longitudinal and nationally representative data (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007; Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014; Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002; Kostelka, 2014). This strand of research has reported a decline in participation since the 1990s. As we have seen, the origins of this phenomenon and the causes of its persistence have remained unclear.

This thesis contributes to the literature by assembling a large longitudinal and nationally representative dataset on protest in Europe. I combine eight rounds of the European Social Survey to create a master dataset consisting of observations from 28 old and new democracies over the period from 2002 to 2017. I pool together 186 national surveys, with at least three surveys by country. From this master dataset, I take subsamples to test specific hypotheses in the empirical chapters. I examine participation in three forms of protest: attending lawful demonstrations, signing petitions, and boycotting certain products.

Figure 1.1 shows the countries covered by this thesis. The color scheme indicates the percentage of respondents who had taken part in a lawful demonstration, signed a petition, or boycotted certain products in the 12 months preceding the ESS surveys. The map clearly shows the East-West protest gap, although there are notable differences within each region. The percentage of protesters ranges from 9% in Hungary to 68% in Iceland. The country

mean for postcommunist democracies is 18% compared to 38% in Western democracies.[4] The difference between the two groups of countries is clearly significant ($p < 0.001$).

In terms of methods, the main challenge facing this study is to disentangle the interrelated effects of age, periods, and cohorts (APC) when examining the impact of micro legacies on protest. Political socialization theory suggests that the micro legacies of repression and transitional mobilization should manifest themselves as cohort differences in protest participation. Yet, isolating the effects of cohorts from those of age and periods is perilous since they are perfectly collinear (N. D. Glenn, 2005; Mason & Fienberg, 1985). This thesis proposes a modeling strategy to bypass this identification problem. Instead of focusing on absolute cohorts differences, the analysis measures the effect of exposure to specific contexts, an antecedent of political socialization. I retrace the level of repression and mobilization experienced by certain cohorts of citizens during their formative years and test the effect of exposure to these contexts on protest participation. I do this while accounting for the simultaneous clustering of observations in cohorts and periods using logistic random-effects models (Neundorf et al., 2020; Yang & Land, 2006, 2008). The analysis combines micro and macro data from different sources to control for potential confounders at the country, country-wave, and individual level. Different versions of this method are applied in three empirical chapters: two cross-national studies and a comparison of East and West Germans.

[4] Eastern Germany is included in postcommunist democracies and Western Germany in Western democracies.



Figure 1.1: Percentage of respondents having taken part in a lawful demonstration, signed a petition, or boycotted certain products in the 12 months preceding one of the ESS surveys (2002-2017)
Note: The results are weighted. Temporal coverage varies by country. Note that Germany is presented here as a single country while, in the analysis, Eastern and Western Germany are treated separately.
Source: based on data from ESS (2017).

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

The rest of this thesis is structured in six chapters. *Chapter 2* lays down the theoretical foundations of this research. I review how classic (Western) theories of protest have attempted to explain the development of extra-representational forms of participation in postcommunist democracies. Grievance, resource, and political opportunity structure theories have improved our understanding of stable cross-national differences in participation between old and new democracies in Europe. Yet, they have been less accurate in predicting longitudinal dynamics in Central and Eastern Europe. These approaches have focused primarily on current contextual factors and paid little attention to the role of biographical trajectories of postcommunist citizens. In response to this, I propose a political socialization approach to protest in new democracies. I formulate theoretical expectations about the long-term effects of exposure to repression and transitional mobilization on protest in new democracies.

Chapter 3 presents the research design of this thesis. First, I review conceptual debates about the nature of protest and its place in the field of political participation before introducing the definition and measurement of protest used in this thesis. Second, I explain why the European Social Survey offers the most appropriate individual-level data to study the effect of political socialization on protest in postcommunist democracies and give a brief overview of the master dataset. Finally, I present my approach to circumvent the APC identification problem, which consists in testing the effect of early exposure to specific contexts using multilevel age-period-cohort models. This chapter is followed by three empirical chapters, each tackling specific aspects of the theory and using variants of the empirical strategy presented in the research design.

Chapter 4 asks the following question: *How does early exposure to repression affect protest participation in postcommunist democracies?* Scholars have often presented the disengagement of postcommunist citizens as the product of a single uniform legacy of socialism. Yet, as I demonstrate in this chapter, the political context experienced by Central and East European citizens varied remarkably before, during, and after the Cold War. Based on political socialization theory, we would expect this changing political environment to have produced cohorts with distinct modes of political participation. The chapter examines the effect of early exposure to civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity violations on protest participation. To measure these two forms of repression, I construct indicators using data from the Varieties of Democracy project and match them to specific birth cohorts in 10 postcom-

munist democracies. I then estimate their residual effect on protest using cross-classified random-effects models.

Chapter 5 asks the following question: *How does early exposure to transitional mobilization affect protest participation in postcommunist democracies?* This chapter tracks the protest behavior of the 1989 generation. This group is composed of citizens who reached political maturity during the collapse of communism. Building on political socialization theory, I suggest that citizens who were exposed to high levels of protest during their formative years might be more inclined to protest later. This implies that the mobilization during the transitions from communism might moderate the current East-West participation gap. The chapter assesses how early exposure to protest has affected the participation of the 1989 generation. I use data from the second wave of the European Values Study to measure the involvement of young citizens at the turn of the 1990s and estimate its long-term effect on protest participation in 24 new and old democracies using longitudinal multilevel models.

Chapter 6 asks the following question: *What is the combined effect of the micro legacies of repression and transitional mobilization on protest?* This chapter examines the protest behavior of citizens socialized in Eastern Germany, a region that inherited two conflicting legacies: the legacy of repression in the German Democratic Republic and the legacy of mobilization during the Peaceful Revolution. Using a counterfactual approach, the analysis assesses the evolution of gaps in protest across generations and time between East and West Germans. West Germans' protest behavior is used as a benchmark to explore how the interaction of the legacies of repression and transitional mobilization has shaped protest participation among East Germans. The analysis is performed using cross-classified random-effects models.

Chapter 7 concludes this thesis. I summarize the findings and, moving back from the micro to the macro level, explore their broader implications for the development of civil society in postcommunist democracies. I indicate the limitations of this study and propose avenues for future research.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Approach: Moving Beyond Current Contextual Factors of Protest in New Democracies

How to explain the current level of protest in Central and Eastern Europe? The three main theoretical approaches to the study of protest and social movements—grievances, resources, and political opportunity structures—have offered important but incomplete answers to this question. In this chapter, I review the literature on extra-representational participation in postcommunist Europe from the perspective of these three approaches. I highlight a questionable assumption often made by such studies: That protest is a synchronous response to the economic and political context in a given country. This assumption explains why the literature mostly focused on institutional and socioeconomic path dependence when it touched upon the subject of communist legacies and their effects on protest. Previous studies neglected the biographical impact of previous events on extra-representational participation. Moving beyond classic theories, the chapter then examines the role of political socialization in protest participation. At the heart of this approach is the idea that protest participation is a deep-seated political orientation acquired through experience. Political socialization at a young age is expected to have an enduring effect on protest participation. This approach allows for delayed effects of macro-level factors and extends structural theories by showing that sensitivity to context varies with age. Political socialization has the potential to explain the lag between expanding opportunities and actual protest in new democracies. The final section of the chapter combines insights from political socialization theory and classic ap-

proaches in an integrated model of protest in new democracies. The model includes two mechanisms through which political socialization affects protest participation: the evaluation of appropriate response and the evaluation of efficacy.

2.1 Classic Theories of Protest

2.1.1 Grievances

Scholars have often analyzed patterns of protest participation in Central and Eastern Europe through the lens of grievance theory. This approach describes protest as a sociopsychological reaction to structural strain (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). According to this theory, protest results from the collective experience of relative deprivation, which is defined as "the gap between what people get and what they expect and aspire to get on the basis of past trends and comparisons with other groups" (Koopmans, 2007, 696). Protest levels are expected to increase when generalized beliefs about the causes of deprivation spread within affected groups. This approach has helped to explain the reasons motivating people to act. However, it has been criticized for underestimating the role played by the social context in facilitating and constraining mobilization (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Rucht, 2007).

Scholars working within this tradition of research expected very high levels of protest after the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. By all accounts, countries in the region experienced tremendous economic and political stress after the collapse of communist regimes. The beginning of the nineties were characterized by high levels of unemployment, the privatization and closure of noncompetitive companies, rising prices, and declining standards of living. At the same time, the newly established democratic institutions appeared fragile: Electoral volatility was very high and party systems changed at each election. Not only did these problems objectively affect people, they were also much more salient in the public sphere once citizens had access to a free press. Feelings of relative deprivation were widespread in the population.

Greskovits (1998) recalls that many observers from the West anticipated that postcommunist societies would crumble under social pressure. They expected the dual transition to democracy and capitalism to generate so much resistance within the population that it would be doomed to fail. Yet, most of these fears were not borne out. In countries where democracy had firmly taken ground (that excludes the Balkans and some former Soviet republics), the nineties turned out to be quite peaceful, and protest levels remained remarkably

low. Since then, Central and East European countries have made major progress on the path to consolidated democracy. Eleven former communist countries have now joined the EU (and East Germany has been reunified with West Germany). The fruits of economic growth, although unequally distributed, are clearly visible in the region.

Grievance theories made a comeback after the Great Recession at the end of the 2000s (Grasso, Yoxon, Karampampas, & Temple, 2019; Quaranta, 2015). The economic downturn struck Central and Eastern Europe particularly hard and scholars questioned whether postcommunist citizens would remain "patient" as they had done before. Yet, even in these times of crisis, overall protest levels did not increase in the region, as Beissinger and Sasse (2014) demonstrated.[1] We are still far from the world hoped for by Central and Eastern European citizens after the 1989 transitions. Postcommunist countries remain part of Europe's economic periphery and the democratic achievements of the last decades are being threatened by populist governments in countries like Hungary and Poland. Postcommunist citizens are still experiencing relative deprivation. They would have the reservoir of discontent needed to participate *more*, not less, than their peers in Western Europe. Theories of grievances therefore seem insufficient to understand the gap of political participation between the older and newer democracies of Europe. The next sections introduce two other approaches—the resources and opportunity structure approaches—which offer more compelling explanations.

2.1.2 Resources

Since the 1970s, scholars of social movements and political participation have examined the role played by resources in turning grievances into protest. The literature suggests that participation in protest activities depends on the availability of resources at three levels: at the contextual level (macro), at the level of groups (meso), and at the level of individuals (micro). Since I am mostly interested in explaining patterns of individual participation in a specific sociohistorical context (postcommunist Europe), I focus here on macro and micro factors (and their interaction).

At the macro level, the literature suggests that socioeconomic development facilitates participation in protest activities. McCarthy and Zald (1977, 1224) argue that richer societies tend to have larger "social movement sectors" because they provide citizens with

[1] Beissinger and Sasse's chapter ("An End to 'Patience'?") indicates that only certain types of economic protest against economic cutbacks did increase during the recession.

more "discretionary resources," that is, time and money. People tend to use discretionary resources to cover their basic needs before they consider investing in "low-priority" activities such as social movement mobilization (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, 1224). More broadly, socioeconomic development provides a social infrastructure conductive to protest. Urbanization, transportation, and the spread of means of communication reduce the costs of nonelectoral participation. They facilitate the diffusion of claims made by mobilized groups, help to attract new activists, and make the coordination of protest activities easier. Access to education (and especially to higher education) is associated with the development of civic skills. Advanced post-industrial societies also tend to have a rich associational life and are connected through transnational networks of mobilization (Norris, 2002; Roller & Weßels, 1996). Furthermore, according to Inglehart and Welzel (2005), socioeconomic development leads citizens to adopt self-emancipative values, which are correlated with participation in elite-challenging activities (see also Inglehart, 1977, 1997; Welzel & Deutsch, 2012). In other words, the structural impacts of modernization are amplified by changes they induce in the political culture. Empirically, the cross-national evidence in support of resource theories is abundant. Many studies confirm that citizens are more active in nonelectoral forms of participation in affluent societies (Dalton et al., 2010; Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002; Roller & Weßels, 1996).

At the micro level, resources function according to a similar logic: well-off, highly educated, and well-connected individuals typically participate the most. In their seminal Citizen Participation Study, Verba and his collaborators (1995) suggested that three types of resources—money, time, and skills—stimulate individual political participation. These resources are highly correlated with group membership and with certain dimensions of socioeconomic status like gender, age, occupation, and education. This classic resource model works for both electoral and nonelectoral forms of participation, although each form of political participation requires a specific balance of the three types of resources. While making a financial contribution to a party requires money but little time and skills, the opposite is true for taking part in a demonstration. This suggests that different political actions generate different forms of inequalities of participation. Some authors argue that nonelectoral forms of participation like demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts are less subject to age and gender inequalities but attract a disproportionate number of highly educated participants (Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010).

Resources (and the lack of thereof) partially explain why postcommunist citizens participate less in protest activities than citizens of Western democracies. Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2013, 50) argue that the communist model of modernization has left characteristic "sociodemographic landscapes" in Central and Eastern Europe. While postcommunist citizens are well-educated, which should lead them to be politically active, they are also poorer than their peers in Western Europe and might lack the financial independence to join protest activities. In addition, low religiosity and church attendance in Central and Eastern Europe, a consequence of communist regimes' anticlerical policies, might depress political participation as involvement in religious communities has been associated with the development of civic skills in other contexts (e.g. Brady et al., 1995).

Using data from the World Values Survey, Howard (2003) also shows that postcommunist citizens are less involved in civil society organizations than citizens in Western democracies and post-authoritarian countries in other regions of the world. The "weakness" of postcommunist civil society, the author argues, is rooted in a legacy of mistrust of formal organizations. During the communist period, autonomous groups were either marginalized or repressed. At the same time, citizens had no choice but to join party-based organizations. Discouraged by their past experience, many citizens are now reluctant to join civil society organizations and instead claim their "right not to participate" (Rose, Mishler, & Haerpfer, 1997, 90). Postcommunist citizens lack access to networks of mobilization that could foster civic skills and reduce problems of collective action.

Other authors have looked at the neoliberal reforms of the nineties for an explanation for the state of participation in postcommunist countries. As mentioned previously, the transition to capitalism imposed high social costs on Central and East European populations. The crisis put citizens in a situation of economic insecurity and deprived them of resources necessary to protest (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). In certain cases, governments seem to have deliberately acted to demobilize potential protesters in order to make way for the transition. Vanhuysse (2006) argues that governments in Hungary and Poland adopted abnormal retirement pension policies to push well-connected, well-organized, and potentially troublesome workers out of the labor market, effectively limiting their resources to mount an effective opposition to the reforms.

In brief, the East-West participation gap appears to reflect, at least partially, differences in resources. The characteristic sociodemographic structure of postcommunist societies and the macro-economic context in the region offer less favorable conditions for the spread of

protest activities than in Western Europe. One puzzle that remains, however, is why the East-West participation gap has not declined over time. After a difficult period of economic adjustment, the new European democracies, especially the new EU members, have sustained high levels of economic growth. Yet, so far, no study has come up with robust evidence showing that postcommunist democracies are catching up with the West in terms of nonelectoral participation. Resource theories appear well-suited to explaining stable cross-national differences but less so to understanding longitudinal dynamics.

2.1.3 Political opportunity Structures

A third way to approach the East-West participation gap is to look at differences in political opportunity structures (for a review, see Kriesi, 2004; Meyer, 2004). Political opportunity structure theories compare political systems in terms of the institutional constraints they impose on mass mobilization (Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995; Tilly, 1978). This literature highlights that, in autocracies, protest events entail high costs for citizens who decide to join them, from legal harassment to severe forms of repressions like incarceration and threats to one's physical integrity. Furthermore, under autocratic regimes, public contestation involves high stakes for all parties. From the perspective of authoritarian rulers, protest is intrinsically disruptive. It can expose the fragility and declining legitimacy of the regime. Authoritarian leaders repress public contention because they fear that such a movement could set off "informational cascades" and open the door to increased mobilization by political opponents (Lohmann, 1994). From the perspective of citizens living under dictatorship, protest is rarely used as a tool to obtain incremental political changes. It is a winners-take-all game. Mobilization is only worth the risk if major reforms are in sight, reforms that are usually incompatible with the continuation of the authoritarian regime. Following Kitschelt (1986), authoritarian regimes combine closed input and output structures: they systematically limit the expression of political disaffection and offer no credible prospect of responding to public demands.

Democracies, in contrast, have many built-in mechanisms—for one, elections—that allow citizens to express their discontent. These mechanisms act as pressure relief valves that lower the stakes of protest. In this context, protest is both less risky and less disruptive: citizens can use it to achieve smaller goals. Civil society organizations and political parties are free to organize and combine multiple forms of participation, both electoral and nonelectoral, in long-term campaigns. Protest and conventional political participation form a

"continuum" of political activism (Goldstone, 2004, 344). Democratic governments are generally not confronted with activists fighting against the whole political system. Authorities are therefore more susceptible to address the demands of protesters. In short, with their open and responsive structures, democracies favor regular, peaceful, and institutionalized protest (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998).

From a simple cost-benefit perspective, it appears more rational for citizens to protest in democracies than in autocracies, although grievances are certainly higher in autocracies. Indeed, several large cross-national studies support this intuition. Many scholars have shown that protest activities are more prevalent in consolidated democracies than in other regimes (Dalton et al., 2010; Norris, 2002; Welzel & Deutsch, 2012). This pattern has also been observed in smaller samples of countries with less heterogeneous levels of political openness (Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014; Marien et al., 2010; Roller & Weßels, 1996). Within the group of established democracies, more sophisticated measures of political openness are necessary to account for the remaining unexplained variance in cross-national levels of protest. Here, scholars have typically considered the number of access points in decision-making processes (the inclusiveness or decentralization of institutions) and the capacity of states to respond to citizens' demands (see Braun & Hutter, 2014; Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., 1995; Vráblíková, 2014). Yet, one major problem with the literature on opportunity structures in Western democracies is that findings can not be integrated easily since authors have applied different indicators of political openness to different samples of countries at different points in time (Kolb, 2007).

At least in terms of input structures, democratization should have had a liberating effect on protest in postcommunist Europe. There is no doubt that postcommunist democracies are much more open to public contestation than the communist regimes that came before them. Democracies in Central and Eastern Europe guarantee freedoms of expression and assembly (although sometimes with restrictions). They ensure some rule of law and their politicians, who are now elected in competitive elections, have more incentives to acknowledge the demands of the public. Yet, research shows that nonelectoral participation declined after the transitions (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002) and later studies do not indicate any notable increase over time (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007; Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014; Kostelka, 2014; Vráblíková, 2014). Higher access to decision-making in postcommunist states has not lead to an expansion of protest. There has been more debate about the effect of output structures in postcommunist Europe. Some authors have characterized postcommunist democracies

as "weak" because they would be "incapable of implementing decisions and maintaining control over society" (Szabó, 1996, 1159). Hooghe and Quintelier (2014) have argued that bad governance and corruption, two signs of weak states, depress political participation in the region. Other authors have suggested that unstable party systems in Central and Eastern Europe are symptomatic of inefficient decision-making and might trigger feelings of apathy within the population (Rose, 1995).

Nonetheless, weak output structures are insufficient to explain the low levels of protest in postcommunist democracies. True, these countries were particularly weak in the 1990s as they struggled to simultaneously adjust to capitalism and democracy. But, since then, many of them have joined the European Union and their economic system has been stabilized. Although observers have questioned the quality of democracy in some countries, the democratic achievements in the region have been remarkable overall. That protest levels did not match these expanding opportunities is intriguing. Both resource and opportunity structure theories led scholars to expect an increase in protest over the last years in response to more favorable conditions for mobilization. Instead, protest participation in Central and Eastern Europe seems characterized by a kind of inertia. Could deeper causes—legacies of the past—determine the protest trajectories of postcommunist democracies?

2.2 Political Socialization

In the previous sections, I have shown that the theoretical expectations of the grievance, resource, and political opportunity structure approaches regarding the development of protest in Central and Eastern Europe did not fully match with the available empirical evidence. Based on grievance theory, scholars anticipated high levels of protest in the nineties as relative deprivation grew in the region. Yet, during this decade, "patience" rather than protest dominated the political landscape (Greskovits, 1998). While the resources and opportunity structure approaches partially explained between-country differences in protest, they made inappropriate predictions about within-country dynamics. These theories led scholars to expect an increase in protest participation in response to expanding resources and the opening of the regimes. However, there is no indication that protest has actually increased in postcommunist democracies over the last two decades.

In this section, I suggest that the limitations of these classic approaches might reflect the way they model contextual effects through time. These theories usually assume that the individual decision to take part in a protest activity is conditioned by the current socio-

economic and political context. In other words, protest participation is modeled as a synchronous response to macro-level factors. In resource and political opportunity structure theories, protest is described as a rational strategy to influence decision-making in a given socioeconomic and political context. In grievance theory, it is presented as the expression of frustration in the face of current structural strain. The idea that the involvement of citizens in a given country mirrors the context they immediately face makes sense when political institutions and the economic system are stable. But what if citizens live through disruptive changes, as was the case in Central and Eastern Europe? Should we expect citizens to approach the new context as a "tabula rasa," ignoring their previous experiences? The three classic approaches do not completely ignore the effect of legacies of the past, but they restrict their potential scope. If protest is a synchronous response to current conditions, legacies can only be modeled as continuities in context, which, in turn, lead to continuities in behavior. Postcommunist citizens might adopt similar attitudes and behave in certain characteristic ways because of their exposure to similar "stimuli" (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2013, 51). These stimuli reflect similar economic and political trajectories, the origins of which go back to the homogenizing enterprise of communist regimes.

Political socialization theory offers another perspective on the effect of contextual change. This approach does not assume that individual political behavior is a synchronous response to context. The theory examines how people become politicized citizens through their interaction with "socializing agents" (Neundorf & Smets, 2017). These are, primarily, parents and peers but also, secondarily, the media and the political context in general (Sapiro, 2004; Sears & Funk, 1999; Sears & Valentino, 1997). Just as citizens adopt certain values and attitudes or internalize their duty to vote through contact with these agents (see Plutzer, 2002), developing a disposition to protest might only be possible within a favorable socialization context. This approach suggests that protest is not only one of many instruments available to citizens to influence decision-making; it is a deep-seated orientation acquired through a process of political learning. Importantly, the theory highlights that citizens' ability to learn is not constant throughout life. Instead, people's sensitivity to context (and how they eventually react to it) varies with age. The dominant stream in the literature suggests that, while citizens continue to adjust to context as they become older, their political behavior remains primarily shaped by early political socialization. Most scholars argue that the process of early political socialization occurs from mid-adolescence to early adulthood, a period famously labeled by Mannheim (1952) as the "impressionable years."

The enduring effect of early experiences suggests that there might be a lag between the context and the way people react to it. In societies that have undergone disruptive political changes, older citizens who came of age in the former context might become "out of phase." Their way of engaging in politics might reflect the former rather than the present context. Early political socialization can therefore be considered a form of micro legacy. In this model, the past context is internalized through socialization and is reproduced in the present by older citizens, creating a mismatch between the current context and the protest response.

Coming back to protest participation in Central and Eastern Europe, how can the past context inform us about current political behavior in postcommunist Europe? Two legacies appear to dominate the political landscape in the region: the legacy of repression and the legacy of transitional mobilization.

2.2.1 The Legacy of Repression[2]

Scholars looking at the effect of political socialization on political attitudes and behavior in Central and Eastern Europe initially focused on experiences with the former communist regime. This approach builds on a long tradition of research in political science describing democratic consolidation as a process of habituation. According to this perspective, citizens of new democracies inherit norms and practices from the former autocratic regime that are incompatible with the workings of the new democratic system. Scholars argue that this mismatch between political attitudes and behavior tainted by the experience of autocracy and the democratic institutions is a fundamental challenge for the stability of new democracies (Almond & Verba, 1963). Adjustment to the new system is said to be more problematic for older cohorts who reached political maturity under the previous regime. This perspective is well-established in the literature on postcommunism. For some authors, the experience of "living through communism" (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2017) explains why, today, certain generations of citizens in Central and Eastern Europe are less supportive of democracy and the market and are less involved in civic organizations, independent of other sociodemographic

[2]Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 originally appeared in an article published in *Comparative Sociology* entitled "Generations and Protest in Eastern Germany: Between Revolution and Apathy" and have been adapted for this thesis (Joly, 2018, 707-709). The sections presented here differ from their equivalent in the article. The "legacy of dictatorship" in the article is now refered to as the "legacy of repression." The text has been adapted accordingly. The thesis also provides more information about the potential effects of changes in the intensity of repression and its degree of violence. Finally, the section on the "legacy of transitional mobilization" has been extended and surveys a broader literature than in the article.

and contextual factors (Mishler & Rose, 2007; Neundorf, 2010; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2013, 2014).

There are reasons to believe that protest participation in postcommunist democracies follows a similar logic of "intergenerational discontinuity" (Mishler & Rose, 2007, 823). As pointed out by Linz (1975), restrictions on autonomous pluralism are a central feature of autocracies. While traditional authoritarian regimes favor the "passive obedience and apathy" of their "subjects," totalitarian regimes, in contrast, monopolize and exacerbate participation through channels controlled by the political apparatus (Linz, 1975, 191-192). Depending on the country and the period, communist regimes tended to follow either the authoritarian or the totalitarian model. In one case or the other, citizens had little room to independently organize and articulate public demands. Individuals were socialized in a political environment in which extra-institutional political participation imposed prohibitive costs on those who practiced it. This legacy of repression left no fertile ground for the routinization of protest during democratic consolidation.

The socializing effect of autocratic repression on protest has remained, however, underresearched. Bernhard and Karakoç (2007) have shown that countries that went through a recent, long period of autocracy before transitioning to democracy have comparatively low levels of protest. The authors, however, do not disaggregate their results by birth cohorts and, therefore, do not attempt to test the macro-micro mechanism behind this relation. Hooghe and Quintelier (2014) have shown that citizens of postcommunist countries in Europe are less active in nonelectoral forms of political participation. Yet, their results, as to how this effect varies across generations, were mostly nonsignificant. In brief, it seems that communist regimes like other autocratic regimes have left a legacy of apathy and disengagement, yet how this legacy plays out for different generations remains unclear.

Furthermore, the extent literature has remained rather mute about the effect of exposure to different levels and types of repression on protest participation in postcommunist democracies. Not all communist regimes operated the same way. Some primarily used hard repression while others endured by combining co-optation and legitimation strategies (Gerschewski, 2013; Kitschelt et al., 1999). Communist rulers also adapted their tactics over time as a function of internal and external pressures. Citizens of postcommunist democracies were affected differently by the former regime. Citizens who were exposed to high levels of repression during their early formative years might be less receptive to expanding opportunities for protest during democratic consolidation. In Chapter 4, I explain in more detail why

exposure to *violent* repression, in particular, might depress citizens' participation. Compared to other forms of repression, personal integrity violations such as political killings and torture are more salient in the public discourse and create memories that are more emotionally charged. According to the literature on the availability and affect heuristics in psychology (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), this might lead citizens to overestimate the risk of these events and discourage people from getting involved into protests.

2.2.2 The Legacy of Transitional Mobilization

Because they grew up in an environment that restricted autonomous pluralism, postcommunist citizens should be less inclined to join protest activities in the subsequent democratic regime. Yet, focusing only on the impact of repression does not capture the full complexity of the political experience of citizens of postcommunist democracies. The democratic transition itself probably constitutes one additional "socialization moment" that should be considered.

While successful transitions are often completed in a matter of months, they remain emotionally charged political junctures that shape the way politics is done during democratic consolidation. When transitions are not only the product of "pacts" among elites, but also build on the participation of large social movements, they can have more disruptive effects (Fishman, 2017). As suggested by della Porta, "protests, particularly the intense moments of mobilization for democracy, are therefore understood as eventful, given their capacity to transform structures through relational, emotional, and cognitive mechanisms" (della Porta, 2016, 3). Through mass mobilization, the social structure that was artificially flattened out under authoritarianism resurfaces (Weßels, 2003). Protest during this critical moment allows citizens to acquire new civic skills and enables groups to organize themselves around common interests. A successful transitional mobilization could therefore counterbalance the demobilizing effect of the legacy of repression under communism.

This assumption is consistent with the work of social movement scholars who have looked at the long-term cultural impact of cycles of contention. Tarrow (1995, 94), for example, has suggested that "new forms of collective action develop within the experimental context of cycles of protest. The most successful – and the most transferable – become part of the future repertoire of collective action even during quieter times" (see Zolberg, 1972). A series of follow-up studies on young protesters involved in the civil rights, anti-war, and

women's movements have shown that these activists continued to participate throughout their lives. Intense episodes of mobilization during the 1960s and 1970s set this generation of participants on a unique course of political engagement (Jennings, 1987; McAdam, 1999). At the level of national populations, the effect of political socialization on political activism was also observed in various studies that tracked generational differences in political participation using nationally representative survey data. In the United States, Caren and his collaborators (2011) have found that Baby Boomers were more likely to have taken part in demonstrations than other cohorts, after controlling for age and period effects. Similarly, in Western Europe, Grasso (2014) has shown that citizens who reached political maturity during the 1960s and 1970s were the most involved in extra-representational forms of political participation. This literature suggests that the political context experienced by citizens at a young age might have an enduring effect on political engagement. Returning to Central and Eastern Europe, we might expect the "eventful" transitions in the region to have constituted defining socialization moments (della Porta, 2016, 346). Participation or simply exposure to massive, peaceful, and successful protest for democracy might have led citizens to embrace extra-representational forms of political participation as an effective way of bringing about political change. Eventful transitions might have, in certain countries, counterbalanced the legacy of repression under communism, especially for those citizens who were still in their formative years at the turn of the nineties.

2.3 An Integrated Model

Experiences of repression and mobilization are two important elements to consider when analyzing the impact of political socialization on protest participation in Central and Eastern Europe. At this point, however, it remains unclear what mechanisms are at work in this process and, especially, how the effect of political socialization is conditioned by the current socioeconomic and political context. In this last section of the theoretical framework, I describe how the political socialization approach can be reconciled with grievance, resource, and opportunity structure theories to explain the development of protest participation in new democracies. The integrated model presented here decomposes the cognitive process leading individuals to take part in a protest as a sequence of three steps: 1) Holding a political grievance, 2) being disposed to protest, and 3) protesting (see Figure 3). This logical sequence offers some preliminary ideas about the causal pathway through which political socialization could affect protest participation in Central and Eastern Europe.



Figure 2.1: Integrated model

All protest activities are triggered by some form of political grievance (*step 1*), that is, a dissatisfaction born out of a gap between aspirations and the observed reality (Davies, 1962). These aspirations might relate to social, economic, or political issues. They can either center on the protester herself and her group (egocentric and sociotropic protest)[3] or target other constituencies (altruistic protest). I assume that all economic and social orders produce winners and losers. Therefore, all societies theoretically have an infinite reservoir of political grievances that could be turned into protest under the right conditions (Turner & Killian, 1972, 251). After identifying a political grievance, citizens need to go through a cognitive process in which they evaluate appropriate responses to the problem. Eventually, they might come up with an action set that includes protest as one of the possible responses. Once citizens are disposed to protest (*step 2*), they need to evaluate the efficacy of their potential action. If the costs of participating are reasonable and citizens perceive that they might have an influence on the sources of their political grievance, they can take part in a protest (*step 3*).

[3]The concepts of egocentric and sociotropic protests are inspired from Giebler, Hirsch, Schürmann, and Veit (2020).

2.3.1 Evaluation of Appropriate Response

To understand the role of political socialization in this sequence, it is necessary to look at the transitions between the three steps. The transition from step 1 to step 2 involves an *evaluation of appropriate response* and the transition from step 2 to step 3 involves an *evaluation of efficacy*. These evaluation processes follow two different kinds of logic. An evaluation of appropriate response depends on citizens' perception of their role and identity in the political community. Citizens ask themselves: "What is the right and legitimate response to my political grievance" or "what reaction is expected given my position in the social structure?" Following March and Olsen (2011, 479), one can argue that protest is first driven by a logic of appropriateness, in which citizens follow "internalized prescriptions of what is socially defined as normal, true, right, or good, without, or in spite of calculation of consequences and expected utility."

One of the main ways in which citizens internalize these rules of political engagement is through political socialization. The political context in which citizens grow up in might shape their beliefs about the appropriate way to express their political discontent. While democracies always accept and often encourage political contestation (within the boundaries of the constitutional order), autocracies only value loyal citizens. In the autocrats' discourse, protesters are "troublemakers," "criminals," or "enemies"—social roles that few people would like to be associated with. In new democracies, generations who grew up under autocracy had little opportunity to experiment with contentious politics. Engaging in protest activities at a later age, once the context has become more favorable, might not be perceived as "natural" as in older democracies (March & Olsen, 2011, 478). This does not mean that regimes are able to perfectly imprint their citizens. Some people might develop feelings of resistance under autocracy and define alternative political identities for themselves. Nonetheless, in most cases, they won't have the chance to express this resistance actively (to live out their imagined social role), making it harder to integrate protest in a routine of political engagement once democracy is established. The situation might be somewhat different in new democracies that experienced an "eventful" transition (della Porta, 2016, 346). As previously discussed, bottom-up transitions to democracy might have the potential to counterbalance the demobilizing effects of autocratic repression. Because these episodes of mobilization are so broad, intense, and emotionally charged, they might lead citizens to perceive protest as a legitimate form of political engagement.

2.3.2 Evaluation of Efficacy

The evaluation of efficacy, in contrast, follows a rational logic. In this process, citizens analyze their prospect of achieving desirable change through protest based on their micro-resources (time, skills, money), their macro resources (the protest infrastructure sustained through socioeconomic development), and the political opportunity structure (the openness of political institutions and their capacity to respond to public demands). They ask themselves: "Do I have the *capacities* to participate?" or "are the *costs* of taking part in a protest justifiable given the potential *gains*?" We can understand this evaluation process as a filtering mechanism: Individuals will activate their latent disposition to protest only if they are in an adequate position in the socioeconomic and political system.

While this mechanism assumes a cost-benefit calculus, citizens' rationality is bounded (Simon, 1985). The information they can access is limited. Therefore, far from being perfectly rational agents, citizens will decide to join a protest based on informed guesses, that is, a broad assessment of the right conditions for participation. When the context is stable, as in old democracies, these guesses might be rather accurate given that citizens have long had the opportunity to witness or participate in protests. In new democracies, however, the evaluation of efficacy might be biased by citizens' experience of repression, internalized through political socialization. We could expect generations who grew up under autocracy to exaggerate the risks associated with protesting while underestimating the potential gains. Again, the situation might be different in new democracies that went through a bottom-up transition. In these countries, citizens might be more optimistic about the impact of protest participation.

All in all, this integrated model provides a holistic picture of factors favoring or hindering protest participation in postcommunist democracies. Contrary to classic approaches to protest, it does not assume that protest is a synchronous response to the current structural conditions but instead proposes that reactions to the current socioeconomic and political context are conditioned by past experiences. Here, political grievances give citizens the first impulse to protest. Yet, before citizens are disposed to translate these grievances into protest, they first need to consider protest a normal and legitimate form of political engagement. This judgment is highly influenced by political socialization. Resources and opportunity structures are essential to understand the constraints imposed on protest. Yet, again, these constraints are perceived differently depending on the context in which citizens reached political maturity. All other things being equal, we would expect generations who

grew up during the Cold War in Central and Eastern Europe to participate less in protest activities than corresponding generations in the older West European democracies. The legacy of repression makes it less natural for citizens to include protest in their action set and biases the cost-benefit calculus citizens perform before joining a protest. A successful, bottom-up transition to democracy might, however, partially compensate for the demobilizing legacy of communism.

Chapter 3

Research Design: The Challenges of Studying Protest across Countries, Time, and Cohorts

Testing the effect of political socialization on protest in postcommunist democracies requires a series of methodological choices. Specifically, this research faces three challenges:

1. *A conceptual and measurement challenge.* The literature has debated which political actions can be considered protest activities. Scholars disagree on where to set the conceptual boundaries of protest between more or less disruptive forms of political participation. These conceptual debates are linked to issues of measurement.

2. *A data availability challenge.* To test the theoretical model detailed previously, the data has to have a series of characteristics. This strictly limits the potential sources of protest data.

3. *A modeling challenge.* Testing the effect of political socialization on protest is problematic because observations are not independent but aggregated at different levels of analysis. Furthermore, cohort effects are multicollinear with age and period effects.

In this chapter, I review various classifications in the literature and explain why I finally settle on a definition of protest as legal extra-representational participation. I then move on to justify the use of the European Social Survey as my main source of data and give an overview of the available sample. Finally, I discuss how multilevel and age-period-cohort

models allow me to estimate the effect of political socialization on protest in new democracies.

3.1 Concept and Measurement

3.1.1 Situating Protest in Political Participation

The concept of protest remains highly contested in the literature.[1] Since the early days of political participation research, scholars have debated whether protest is a form of political participation in its own right and, if it is, what types of political actions can be subsumed under this term (Vassallo, 2018). In the US-centered post-war literature, protest was usually not considered a legitimate form of political participation. At that time, it was often perceived as an irrational, almost desperate instrument used by disenfranchised groups to express their grievances (Rucht, 2007). Most scholars considered that only individuals at the margins of the political system would participate in contentious politics. Verba and Nie's (1972) influential study on political participation, for example, focused almost entirely on political actions related to the electoral arena. With the rise of the civic rights, women's, and antiwar movements, it became clear that contentious forms of political activism were not confined to the margins of society, but had reached the center stage in Western democracies. Soon, scholars started systematically measuring alternative forms of participation. Barnes and Kaase's (1979) study was the first to test a battery of survey items on what they called "unconventional" participation in a cross-national context. Their findings and those of studies that followed indicated that unconventional forms of participation were becoming widespread in Western societies, to the point of losing their disruptive character (Dalton, 2008; Fuchs, 1991; Rucht, 2007; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2001). To cite Kaase (2007, 793), the broad conclusion of these studies was that "these participatory acts, at least the non-violent ones, indicated an extension of the citizen's political action repertory within the realm of democratic engagement, but did not signal a turn away from liberal pluralist democracies."

Once protest had spread in Western democracies and was considered a legitimate form of political participation in the literature, new debates emerged about how to categorize various activities within different types of political participation. Protest was described as unconventional participation. However, this category remained vague and sometimes over-

[1] My perspective on the evolution of the concept of protest is anchored in the field of political participation, especially in studies based on survey data. Social movement research has arguably an older and more complex historiography of contentious politics.

lapped, at one end of the spectrum, with concepts of civic engagement and social capital and, at the other end, with political violence (Ekman & Amnå, 2012; van Deth, 2014). To address this problem of "conceptual stretching" (Sartori, 1970), scholars developed new overarching definitions of political participation and devised new typologies to classify political actions. More recent definitions of political participation are usually based on four conditions: 1) political participation consists of actions (not attitudes), 2) these actions are voluntary, 3) they are done by ordinary citizens (not professionals), and; 4) they are intended to influence some political outcomes (Brady, 1999; Teorell et al., 2007; van Deth, 2014).

Teorell et al. (2007) propose to sort political actions fitting under this overarching concept in five categories: voting, consumer participation, party activity, protest activity, and contacting. This typology is constructed on the basis of three criteria: the channel of expression (representational or extra-representational), the mechanism of influence (exit-based or voice-based), and the nature of the demands (targeted or non-targeted). Protest activity is classified as extra-representational, voice-based, and non-targeted activity.[2] This typology represents an improvement over the earlier and more restrictive concepts of political participation, but it still has some limitations. While its first criteria of classification is appropriate—protest does represent an extension of the repertoire of political participation beyond the electoral arena—the other two criteria are questionable. First, protest often combines both voice- or exit-based elements. Take, for example, the Fridays for Future movement. By refusing to go to class, students are employing an exit-based strategy, but at the same time they are voicing their discontent about climate change policies in gatherings and marches. Second, while public demonstrations can sometimes be non-targeted (the ritual 1st of May demonstrations are a good example), usually they present clearly-defined demands to specific politicians. It is common for protesters to gather in front of public buildings (e.g. ministries) and direct their claims to elected officials.

Ekman and Amnå (2012) present another typology where they distinguish between formal political participation and activism. The category of activism is again subdivided into four types depending on whether the activity is legal and whether it is individual or collective. This classification has the advantage of explicitly incorporating illegal forms of activism as a separate type of political participation. The distinction between individual and collec-

[2] The other four types are classified as follows: voting is representational and exit-based; consumer participation is extra-representational and exit-based; party activity is representational, voice-based, and non-targeted; and contacting is both representational and extra-representational, voice-based, and targeted (Teorell et al., 2007, 341).

tive forms of participation, however, is problematic. While the act of signing a petition, for example, is individual, it only makes sense in a collective context (no one would initiate a petition if they thought they would be the only signatory). A demonstration might be a collective event, but each individual is free to join or leave it at any time. These attempts at sorting forms of political participation show the difficulty of placing protest in a specific category. Protest is creative, dynamic, and multifaceted. It covers a broad range of more or less costly activities.

3.1.2 Protest as Legal Extra-Representational Participation

Faced with this conceptual ambiguity, how should we situate protest in political participation? This thesis adopts a simple approach. From Teorell et al.'s and Ekman and Amna's typologies, I retained two less contested and operationalizable criteria: the channel of expression and the legal status. Inspired by Brady's (1999, 737) classic definition of political participation, I refer to protest as *legal extra-representational activities by citizens to influence political outcomes*. This corresponds to activities such as attending lawful demonstrations, signing petitions, and boycotting products. I exclude illegal activities, which I categorize here as confrontational activism. For sure, illegal nonviolent political participation—in other words, civil disobedience—has been instrumental in promoting the rights of marginalized groups. In fact, this type of political participation has often contributed to redefine what is legal and what is not. Excluding this type of participation from the definition of protest might run counter to the mainstream literature on social movements. In the context of this thesis, however, I consider that these actions pose different challenges to democracy and their contribution to a vibrant public sphere is more debatable, especially in new and more fragile democracies. As for violent political participation, I consider that this form of militancy is not reconcilable with democracy. All in all, I agree with Rucht's (2007, 715) affirmation that "the great bulk of protest politics is restricted to moderate and legal forms of expressing dissent." A new map of political participation is presented in Figure 3.1.

Beyond these defining characteristics, demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts share a number of additional properties that explain how they can contribute to the ideal of a vibrant, pluralist democracy (Dahl, 1982). First, they are modular: these political actions can be adapted to different causes and embraced by different groups. They travel well across countries and through time. Second, they involve a "triangular communication process" (Rucht, 2007, 709): protest stimulates interactions between agents (the protesters), their targets, and



Figure 3.1: Map of political participation
Note: The map is inspired from Brady (1999), Ekman and Amnå (2012), and Teorell et al. (2007).

a more or less broad audience. Third, protest is not necessarily initiated by elites: bottom-up initiatives can be successful in empowering outsiders and stimulating debate around new issues. Together, these properties explain why protest can create more dynamic interactions between citizens and elected officials, foster participation in-between elections, and, sometimes, correct inequalities of representation.

3.1.3 A Note on Measurement Equivalence

The problem of measurement equivalence is intrinsically related to concept building (Adcock & Collier, 2001; Jackman, 2008; Quaranta, 2013). In the literature on protest activism, the mainstream approach has been to treat petitions, boycotts, and demonstrations as functional equivalents. Scholars often combine these three forms of participation either by summing them in indexes (e.g., Dalton et al., 2010; Welzel & Deutsch, 2012), by creating dichotomous measures in which doing one out of many potential activities qualifies as protest (e.g., Braun & Hutter, 2014), or by extracting a common factor (e.g., Vráblíková, 2014). These approaches, however, neglect the fact that protest actions differ in difficulty and that the hierarchies of difficulty are themselves culturally and historically relative (Topf, 1995, 67). In a detailed study, Quaranta (2013) demonstrates the limits of the cross-national measurement equivalence of protest actions. Using a sample of Western European countries and five protest items from the European Values Study, he shows that only in 10 out of 20 selected coun-

tries do the items exhibit the same configuration and scale properties. The measurement equivalence increases somewhat if one uses a three-item instead of a five-item index, but so does the measurement error. In the end, this solution still forces scholars to drop an unacceptable number of countries from the analysis. Furthermore, we would expect problems of measurement equivalence to be even greater once we integrate Central and East European countries in the sample.

For these reasons, this thesis considers that demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts have a "family resemblance" (Goertz, 2006, 7), but remains agnostic about their dimensional or latent properties (see Welzel & Inglehart, 2016). All the empirical analyses are performed separately on each protest action. This method has the advantage of letting the effect of predictors of protest vary across different political actions. As will become clear in the analysis, the "antecedents" (Welzel & Inglehart, 2016) of costly protest activities such as demonstrations are not the same as less demanding actions such as petitions and boycotts. Given these results, it appears that a combined measure of protest would face problems of "external validity" (Datler, Jagodzinski, & Schmidt, 2013).

3.2 Data

3.2.1 Protest Data Characteristics

Linking current political participation in postcommunist democracies to citizens' past experiences requires rich data. The challenge in this research is to separate the deep currents driving protest in new democracies from conjectural factors associated with temporary peaks and troughs in participation. To test the theoretical framework, the protest data has to have five characteristics. It needs to be:

1. *At the individual level.* The analysis requires information on the year of birth of citizens to reconstruct their early socialization context. Other individual covariates have to be included in the analysis to control for individual determinants of protest like resources. Protest event data obtained from newspaper articles or other comparable sources would not satisfy this first condition and therefore cannot be used in this study.

2. *Nationally representative.* This thesis does not focus on specific protest events, but instead examines the average participation levels of certain cohorts in Europe. This

research is more interested in normal, regular, and routine forms of protest participation than exceptional outbursts of mobilization. Not being nationally representative, qualitative interview data and data from on-site surveys have to be excluded.

3. *Cross-national.* In order to perform adequate comparisons between different European countries, consistent cross-national data is needed. Homogeneous data obtained from large international projects is to be preferred to heterogeneous data from various national studies.

4. *Repeated.* To test the effect of political socialization on protest, the analysis needs to track the same generations over a relatively long period of time. The protest data should have been acquired using a consistent methodology over several years.

5. *Time variant.* The protest data should capture changes in participation levels over time. Many large survey projects, like the European Values Survey and the World Values Survey, ask respondents if they "have done," "would do," or "would never do" certain protest activities. Following Barnes and Kaase (1979), this type of question is designed to measure protest experience and protest potential. Formulated this way, however, questions on protest are cumulative and do not reflect temporal variations in protest participation.

In light of these conditions, the European Social Survey (ESS, 2017) offers the most appropriate protest data for this research. Besides displaying the five characteristics mentioned above, it follows high methodological standards, boasts a comparability high response rate, and was conducted at regular intervals in a large number of European societies. The ESS asks respondents if they have taken part in a protest activity in the 12 months preceding the survey. This type of question makes it possible to situate political activism in its context and to examine trends in protest participation.

3.2.2 Macro Data

In addition to the ESS data, two of the three empirical chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) use data at the country and country-year levels. Economic data from the World Bank (2018) and data on the political context from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al., 2019b; Pemstein et al., 2019) control for macro resources and political opportunity structures. In addition, Chapter 4 includes historical data from V-Dem to trace back the

level and the type of repression experienced by respondents during their formative years. Chapter 5 uses data from the European Values Study (EVS, 2015), aggregated at the country level, to examine legacies of transitional mobilization. More details on the operationalization of macro variables are given in the empirical chapters.

Importantly, macro data is also used to determine the relevant cases for this thesis. Postcommunist countries, in general, have taken very different democratic trajectories, from closed authoritarian (sometimes even sultanic) regimes in Central Asia to full-fledged democracies in the European Union. This project focuses on postcommunist democracies. Here, countries are sorted between democracies and non-democracies according to data from Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013). This is one of the only databases specifically designed to include a dichotomous measure of democracy. Based on Boix et al.'s coding, data on 28 old and new European democracies, for which at least three rounds were available, was selected from the ESS raw sample.

3.2.3 An Overview of the Data

Table 3.1 describes the available ESS data. Because of missing units at the macro level and specific research design choices, only subsets of the full available data will be used in the empirical analysis (see Section 3.3.4, *Three Empirical Strategies*, and the empirical chapters for more details).

Table 3.1: Available ESS data

N countries	N country-waves	N respondents
28	186	$\sim$ 336,000

Source: based on data from ESS (2017).

Even though I did not use the full available sample in the empirical chapters, it gives a broad and recent picture of protest participation in Europe. Descriptive data such as these have been missing in the literature. The data shows that the East-West participation gap exists across different types of protest activities and persists over time, confirming the relevance of the empirical puzzle at the heart of this thesis. Figure 3.2 presents the percentage of respondents in the 28 countries of the sample who had taken part in a lawful public demonstration, signed a petition, or boycotted certain products in the 12 months preceding the surveys.[3] The data covers the eight rounds of the ESS from 2002 to 2017.

[3] See Appendix A for a list of country codes used in the graphs of this thesis.

Figure 3.2: Participation in three protest activities in 28 European democracies (2002–2017)
Note: Weighted results.
Source: based on data from ESS (2017).

The bar charts clearly show that citizens of postcommunist democracies participate, on average, less in protest activities than citizens of Western Europe. The percentage of citizens taking part in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts in old democracies is twice as high as the percentage in newer democracies: respectively, 9% compared to 4%, 27% compared to 12%, and 20% compared to 7%. Eastern Germany appears to be an outlier in all three protest metrics and will be examined in detail in the last empirical chapter of the thesis. Ukraine's high level of participation in demonstrations appears to reflect the mobilization during the 2004 Orange Revolution. Often, participation levels are consistent across the three forms of protest. Iceland, for example, systematically ranks among the most mobilized countries. Other countries, however, appear to have varying levels of participation in different protest activities. Finnish respondents, for example, are almost absent in lawful demonstrations, but are quite active in petitions and boycotts. This finding illustrates the difficulty of combining protest actions in a single measure.



Figure 3.3: Trends in protest participation in 28 European democracies (2002-2017)
Source: based on data from ESS (2017).

Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of the East-West participation gap over the period covered by the ESS.[4] Each gray line represents the protest trend in a single country. The dashed, light blue lines show the average trends for old democracies and the dashed-dotted, dark blue lines represent the average trends for new democracies. The protest deficit in postcommunist democracies is constant over time and might even slightly increase for demonstrations and boycotts. Despite more favorable conditions for protest, there is no indication that new democracies are catching up with Western Europe in terms of protest participation.

3.3 Modeling Strategy

3.3.1 Multilevel Structures and the APC Conundrum

The theoretical model introduced in the previous chapter involves a combination of factors operating at different levels. A person's decision to take part in a protest is determined by his or her individual circumstances (micro level), changes in the economic and political context (time-variant, macro level), stable contextual features (time-invariant, macro level), and a socialization context (cohort level). Testing a cross-national political socialization model of protest participation therefore requires an appropriate multilevel modeling strategy (Gelman & Hill, 2007; Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). Observations in repeated cross-national surveys are not fully independent from one another: individuals from the same country, interviewed in the same survey, and/or from the same cohort will likely behave in a similar way. From a statistical point of view, failure to account for the nesting of observations within these levels would lead to biased standard errors and an incorrect estimation of the available degrees of freedom in the analysis (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002, 219). Ignoring the clustering of observations and simply testing a macro-level effect as if it were randomly distributed within the population would result in ecological fallacy (Luke, 2004, 5).

Social scientists now have many powerful statistical tools at their disposal to analyze multilevel data. Yet, beyond problems arising from the clustering of observations, this thesis faces a more fundamental methodological challenge. In the theoretical model, two levels of analysis—cohorts and periods (i.e. surveys)—are perfectly collinear with age, as in:

$$cohort = period - age \tag{3.1}$$

[4] Appendix B presents the evolution for each country in the dataset.

This is known as the age-period-cohort (APC) identification problem (N. D. Glenn, 2005; Mason & Fienberg, 1985). This problem supposes that social change is driven by three co-occurring forces. *Age effects* reflect biological, psychological, and social processes related to the life cycle (N. D. Glenn, 1974). *Period effects* result from shocks experienced by whole societies at a certain time. *Cohort effects* are produced through socialization or other imprinting mechanisms that give people born around the same time stable characteristics (Mannheim, 1952; Ryder, 1965). There are no mechanical solutions to this conundrum because "APC are confounded in the population, not just the sample; the confounding is mathematical or logical" (Bell and Jones, 2014a, 338; see also N. D. Glenn, 1976).

Scholars have nonetheless attempted to estimate APC effects by constraining some of the three terms in the equation. Based on theory, cohorts are often treated as discrete (e.g., the Baby boomers or Generation X) instead of continuous. This breaks the perfect linear additive relationship in the APC equation. However, if these groups do not perfectly correspond to the true clustering mechanism in the population (an often unreasonable assumption), results will be biased (Bell & Jones, 2014a; Osmond & Gardner, 1989). Scholars can also leave one of the three terms out of the equation and replace it with some "proxy" (Heckman & Robb, 1985; Winship & Harding, 2008). Stages in the life course, for example, can be described by variables such as marital status, number of children, occupation, and health. However, if these proxies do not capture the full age effect, the problem of omitted variable bias will persist.

Yang and Land (2006, 2008) have suggested that age-period-cohort analysis can be performed with data from repeated, cross-sectional surveys if cohort and period effects are modeled as random in a cross-classified design. Their method is attractive because, instead of approaching cohort and period effects as fixed and additive, they conceptualize them as "social historical contexts within which individuals are embedded and ordered by age" (Yang & Land, 2013, 69). APC analyses based on cross-classified models assume that cohort and period random effects are normally distributed and that the residuals of these effects are not correlated with individual predictors. Since only age remains as a fixed term in the APC equation, the identification problem can theoretically be "solved." This method has received a lot of attention in the social sciences and epidemiology. In the field of political participation, Caren et al. (2011) and Quaranta (2016) have applied this technique to identify cohort and period effects on protest in the United States and in Italy. Bell and Jones (2014a, 2014b, 2015), however, have demonstrated through simulations that Yang and Land's method leads

to biased results if period or cohort effects exhibit a linear or nonlinear trend. Biases appear, for example, if the period or cohort trend correlates with age (but see Reither, Land, et al., 2015; Reither, Masters, et al., 2015).

3.3.2 The Effect of Exposure to a Specific Political Context

Despite the growing sophistication of APC models, measuring "pure" age, period, and cohort effects without strong theoretical assumptions remains problematic, if not impossible. This thesis takes a different route: it tries to unpack cohort effects by examining their logical antecedents. In the theoretical chapter, I have suggested that the distinct behavior particular cohorts exhibit is shaped by political socialization. This mechanism operates at the intersection of age and context. It assumes that members of a cohort behave in a certain way because they were exposed to a specific political context during their early formative years. In other words, early exposure to a specific political context is a factor anterior to the cohort effect; it is the catalyst that generates the cohort as a social entity.

The proposed method builds on the work of other authors who have studied the effect of exposure to specific political contexts on political attitudes (Neundorf et al., 2020; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2017). This approach is similar to the "proxy" approach to the identification of APC models, except that, here, the proxy (early exposure to a specific political context) precedes the cohort effect in the causal chain (Winship & Harding, 2008, 368-371). In the language of process tracing, one could argue that a significant effect of early exposure to a given social context on protest would work as a "hoop test" for the generational model presented previously (Collier, 2011, 826-827). A significant effect is a necessary condition to demonstrate the validity of the theory but not a sufficient one. It is insufficient because the effect of exposure to context on protest can pass through other causal pathways beyond political socialization. Confounding needs to be controlled for in the analysis to reinforce the plausibility of a causal inference (see Section 3.3.3, *A Note on Control Variables*).

Importantly, early exposure to a given political context is not randomly distributed within the population but is nested within cohorts. Following Yang and Land (2006, 2008) and more recent adaptions of their approach by Neundorf et al. (2020), it seems reasonable for researchers to also account for the clustering of observations in cohorts and periods when measuring the effect of early exposure to context, even if they are not directly interested in the pure APC effects. The approach suggested here is to test the effect of early exposure to certain political contexts on protest in a cross-classified design where observations are si-

multaneously nested in periods and cohorts. This method represents a compromise between the proxy approach and Yang and Land's cross-classified modeling technique.

3.3.3 A Note on Control Variables

As mentioned above, a significant effect of early exposure to context cannot in itself validate or invalidate the theoretical model introduced in the previous chapter. This is because political socialization is not the only mechanism through which early exposure to context influences protest. As shown in Figure 3.4, the effect of exposure can also pass through other unspecified mechanisms (Z) (Winship & Harding, 2008, 368-371). Therefore, to increase the plausibility of a causal effect of political socialization on protest, it is important to control for potential confounders. Exposure to the past context might affect the distribution of resources for protest between and within countries. Countries' political opportunity structures might also follow path dependent trajectories determined by legacies of this past context.



Figure 3.4: The effect of early exposure to a specific political context on protest: basic model
Note: Solid lines denote fixed effects; dashed lines denote random effects (nesting structure).

The thesis employs a parsimonious set of control variables to approximate Z. At the individual-level, the three empirical chapters control for factors closely related to resources: age, gender, education, unemployment, union membership, membership of a party or an organization, migration background, and social class.[5] At the contextual level, the analysis incorporates indicators of quality of democracy and economic development. When appro-

[5]I do not control for income since this variable has a very high percentage of missing values. Also, I do not consider values or attitudes to be valid confounders and will not control for them. These variables are endogenous to protest (Leighley, 1995). As demonstrated by Pierce and Converse (1990) in a panel study in France, variables like political interest appear to be outcomes rather than determinants of protest. Since the

priate, I control separately for the country mean and within-country difference of these contextual variables to take into account changes in macro resources and political opportunity structures.

3.3.4 Three Empirical Strategies

This thesis focuses on two types of exposure: early exposure to repression and early exposure to mobilization during the transition to democracy. The three empirical chapters develop innovative ways to measure these types of exposure and to model their effect on protest. Each chapter's analysis follows a distinct logic of comparison to test the effect of early exposure to specific political contexts. Here, I present an overview of these methodological choices (see Table 3.2 for a summary). A full description of the empirical strategies is given in the individual chapters.

The first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) examines whether early exposure to repression has an effect on protest in postcommunist democracies. Early exposure to repression is measured here as the average level of repression experienced in a country by members of a birth cohort during their early formative years, from mid-adolescence to early adulthood. Two indicators of repression at the country-year level—civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity violations—are taken from the V-Dem data and matched to specific birth cohorts. Individual participation in protest is modeled as cross-classified in country-waves and country-cohorts. Country dummies are included in the analysis so that the effect of early exposure only reflects within-country variation. This specification ensures that the effect of exposure to repression is not due to country-invariant factors. The analysis is performed on a sample of 10 postcommunist democracies.

The second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) examines whether exposure to mobilization during the transition from communism has had a spillover effect on current participation and, if so, whether this spillover effect moderates the current East-West participation gap. The analysis focuses on a single cohort, the 1989 generation, which corresponds to citizens who were in their early formative years during the transition from communism. Exposure to mobilization is measured by aggregating data from the second wave of the European Values Study (EVS) that was conducted around the time of the collapse of communism in Europe. Since the chapter focuses on a single cohort, a cross-classified structure is unnecessary. In-

protest variables in the ESS are retrospective, incorporating these variables would artificially reduce the effect of other variables.

stead, fruitful comparison is made possible by comparing the behavior of the same cohort in old and new democracies. I analyze protest participation in old and new democracies using three-level models where individuals are nested in country-waves, which are themselves clustered in countries. The sample includes 9 new and 15 old democracies.

The third empirical chapter (Chapter 6) digs deeper into one special case: Eastern Germany. This case needs to be analyzed separately for two reasons. On the one hand, the reunification with West Germany represents a unique historical development. Scholars should be careful when generalizing findings based on the East German case to the broader universe of postcommunist democracies. On the other hand, this unique historical setting offers the possibility of comparing East Germans with West Germans, who shared a common history before 1945 and have lived in the same state since 1990. This quasi-experimental design allows me to undertake a systematic comparison of the effect of different socialization contexts. This chapter exclusively uses data on Germany. The exposure variable simply corresponds to socialization in Eastern Germany. Citizens are considered to have been socialized in Eastern Germany if they spent the majority of their early formative years on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic. The analysis relies on cross-classified models with individuals nested in survey-rounds and five-year cohorts. The slope of the exposure variable is assumed to vary randomly across periods and cohorts. With this specification, I can test whether East and West Germans' participation converges across cohorts and over time.

Table 3.2: Empirical strategies developed in the three empirical chapters

	Mesure of exposure	Modeling strategy	Logic of comparison	N countries	N country-waves	N respondents
Chapter 4	Exposure to repression (source: indicators from V-Dem matched to country-cohorts)	Cross-classified models with individuals simultaneously nested country-waves and country-cohorts + country dummies	Within-country variation	10	63	$\sim$ 93,000
Chapter 5	Exposure to mobilization, 1989 Generation (source: aggregated data from the second wave of the EVS)	Three-level models with individuals nested in country-waves, nested in countries	Between-country variation	24	163	$\sim$ 44,000
Chapter 6	Socialization in Eastern Germany (source: ESS country-specific questionnaire)	Cross-classified models with individuals simultaneously nested in survey rounds and five-year cohorts + random slope of the exposure variable	East vs. West Germans	1	8	$\sim$ 18,000

Chapter 4

The Legacy of Repression: The Effects of Exposure to Civil Liberties Restrictions and Personal Integrity Violations on Protest

When the transitions from communism began in Central and Eastern Europe, the majority of citizens in the region had grown up in a political system that rejected extra-institutional forms of political participation. Communist regimes actively sought to encourage participation by their citizens. Yet, political involvement was usually channeled through top-down organizations and used to legitimate the system. Autonomous participation, in contrast, was discouraged and often repressed. The literature suggests that the repression of civil society during the communist era left its mark on the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Many studies have found that postcommunist citizens have low levels of political participation (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007; Bernhard & Karakoç, 2007; Kostelka, 2014; Vráblíková, 2014) and are rarely involved in civil society organizations (Howard, 2003; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2013).

Based on these findings, it would be tempting to treat Central and East European countries as a block. Yet, the experience of communism was not as homogenous as it might seem at first sight. State repression differed across countries and over time in the region. First, the context in which communist regimes took root varied: Some countries, like Czechoslovakia,

established a democratic system in the interwar period while others simply moved from one authoritarian regime to the other. The precommunist context, in turn, largely influenced the model of state socialism that ensued. Finally, differences in the modes of extrication from communism determined how much of the former regime was preserved after the Cold War (Kitschelt et al., 1999).

This suggests that citizens of different generations, in different countries Central and Eastern European countries, were exposed to varying levels of repression during their early formative years. From the perspective of political socialization theory, this variation in context might have led certain cohorts to adopt distinct attitudes and behavior. Few studies, however, have looked at the relationship between the structural conditions experienced by Central and East European citizens during their youth and their current political orientations.

The goal of this chapter is to examine the effect of early exposure to repression on protest participation in Central and Eastern Europe. Inspired by the literature on political socialization, comparative authoritarianism, and risk perception, I suggest that both the *level* and *type* of repression experienced by citizens during their formative years influence their participation in protest activities. I expect repression—especially violent repression—to depress participation in protest activities. To test this theoretical expectation, I propose a new way of measuring early exposure to repression. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy project, I develop two indicators—specific to each year of birth, in each country—that capture citizens' exposure to civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity violations. I use age-period-cohort models to estimate the effect of these indicators on protest participation in 10 postcommunist democracies. The data covers a period from 2002 and 2017 and includes respondents born between 1904 and 2002.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, in a brief historical review, I explore how repression varied over the last century in Central and Eastern Europe. Second, combining insights from studies on political socialization, comparative authoritarianism, and risk perception, I present hypotheses about the effect of early exposure to repression on participation in protest activities. Third, I describe my empirical strategy. Fourth, I present the results of the age-period-cohort models and, fifth, I conclude with a summary of findings and suggestions for future research.

4.1 Repression in Central and Eastern Europe: A Historical Overview

Central and East European countries went through diverse political trajectories before, during, and after the Cold War. During these three phases, citizens in the region came of age in radically different political contexts. Depending on the country and the period, they were exposed to varying levels of repression. In the interwar period, some countries established functioning democracies while others remained under authoritarian rule. During the Cold War, all communist regimes restricted the expression of political dissent, but notable differences existed between more or less rigid communist systems. Finally, after the collapse of communism, Central and East European countries progressed unevenly toward consolidated democracy.

4.1.1 Repression before the Cold War

The power vacuum left by the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman, and Russian empires at the end of the first World War allowed some Central and Eastern European nations to gain self-determination. In certain countries, national independence was accompanied by the establishment of the first democratic institutions. A first generation of Central and East European citizens freed itself from the repression that existed under imperial rule. Yet, the new democracies remained fragile. Amid ethnic conflicts, territorial disputes, and a deteriorating economic context, few managed to survive more than a decade. The only democracy that endured during the entire interwar period was Czechoslovakia. The other democracies in the region regressed into authoritarianism through coups or abuses of power by their leaders (Rothschild & Wingfield, 2008, 13-14). Germany's experience with democracy in the Weimar Republic was marked by political instability and ended abruptly with the Nazis' seizure of power in 1933. Poland's first democratic era was halted by Marshall Piłsudski's coup in 1926, which marked the beginning of an increasingly repressive period. The three Baltic republics experienced a similar fate in a series of coups: first, in 1926 in Lithuania, and, then in 1934 in Latvia and Estonia (Berglund & Aarebrot, 1997, 28).

The other countries of Central and Eastern Europe remained under authoritarian rule during the whole interwar period. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia (the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) sometimes exhibited democratic features such as elections, but these were mostly cosmetic. In reality, these countries kept systems of un-

fair political competition with little tolerance for political dissidence (Aldcroft, 2006, 16). In the USSR, Soviet leaders consolidated their power in the republics using detentions, deportations, and executions to annihilate the opposition.

In brief, the repression experienced by Central and Eastern European citizens varied during the interwar period. In some countries, citizens were able to exercise their civil and political liberties for a short period, while, in others, they continued to be subjected to high levels of repression from the imperial to the communist period. By the end of the 1930s, however, democracy had been suppressed in the region.

4.1.2 Repression during the Cold War

The communist regimes established after the Second World War in Central and Eastern Europe shared a number of characteristics. They were all dominated by a single party and tolerated little political contestation. They marginalized and often banned independent organizations. They used censorship, arrests, and imprisonment as instruments to maintain order. Furthermore, they remained under the surveillance of Moscow, which could—and did—intervene militarily to prevent its satellite states from deviating too much from the Soviet model of socialism.[1] Yet, despite their similarities, communist regimes were more heterogeneous than it appeared on the surface. The intensity and type of repression used under communism varied across countries and over time.

Cross-national differences in repression tended to align with Kitschelt et al.'s (1999) typology of communist regimes. Kitschelt and his collaborators have suggested that Central and East European countries' contrasting democratic experience and varying levels of industrialization in the interwar period led to the formation of three distinct types of communist rule: patrimonial, national-accommodative, and bureaucratic-authoritarian. These three types differed along two dimensions: the level of "formal bureaucratization of the state apparatus" and the "methods to induce popular compliance", that is, the extent to which they resorted to repression and co-optation (Kitschelt et al., 1999, 36). Patrimonial communism emerged in agricultural societies with no experience of democracy during the interwar period. It was organized in corrupt, informal structures and combined intense repression and co-optation (Kitschelt et al., 1999, 23-24). National-accommodative communism developed in countries with a "partially industrialized market economy" and "semi-

[1] Albania and Yugoslavia had arguably more leeway to develop their own model of socialism. The former withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in 1968 and the latter never joined it.

authoritarian rule" prior to the Cold War (Kitschelt et al., 1999, 36). It exercised a less rigid control over society, but used extensive co- optation to prevent citizens from mounting an effective opposition (Kitschelt et al., 1999, 24-25). Finally, bureaucratic-authoritarian communism took root in countries that had experienced a competitive party system and an industrialized economy before the communists' takeover. It relied on a formal chain of command to repress dissidents. It maintained an orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology and did not make concessions to the opposition (Kitschelt et al., 1999, 25-27). In short, patrimonial and bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes were most likely to use repression, but their modus operandi differed. The former relied on the leaders' informal network to silence opponents while the latter had access to a tightly structured security apparatus. Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism was most clearly implemented in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, national-accommodative communism in Hungary and Yugoslavia, and patrimonial communism in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and the USSR.[2] Poland was considered a hybrid case between the bureaucratic-authoritarian and national-accommodative types (Kitschelt et al., 1999, 39).

Repression under communism also fluctuated over time and within countries. According to most historical accounts, the period between the communist takeovers and Stalin's death in 1953 was particularly repressive. During this period, the remaining pre-war elites were purged from all the centers of power while communist authorities established their monopolistic rule and embarked on a program of rapid industrialization and collectivization. After the Stalinist period, some countries like Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Romania maintained this repressive course, with minor adjustments. Others experimented with reforms. Some regimes granted citizens modest civil and religious liberties and made space for a comparatively large private sector, like Poland, where the collectivization of agriculture was abandoned (Kitschelt et al., 1999, 24-25). The 1956 Hungarian Counter-Revolution and the 1968 Prague Spring pushed these attempts at developing alternatives ways to socialism to their limit, forcing Moscow to militarily intervene. A few years later, in Poland, the Solidarity movement obtained a series of concession from the government until the imposition of the martial law in 1981. In the USSR, the regime relaxed its control over society with the introduction of the policies of glasnost and perestroika in the 1980s (Berglund & Aarebrot, 1997, 70-107).

[2] In fact, Kitschelt et al. (1999) do not treat Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the USSR as unitary cases. They divide them in their separate republics and order these in different categories. I would argue that this classification exaggerates the heterogeneity of communist rule that existed at the subnational level.

These examples of deviance from the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy indicate that Central and Eastern Europe was not a unified and homogeneous bloc during the Cold War. Opportunities for citizens to express their dissent under communism varied significantly across countries and over time. A person who grew up in the midst of the red terror in the USSR surely experienced more repression than someone who reached political maturity during the expansion of Solidarity in Poland at the turn of the 1980s. This suggests that there was not one but many legacies of repression under communism.

4.1.3 Repression after the Cold War

Differences in levels of repression in Central and Eastern Europe increased further after the transitions from communism. In the three decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall, we have witnessed the emergence of a postcommunist divide between countries in the EU's sphere of influence and the former non-Baltic Soviet Republics. The former have made remarkable steps toward consolidated democracy, while the latter have fallen back into authoritarianism. Yet, even for the first group of countries, the road to stable democracy has been bumpy. Repression did not completely disappear after the fall of communism.

East Germany was the first country to secure its transition to democracy through reunification with West Germany. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia also made rapid steps to build solid democratic institutions in the early nineties. The Baltic countries soon followed once their self-determination was no longer in question on the international scene. Other countries, however, remained under strongman rule during the first years following the collapse of communism. After the Velvet Divorce, Slovakia was considered the "black sheep" of Central Europe (Traynor, 2004). The country's flirtation with authoritarianism only ended with Mečiar's failure to build a coalition after the 1998 parliamentary election. This electoral turnover set the stage for similar democratic breakthroughs in Croatia and Serbia in 2000 (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011). In Bulgaria and Romania, the transition to democracy was managed by reformed communists who maintained a degree of continuity with the previous regime (Rothschild & Wingfield, 2008, 225–232). The two countries could be described as "defective democracies" (Merkel, 2004), with widespread corruption and a tilted political playing field. In Ukraine, repression and violence have continued to affect citizens' daily life since the collapse of communism. The country has been torn between pro-EU and pro-Russian forces; its path to democratic consolidation remains uncertain. Observers from the West expected that the accession of eleven postcommunist countries to EU mem-

bership would protect them from new authoritarian temptations. These hopes, however, have been largely disappointed by the recent populist turn in Hungary and Poland. These countries—paradoxically, the front runners in the introduction of democratic reforms in the nineties—are now reusing some of the well-tested communist recipes to induce compliance: they are restricting the activities of civil society organizations, attacking independent media outlets, and disregarding the separation of powers.

This historical overview shows that repression in Central and Eastern Europe did not start nor end with communism. Furthermore, even during communism, restrictions on civil and political liberties varied across countries and over time. Therefore, to examine the effect of exposure to repression on protest in new European democracies, it is important to account for these multiple political trajectories. Rather than a mere proxy for communist rule, political repression in Central and Eastern Europe should be conceived as a spectrum of constraints on autonomous pluralism before, during, and after the Cold War.

4.2 Early Exposure to Repression and Protest

How is the complex history of repression in Central and Eastern Europe reflected in citizens' current protest behavior? This question has remained so far unexplored in the literature. Many studies on political attitudes, however, have found that living through autocracy has left a mark on Central and East European citizens. These studies have given us insights into the dynamics of political socialization and its impact on democratic citizenship in new democracies. In this section, I propose to extend this approach to the study of protest behavior. I draw on the comparative authoritarianism literature and on the psychological literature on risk perception to formulate hypotheses about the relationship between early exposure to repression and protest in new democracies.

4.2.1 Insights from Studies on Political Attitudes

Political socialization theory suggests that citizens' political orientations crystallize during early adulthood and remain stable afterwards. How one perceives the current political environment and acts upon it is strongly influenced by early formative experiences. Based on these assumptions, scholars have examined whether growing up during communism had an impact on citizens' political attitudes such as satisfaction with democracy (Neundorf, 2010) and trust in parties (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2011). They compared cohorts socialized during

communism to younger cohorts who grew up after the transition. They found that older cohorts were more nostalgic of the previous regime and had more difficulty adjusting to the democratic system. This strand of research, however, treated the communist generation as a block. It did not take into account the multiple models of communism experienced by Central and East European citizens during the Cold War.

Recent studies have gone a step further. They explored how the impact of communism varied across types of communist rule. Pop-Eleches and Tucker's (2017) project on communist legacies is exemplary in this regard. Not only did the authors examine whether the length and age of exposure to communism influenced citizens' political attitudes, they also estimated the effect of variation in the intensity of exposure. They suggested that the most intense exposure to communism occurred under Stalinism, followed by Neostalinism, Post-Totalitarianism, and Reformism. Their analysis indicated that variation in regime types had an effect on citizens' attitudes toward democracy, markets, social welfare, and gender equality—although, not always in the direction expected by the authors. While improving upon the previous literature, Pop-Eleches and Tucker's approach has nonetheless been criticized for bundling very different experiences of communism under the same regime type.[3] More importantly, the authors did not clearly define the concept of intensity of exposure beyond "the effort on the part of communist regimes to actively inculcate their citizens with the underlying values of Soviet communism" (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2017, 52). They did not explain to what extent this effort involved indoctrination, repression, cooptation, or a mix of these strategies. The specific thresholds separating the four types[4] of communism have remained unclear.

Instead of examining discrete types of communism, Neundorf et al. (2020) measured how autocracies in general vary in terms of political and economic inclusion. Using an impressive dataset that harmonizes over a thousand national surveys and macro data from the Varieties of Democracy project, the authors examined how variation in autocratic regimes' level of inclusion affected individual support for democracy. Their results indicated that citizens who grew up under inclusionary autocracies are less satisfied with democracy, after controlling for other current individual and contextual factors. This explains why citizens socialized under communism, a type of regime relying extensively on economic redistribution, are generally less satisfied with democracy (Neundorf, 2010). This approach is attractive because

[3] For example, the Soviet Union in the 1920s and Poland at the end of the 1980s are both considered reformist communist regimes.

[4] The authors add a fifth category, "Transition to communism," which they use as reference.

it systematically measures exposure to regimes' ruling strategies and analyzes the impact of this exposure on citizens' contemporary political attitudes. The authors use continuous measures that capture fine differences between regimes and matches them to specific birth cohorts.

The literature on political socialization and political attitudes in new democracies reveals that the type of regime experienced by citizens during their youth has a durable impact on their political orientations. It is not just the duration of autocratic regimes but also their specific ruling strategies that are relevant for understanding their long-term impact on political attitudes. This type of approach, however, has not yet been used to study the effects of legacies of repression on protest.

4.2.2 The Effects of Exposure to Civil Liberties Restrictions and Personal Integrity Violations on Protest

In contrast to the aforementioned literature, studies in comparative authoritarianism have extensively discussed the relationship between coercion and protest. Scholars in this field have highlighted that repression is one of the three pillars of autocratic stability together with legitimation and cooptation (Gerschewski, 2013). Broadly defined, repression consists of all coercive measures imposed by the ruling elites to limit the power of domestic challengers (Davenport, 2007, 487). The comparative authoritarianism literature has looked at repression both as a dependent and as an independent variable. In the first case, studies have analyzed when and how autocrats use repression (e.g., Davenport, 1997, 2007; Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014; Henderson, 1991; Sorens & Ruger, 2012). In the second case, research has examined the effect of repression on opposition (e.g., Francisco, 1995; Gupta, Singh, & Sprague, 1993; Moore, 1998) and autocratic stability (Escribà-Folch, 2013). One chilling finding of these studies is that repression works: Repression is positively correlated with the survival of autocratic regimes (Escribà-Folch, 2013).

But how does repression work beyond autocratic regimes? Does it leave a trace in the political behavior of citizens of new democracies? The answer to this question might vary depending on the type of repression used by autocrats. The literature usually differentiates between two types of repression (Davenport, 1997; Escribà-Folch, 2013; Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014).[5] The first type, *civil liberties restrictions*, refers to constraints on freedoms

[5] I use Davenport's (2007) terms "civil liberties restrictions" and "personal integrity violations." Escribà-Folch (2013) refers to the same forms of repression as "restrictions on civil rights" and "violation of physical rights."

of expression and association such as media control, censorship, barriers to parties, and interference in the activities of civil society organizations. These forms of coercion are systemic and become part of a routine of interaction between state authorities and civil society. Autocratic leaders resort to this type of repression when they believe that opposition is widespread, but are unable to target specific challengers (Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014, 336). The second type of repression, *personal integrity violations*, refers to organized political violence such as torture and political killings. These are targeted attacks on real or imagined opponents (Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014, 336).

Based on the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2, we would expect citizens who were exposed to repression during their youth to be less inclined to join protest activities. Both civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity violations bias citizens' evaluation of the appropriateness and efficacy of protest. Having grown up in a system where protesters were outlaws, certain cohorts in Central and Eastern Europe might be less likely to regard protest as a normal form of participation and might overestimate the risks associated with this type of political involvement.

I argue, however, that the two types of repression have a different effect on risk perception. Studies in psychology have long established that two factors bias people's risk assessment. First, the availability heuristic suggests that "people assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1127). People tend to have more vivid memories of events that affected them directly (or happened in their social network) or of events that were salient in the media (Pachur, Hertwig, & Steinmann, 2012). This leads them to overestimate the risk of these events. Second, the affect heuristic suggests that feelings or emotions related to an event influence our perception of the threat it poses to us (Slovic et al., 2005). Events associated with a feeling of dread,[6] in particular, are perceived as more risky and frequent than they really are (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987).

In the minds of citizens of new democracies, mental associations with personal integrity violations are both more available and more emotionally charged than associations with civil liberty restrictions. Acts of torture or political killings are recalled as the high watermark of repressive regimes. These events are deeply ingrained in the collective memory. They

Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) use the terms "repression of empowerment rights" and "repression of physical integrity rights."

[6] A "great fear" or "extreme uneasiness in the face of a disagreeable prospect" (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2020).

are regularly commemorated and serve as focal images of the past. Memories of political violence might influence a citizen's decision to join a protest or not—much more so than the closure of an independent newspaper, the surveillance of an NGO, or other forms of civil liberty restrictions. People who witnessed personal integrity violations during their early formative years might never perceive protest as normal and safe.

Using insights from the literature on political socialization, comparative authoritarianism, and risk perception, we can therefore derive two hypotheses with regards to exposure to repression and protest in new democracies:

Hypothesis 4.1 ($H_{4.1}$): Early exposure to civil liberties restrictions decreases participation in protest activities.

Hypothesis 4.2 ($H_{4.2}$): Early exposure to personal integrity violations decreases participation in protest activities more than early exposure to civil liberties restrictions.

4.3 Empirical Strategy

As highlighted in the historical background presented in Section 4.1, repression varied both between and within countries in Central and Eastern Europe during the twentieth century. To investigate how these changes in political context have left a mark on citizens' political behavior, this chapter matches individual-level protest data to measures of repression at the country level. It then tests the effect of exposure to civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity violations on protest in an age-period-cohort model.

4.3.1 Individual-Level Data and Dependent Variables

As detailed in the research design of this thesis (see Chapter 3), I examine citizens' participation in three protest activities: attending lawful demonstrations, signing petitions, and boycotting certain products. I use data from the ESS (2017) that asked respondents if they had taken part in these protest activities during the year preceding the survey. From the available ESS data (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2), I selected 63 country-waves from ten post-communist democracies: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Eastern Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. The analysis covers the period of eight survey rounds, from 2002 to 2017.

4.3.2 Early Exposure to Repression

To capture the respondents' socialization context, I propose a new measure of early exposure to repression. This measure is coded so that it represents the average level of repression experienced by a person during her formative years (15 to 25 years old) in a given country. It is operationalized as follows:[7]

$$\mu_{ct} = \frac{\sum_{k=c}^{t} \omega_{ck}\pi_k}{\sum_{k=c}^{t} \omega_{ck}}$$

$$\omega_{ck} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } 15 \leq (k-c) \leq 25 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{4.1}$$

where μ_{ct} is the early exposure to repression of a person of birth cohort c at year t ($t-c$ is the age of the person). π_k was the repression level in the country for a specific year in the interval $[c, t]$. ω_{ck} is a weight function that takes value 1 if the person was aged 15 to 25 during this year and value 0 otherwise.[8] This measure is specific to each year of birth, in each country of the sample. It improves upon existing measures of socialization contexts (e.g., Neundorf et al., 2020) by explicitly specifying the limits and weights of citizens' early formative years.[9]

I implemented two versions of this measure to capture the respondents' early exposure to civil liberty restrictions and early exposure to personal integrity violations. In both cases, π_k was approximated using data from the Varieties of Democracy's (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al., 2019b; Pemstein et al., 2019). *v2x_clpol* and *v2x_clphy*[10] are V-Dem's indicators for the

[7] The formula is an adaptation of Bartels and Jackman's (2014, 10-11) generational imprinting model.

[8] Because respondents are aged 16 or older, there is no risk of a zero by zero division.

[9] Neundorf et al. (2020) also use V-Dem data and match it to specific cohorts. The authors, however, do not explicitly mention when citizens' early formative years begin and end. In their study, "the macro variables are averaged across 5-year intervals from 1915 to 2015 and matched to the corresponding national generation that came of age during a particular 5-year period" (Neundorf et al., 2020, 13). The national generations are defined as "5-year groupings when respondents turned 15" (Neundorf et al., 2020, 14). This implies that the age of exposure varies depending on a respondent's year of birth within a given cohort. To illustrate this, imagine two respondents, one born in 1960 and the other in 1964. Both would receive the same score based on the average value of the macro variables over the period from 1975 to 1979. For the first respondent, this period would correspond to the context he or she experienced between the age of 15 and 19; but, for the second respondent, it would correspond to the context experienced between the age of 11 to 15.

[10] *v2x_clpol* is an aggregation of eleven components measuring government censorship effort (media), harassment of journalists, media self-censorship, freedom of discussion for men and women, freedom of academic

respect of political civil liberties and freedom from political violence. Once inverted, they come closest to the definition of civil liberty restrictions and personal integrity violations. The variables range from 0 (respondents experienced no repression at all during their formative years) to 1 (respondents grew up in an extremely repressive political system).

The exact delimitation of formative years remains debated, but most authors situate this period between mid-adolescence and early adulthood. A 15-25 years interval, as proposed by Grasso (2016, 40), is consistent with traditional theories of political socialization. Yet, other studies suggest that children may be highly sensitive to their political environment, even at a very young age (Neundorf & Smets, 2017, 4). As a robustness check, I also analyzed the data with an alternative specification of the variable where the impressionable years were set between 7 and 17 years old. This period corresponds to the peak of political sensitivity during adolescence according to Bartels and Jackman (2014, 16).

I take into consideration the repression level in a country from 1919 onward. The year 1919 constitutes an appropriate starting point, as the Treaty of Versailles, signed in this year, initiated the dissolution of several empires in continental Europe. By taking 1919 as a lower limit, I am able to compute the early exposure to repression for respondents born in 1904 and after (1919 - 15 years).[11] The two indicators of early exposure to repression require a continuous, annual measurement of structural repression. This poses a challenge for countries in the sample that became independent after 1919. The Varieties of Democracy dataset does not provide the relevant data at the subnational level. In order to address this problem, I follow the same approach as Gerring, Bond, Barndt, and Moreno (2005, 341). I attribute to subnational units, for the years preceding their independence, the repression level of the larger nation-state they were part of.[12]

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and cultural expression, party ban, barriers to parties, opposition parties autonomy, CSO entry and exit, and CSO repression. This variable ranges from 0 (complete absence of political civil liberties) to 1 (full political civil liberties), with a mean of 0.59 and a standard deviation of 0.38. *v2x_clphy* combines two subindicators on freedom from torture and freedom from political killings. It ranges from 0 (extreme level of political violence) to 1 (complete absence of political violence), with a mean of 0.39 and a standard deviation of 0.26. For more details on V-Dem's measurement model, see Coppedge et al. (2019a) and Pemstein et al. (2019).

[11] With the alternative specification of the variable used in the robustness check, I am able to compute the early exposure to repression for respondents born in 1912 and after (1919 - 7 years).

[12] I used this procedure for the following countries: Estonia (USSR: 1940—90), Eastern Germany (Germany: 1919—44, 1990—2014), Lithuania (USSR: 1940—90), Poland (Germany: 1939—44), Slovakia (Czechoslovakia: 1919—38, 1945-93), Slovenia (Yugoslavia/Serbia: 1919—88), and Ukraine (USSR: 1919—89). There are four years missing for East Germany during the occupation (1945—48). I use interpolation to fill this gap.

4.3.3 Control Variables

Some factors have a direct effect on the resources available to citizens to take part in protests and might, if they were not controlled for, confound the effect of political socialization. Therefore, at the individual-level, the analysis controls for gender, age (and age squared), education level (low, middle, or high), employment status (employed or unemployed), place of birth (native or not[13]), size of the town (from 1: "a farm or home in the countryside" to 5: "a big city"), work for a party or a group (yes or no), and current or previous membership of a labor union (yes or no). In addition, I use Oesch's (2006a; 2006b) classification of occupations to sort respondents into five social classes (unskilled workers, skilled workers, small business owners, lower-grade service class, higher-grade service class). The statistical model used in this chapter absorbs all the between-country variation (see Section 4.3.4 below). Therefore, the included macro variables only control for factors that vary over time within countries. GDP per capita (constant 2010 USD, logged) measures economic growth (or recession), which is hypothesized to increase (or decrease) the resources available for protest (World Bank, 2018).[14] The level of democracy is approximated using the Varieties of Democracies' Electoral Democracy Index (*v2x_polyarchy*) (Coppedge et al., 2019b; Pemstein et al., 2019). This index is itself an aggregation of five components measuring freedoms of expression and association, the share of population with suffrage, the quality of elections, and processes of appointment of the executive. It therefore takes into account both procedural and substantive aspects of democracy. This variable ranges from 0 (fully autocratic) to 1 (fully democratic). The two variables measuring GDP per capita and the level of democracy are centered within countries and lagged by one year. Finally, I also include the year of the survey to control for any linear time trend.

4.3.4 Statistical Approach

The statistical approach used in this chapter is inspired from Neundorf et al. (2020) who adapted Yang and Land's (2006; 2008) hierarchical age-period-cohort modeling technique to fit crossnational data. Based on this approach, observations are assumed to be simultaneously nested in country-cohorts and country-periods (i.e. country-waves or surveys). The

[13] For Eastern Germany, citizens born in Western Germany are also considered non-native.

[14] The World Bank data is at the national level. In order to obtain separate information for Eastern and Western Germany, I proceed as follows. First, using data from the German federal and regional statistical offices, I calculate a regional gap in GDP per capita, compared to the German average, from 2002 to 2017 (Arbeitskreis "Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder", 2018). Second, I multiply this gap with the values provided by the World Bank for Germany.

model also includes country dummies to capture all time-invariant factors at the country level. In other words, all effects are measured within countries. Contrary to Neundorf et al., however, I group the observations in one-year instead of five-year country-cohorts. This is necessary because the measures of early exposure to repression are specific to each year of birth, in each country. This specification captures more subtle variations in the respondents' socialization context. The model is formalized in Equation 4.2 below.

$$
\begin{aligned}
LogitPr(protest_{ijtk} = 1) &= \beta_{0jt} + \beta_1 age_{ijtk} + \beta_2 age^2_{ijtk} + \sum_{m=3}^{M} \beta_m x_{mijtk} \\
&\quad + \sum_{k=2}^{10} \omega_k country_k \\
\beta_{0jt} &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} exposureCLR_j + \gamma_{02} exposurePIV_j \\
&\quad + \sum_{p=3}^{P} \gamma_{0p} z_{pt} + \upsilon_{0j} + \nu_{0t} \\
\text{with } \upsilon_{0j} &\sim N(0, \sigma^2_{\upsilon 0j}) \text{ and } \nu_{0t} \sim N(0, \sigma^2_{\nu 0t}) \\
\text{for } i &= 1, 2, ..., N \text{ individuals} \\
\text{for } j &= 1, 2, ..., 865 \text{ country-cohorts} \\
\text{for } t &= 1, 2, ..., 63 \text{ country-waves} \\
\text{for } k &= 1, 2, ..., 10 \text{ countries}
\end{aligned}
\tag{4.2}
$$

Here, the logit of the probability of having taken part in a protest activity during the 12 months preceding the survey for an individual i, in a country-cohort j, in a country-wave t, and in a country k is a function of an intercept β_{0jtk}, the effects of age (β_1) and age squared (β_2), the effects of other individual covariates (β_m), and the country-fixed effects (ω_k). β_{0jtk} is itself obtained by combining an overall intercept (γ_{00}), the effect of exposure to civil liberties restrictions (γ_{01}), the effect of exposure to personal integrity violations (γ_{02}), the effects of time-variant country-level variables (γ_{0p}), the random effect of country-cohorts (υ_{0j}), and the random effect of country-waves (ν_{0t}).

4.4 Findings

Before moving to the multilevel analysis, I first examine whether the measures of exposure to repression properly capture political-context variations in Central and Eastern Europe. Figure 4.1 shows citizens' early exposure to civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity violations by year of birth and by country. For the ten countries in the sample, we see that citizens who grew up under communism experienced high levels of repression. Exposure to repression then declined rapidly after the transition.



Figure 4.1: Early exposure to civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity violations by year of birth and by country
Note: Results of the last survey available for each cohort. The lines cover the range of cohorts available in the ESS (2017).
Source: based on data from Coppedge et al. (2019b).

Beyond this general pattern, however, there are notable differences between and within countries, in line with the historical overview presented in Section 4.1. Citizens from the former Czechoslovakia, for example, were less subject to repression before the Second World

War and during the short democratic interlude that preceded the 1948 communist takeover. Ukrainian citizens, in contrast, were already living under Stalinist repression in the 1920s. During the Cold War, we also observe that citizens who grew up in national-accommodative regimes—Hungarians, Poles, and Slovenes—were less exposed to repression, especially personal integrity violations. In comparison, political violence was more intense in the East German bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. In the GDR, over a hundred people were deliberately killed trying to flee to the West and the Stasi used highly repressive methods, including torture, to demobilize political opponents (City of Berlin, 2017; Stiftung Gedenkstätte Berlin-Hohenschönhausen, 2020). In all ten countries, younger citizens who reached political maturity after the Cold War experienced lower levels of civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity violations than their parents. In Ukraine, nonetheless, repression has remained relatively high as the country has gone through intense political upheaval. Finally, there has been an increase in repression in Hungary and Poland since nationalist-populist parties have taken power in those countries.

4.4.1 Age-Period-Cohort Models

In the next step, I use multilevel models to examine cohort variation within countries. The proposed models capture all the effects of time-invariant country-level factors and control for relevant individual and country-variant factors. This specification allows me to focus on the generational imprint produced by exposure to repression. The results presented in Table 4.1 indicate that exposure to repression has a significant effect on demonstration attendance but not on petition signing nor on participation in boycotts. Furthermore, the two types of repression have opposite effects on participation in demonstrations. Contrary to $H_{4.1}$, exposure to civil liberties restrictions increases participation in demonstrations. Respondents who came of age at a time when authorities imposed systematic limitations on freedoms of expression and association are more likely to join demonstrations than others who grew up when these freedoms were protected. In contrast, exposure to personal integrity violations decreases participation in demonstrations. In accordance with $H_{4.2}$, experiencing high levels of political violence discourages people from protesting on the streets. It should be noted that the cross-classified structure only slightly improves the model fit in comparison to a single-level model. A small portion of the variance is explained at the country-wave and country-cohort levels.

Table 4.1: Age-period-cohort models

	Demonstration		Petition		Boycott	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Exposure to repression						
Civil liberties restrictions	1.16***	(0.19)	−0.05	(0.13)	0.10	(0.15)
Personal integrity violations	−0.93***	(0.26)	0.18	(0.18)	−0.33	(0.21)
Individual-level variables						
Woman	−0.30***	(0.04)	0.07**	(0.02)	−0.03	(0.03)
Age (10 years)	−0.61***	(0.10)	0.03	(0.06)	0.25**	(0.08)
Age^2	0.03***	(0.01)	−0.03***	(0.01)	−0.04***	(0.01)
Education, Low (ref.)						
Middle	0.26***	(0.07)	0.45***	(0.04)	0.49***	(0.06)
High	0.54***	(0.08)	0.81***	(0.05)	0.88***	(0.06)
Unemployed	0.18*	(0.07)	−0.03	(0.05)	−0.07	(0.06)
Worked for party or group	1.83***	(0.04)	1.51***	(0.03)	1.13***	(0.03)
Union member	0.35***	(0.04)	0.31***	(0.03)	0.29***	(0.03)
Native	−0.15*	(0.07)	0.13*	(0.05)	−0.02	(0.06)
Town size, Home in countryside (ref.)						
Country village	−0.06	(0.18)	−0.01	(0.10)	−0.07	(0.12)
Town or small city	0.29	(0.18)	0.28**	(0.10)	0.20+	(0.12)
Outskirts of big city	0.61**	(0.19)	0.40***	(0.10)	0.49***	(0.13)
A big city	0.83***	(0.18)	0.46***	(0.10)	0.49***	(0.12)
Social class, Unskilled workers (ref.)						
Skilled workers	0.02	(0.06)	0.10**	(0.03)	0.14**	(0.04)
Small business owners	0.13+	(0.08)	0.27***	(0.05)	0.64***	(0.06)
Low service class	0.22***	(0.06)	0.34***	(0.04)	0.41***	(0.05)
Higher service class	0.23***	(0.07)	0.44***	(0.04)	0.55***	(0.05)
Country-wave-level variables						
Year	−0.01	(0.03)	−0.00	(0.02)	0.04*	(0.02)
Electoral democracy index	−4.14**	(1.46)	−1.36	(1.05)	1.50	(1.12)
Logged GDP/cap.	1.02	(0.93)	0.84	(0.63)	−0.43	(0.63)
Country dummies	yes		yes		yes	
Intercept	−2.47***	(0.39)	−3.61***	(0.26)	−5.15***	(0.29)
Variance (country-wave)	0.14	(0.03)	0.07	(0.01)	0.06	(0.02)
Variance (country-cohort)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.00)	0.01	(0.01)
N (country-waves)	63		63		63	
N (country-cohorts)	875		875		875	
N (individuals)	92887		92787		92598	

(Significance: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$)

Note: Results with logit estimates and standard errors.
Source: based on individual-level data from ESS (2017) and macro data from Arbeitskreis "Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder" (2018), Coppedge et al. (2019b), and World Bank (2018).

Figure 4.2 shows the predicted probabilities of attending a lawful demonstration at different levels of exposure to repression. Moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of exposure to civil liberties restrictions (0.035 and 0.961 respectively) increases the probability of attending a demonstration from 0.02 to 0.06. Moving from the 10th to 90th percentile of exposure to personal integrity violations (0.032 and 0.708 respectively) decreases the probability of

attending a demonstration from 0.05 to 0.03. This 2 to 4 percentage point variation might seem negligible, but given that the average level of participation is low, it is important. The magnitude of change is comparable to the difference in probabilities between respondents with low and high levels of education.



Figure 4.2: Predicted probabilities of having attended a lawful demonstration in the last 12 months as a function of early exposure to civil liberties restrictions (CLR) and early exposure to personal integrity violations (PIV): predictions for the 10th and the 90th percentiles
Note: Based on the results of Model 1 in Table 4.1. The capped spikes represent 95% confidence intervals.
Source: based on individual-level data from ESS (2017) and macro data from Arbeitskreis "Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder" (2018), Coppedge et al. (2019b), and World Bank (2018).

Beyond exposure to repression, the main factors influencing participation in protest relate to individual resources. Educated respondents are more politically active. The same is true for members of unions, parties, and other groups. Individuals living in bigger cities are more likely to take part in protest activities as well. Respondents from higher social classes, especially in the service sector, tend to protest more often. One exception to the finding that

resourceful persons are more politically engaged is that unemployment slightly increases the likelihood of participating in demonstrations. Looking at other sociodemographic factors, the results show that women tend to participate less in demonstrations, but are more likely to sign petitions. There is no significant gender difference with regards to boycotts. The effect of age is curvilinear, with young respondents generally being more active. The effect of migration background is unclear as native respondents are less involved in demonstrations but more involved in petitions. The effect of migration background on boycotting products is not significant. Finally, country-wave-level factors have a weak and mostly insignificant effect on protest. One surprising result, however, is that individuals are more likely to take part in demonstrations when the quality of democracy declines. This contradicts findings of many large-N studies suggesting that the level of democracy is positively correlated with protest (e.g., Dalton et al., 2010).

4.4.2 Alternative Specifications

I test the robustness of these findings in two additional analyses. First, the multilevel models are re-estimated with alternative measures of exposure to repression. Here, I examine whether exposure at a younger age, between 7 and 17 years old, has a significant effect on protest. As shown in the coefficient plot presented in Figure 4.3, this specification decreases the size of the effect of exposure to repression on demonstration attendance, turning the coefficient of personal integrity violations insignificant (the effect of civil liberties restrictions remains however significant). This suggests that repression has a more lasting effect on protest when it is experienced later in life, between mid-adolescence and early adulthood.

Second, I re-estimate the models using relative instead of absolute measures of early exposure to repression. Individuals' perception of the risk and efficacy of protest might not only dependent on their past experiences, but also on differences between their past experiences and current conditions. To obtain relative measures, I subtract the level of repression experienced by respondents during their formative years from the level of repression during the year of the survey. As shown in Figure 4.4, relative measures of exposure to repression produce results comparable to the original ones.

4.4.3 Interpretation

We can highlight three key findings from the analysis. First, exposure to repression has a stronger effect on demonstration attendance than on petition signing and participation in



Figure 4.3: Coefficient plot: effects of exposure to civil liberties restrictions (CLR) and personal integrity violations (PIV) on protest (age of exposure: 7 to 17 years old)
Note: The figure reports coefficient sizes and 95% confidence intervals.
Source: based on individual-level data from ESS (2017) and macro data from Arbeitskreis "Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder" (2018), Coppedge et al. (2019b), and World Bank (2018).

boycotts. One possible explanation is that demonstrations are anchored in a longer history of interactions between the state and civil society in postcommunist democracies. For citizens of the region, past experiences of repression will come more easily to mind when deciding to join a demonstration than when deciding to participate in a petition or a boycott.

Second, contrary to expectations, exposure to civil liberties restrictions has a positive effect on participation in demonstrations. Citizens who were subjected to this type of repression in their youth now seem to embrace their civil and political freedoms. Based on these results, we can conclude that democratization has had, to some extent, a liberation effect. Results from alternative models with a relative measure of exposure to repression support this interpretation.

Third, exposure to personal integrity violations is associated with a lower participation in demonstrations. Freeing people from political violence does not produce the same liberation effect as with civil liberties restrictions. As suggested by theories of risk perception, the effect of personal integrity violations might qualitatively differ from the effect of other forms of repression. This is because political violence creates focal images that are easily available when deciding to take part in a protest (availability heuristic). It also generates feelings of



Figure 4.4: Coefficient plot: effects of relative exposure to civil liberties restrictions (CLR) and relative personal integrity violations (PIV) on protest (liberation effect)
Note: The figure reports coefficient sizes and 95% confidence intervals.
Source: based on individual-level data from ESS (2017) and macro data from Arbeitskreis "Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder" (2018), Coppedge et al. (2019b), and World Bank (2018).

dread that might lead people to overestimate the risks of protest activities (affect heuristic). From a micro perspective, only exposure to the most extreme form of repression, political violence, depresses participation in the long term.

4.5 Conclusions

This chapter has examined the relationship between exposure to repression and participation in protest activities in Central and Eastern Europe. Citizens of the region experienced different levels and forms of repression before, during, and after the Cold War. Building on insights from three bodies of literature—political socialization, comparative authoritarianism, and risk perception—I expected citizens who were exposed to high levels of repression during their early formative years to be less inclined to join protest activities later in life. Furthermore, I suggested that different types of repression might have different effects on protest participation. Personal integrity violations were expected to depress participation more than civil liberties restrictions. I tested these theoretical propositions using data from the European Social Survey on 10 postcommunist democracies. I developed new indicators

capturing the level of repression experienced by respondents during their formative years and, then, examined the effect of these indicators on three protest activities—attending lawful demonstration, signing petitions, and boycotting certain products—in age-period-cohort models.

I only have found partial support for the theoretical model. While exposure to repression has a significant effect on demonstration attendance, its influence on petition signing and participation in boycotts is negligible. Furthermore, the two types of exposure to repression have opposite effects on demonstration attendance. Surprisingly, exposure to civil liberties restrictions increases participation. Citizens who reached political maturity when the state was systematically restricting freedoms of expression and association are more likely to join demonstrations. This finding seems to reflect a liberation effect: after years of constraints, citizens now feel free to express their political grievances. Exposure to personal integrity violations, in contrast, decreases participation. Citizens who were exposed to political killings and torture are less likely to go on the streets to express their dissent. Drawing on psychological theories of risk perception, I have interpreted this effect as been caused by the easiness with which images of political violence come to mind (the availability heuristic) and the feelings of dread they transmit (the affect heuristic). Both heuristics might lead potential protesters to overestimate the risks associated with demonstrations.

The results presented in this chapter show the average effects of exposure to repression on protest. Yet, not all citizens experience repression the same way. Artists, students, intellectuals, and opposition supporters in general are often the first victims of authoritarian repression. Other citizens, in contrast, might even benefit from repression if they align with the regime. More research is necessary to understand how exposure to repression affected the political behavior of different subgroups within cohorts in Central and Eastern Europe.

This chapter has contributed to the growing literature on authoritarian legacies by showing that the impact of repression is multifaceted. A central finding is that different types of repression have different effects on political behavior. The chapter also introduced an empirical strategy and, importantly, measures of early exposure to repression that can be adapted to other research endeavors.

Chapter 5

The Legacy of Transitional Mobilization: Assessing the Protest Behavior of the 1989 Generation in Europe

The current low levels of protest participation in postcommunist democracies contrast with the mass mobilization observed during the collapse of communist regimes at the turn of the 1990s. In many countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the democratic breakthroughs were fueled by large social movements. To many observers at the time, the transitions from communism were a clear demonstration that "people power" matters in democratization (Bunce, 1999; J. K. Glenn III, 2001; Teorell, 2010). Many scholars now wonder what remains of the transitional mobilization in postcommunist Europe. Or, in the words of Donatella della Porta, "where did the revolution go?" (della Porta, 2016).

Surprisingly, little research has tried to connect the current state of political participation in Central and Eastern Europe with experiences of mobilization during the transition. As we have seen in Chapter 2, cross-national studies have usually explained differences in participation levels between old and new democracies in Europe by referring to grievances, resources, and opportunity structures—with mixed results. The last chapter added another layer of explanation by showing that exposure to violent repression depressed participation in demonstrations in Central and Eastern Europe. So far, however, the literature has

not closely looked at the effect of legacies of transition on political involvement after the establishment of democracy.

This chapter re-examines current differences in political participation between new and old democracies of Europe and explores how these differences are moderated by previous experiences of mobilization. The empirical strategy exploits the facts that 1) the mobilization that accompanied the transition from communism in Central and Eastern Europe occurred approximately at the same time in different countries, but 2) the share of the population involved in these protests varied a lot across countries. This means that citizens of the same generation experienced different types of transitions to democracy: some were exposed to high levels of mobilization in some countries, others to low levels.

I focus here on the protest behavior of the "1989 generation," that is, the group of citizens who were aged 17 to 25 in 1989. The 1989 generation includes citizens who were at the peak of their political sensitivity when the wave of democratization broke in Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing on political socialization theory, I hypothesize that citizens of the 1989 generation who were exposed to a higher mobilization have tended to participate more later in their life. I expect that some transitions in Central and Eastern Europe have had a spillover effect that moderates the current East-West participation gap.

To capture the level of mobilization during the transition from communism, I use the second wave of the European Values Study, conducted from 1990 to 1993. The EVS gives a snapshot of the level of mobilization during the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. I compare the protest trajectory of the 1989 generation in 9 postcommunist and 15 West European democracies over the 16 years covered by the ESS. Multilevel models allow me to disentangle the effects of individual, country-variant, and country-invariant factors behind the participation in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts.

The chapter is structured as follows. First, I discuss the theories of legacies of transition. Second, I look at the context in which the 1989 generation reached political maturity in countries of the former Eastern Bloc and formulate theoretical expectations as to the development of protest in the years following the transition from communism. Third, I explain my empirical strategy. Fourth, I present the results of the multilevel analysis and, fifth, I summarize and discuss the findings.

5.1 The Legacies of Transition: Three Mechanisms

How is the mobilization during the transition from communism reflected in current levels of political participation in Central and Eastern Europe and how does it moderate the East-West participation gap? According to the dominant perspective in the literature, the effect of the mobilization during the transition rapidly faded during the 1990s. Since then, inter-regional differences in political participation, between old and new democracies in Europe, appear to have trumped intraregional diversity. Postcommunist citizens appear to face a distinct set of obstacles to participation. Yet, this emphasis on a common postcommunist "syndrome" tends to neglect the remarkable diversity of exits from communism. Given that the transitions to democracy in Central and Eastern brought hundreds of thousands of citizens onto the streets, it would be surprising if the mobilization did not influence political involvement in the following years. If this were the case, the East-West participation gap could be moderated—at least in some countries—by previous experiences of mobilization during the transition.

The research on democratization and social movements highlights three mechanisms through which bottom-up transitions can have a positive impact on political involvement. First, at the institutional level, some authors argue that democracies born out of nonviolent campaigns tend to be more inclusive and, therefore, more receptive to the demands of civil society. In their seminal study on civil resistance, Chenoweth and Stephan find that nonviolent campaigns are more successful in achieving their goals than violent campaigns (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Furthermore, countries that went through episodes of nonviolent as opposed to violent mobilization are more likely to become and remain democratic (Bayer, Bethke, & Lambach, 2016). According to these studies, the main advantage of nonviolent campaigns is their appeal to broad segments of society. Nonviolent resistance campaigns gather large number of supporters. Once opponents to autocratic regimes obtain power, they are usually accountable to many parties and have to find compromises. This gives rise to a culture of dialog among the new political elites. As suggested by della Porta, "the political inclusivity is here higher, given the (institutional and cultural) imprinting by those civic society activists who entered political and administrative institutions in large numbers" (della Porta, 2016, 354). Former social movement activists in the political apparatus will probably perceive contestation as a normal and even expected part of the democratic consolidation process. By increasing the political acceptance of protest, bottom-up transitions might foster more active political participation.

Second, at the organizational level, the groups behind the transitional mobilization will likely share networks, resources, and strategies that can be reused for other causes once democracy has been established. Social movements are coalitions of organizations. At the end of a cycle of contention, these organizations might split and support different policy goals. In the process, they are likely to carry with them common "interpretive frames, organizational structures, political analysis, and tactics" (Meyer & Whittier, 1994, 290). The diffusion of these ideas and practices may fuel other protests later. In the case of movements for democracy, mobilization usually involves a broad spectrum of organizations, which, in spite of their differences, decide to join forces to oust authoritarian rulers. While these transitional coalitions rarely survive the founding elections in new democracies, they can provide symbolic and organizational resources for further mobilization (della Porta, 2016, 346). In Slovakia, for example, Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar and his party, the HZDS, were defeated during the 1998 parliamentary elections, putting an end to the illiberal turn taken by the young democracy after the independence. This electoral turnover was facilitated by coordination between many civil society organizations under the Civic Campaign (OK) '98. Symbols of the transition were re-appropriated by OK '98 activists and the leaders of the movement did not hesitate to describe their mobilization as a second or "delayed Velvet Revolution" (Bútora & Bútorová, 1999).

Finally, at the individual level, exposure to and participation in mass protests during the transition might lead certain cohorts of citizens to develop a taste for political activism. Political socialization theory suggests that events experienced from mid-adolescence to early adulthood shape a person's political attitudes and behavior. As I have proposed in Chapter 2, early formative experiences play a key role in two cognitive processes leading citizens to join a protest. First, to turn political grievances into protest potential, citizens evaluate whether protest would constitute a normal and expected response in their situation. This evaluation of appropriate response is influenced by citizens' conception of their social roles, which are internalized through political socialization. Second, once citizens consider protest to be appropriate in their situation, they go through an evaluation of efficacy in which they compare the costs and the benefits of a protest action. Early formative experiences weight heavily on this rational calculus. For these reasons, citizens who lived through a successful bottom-up transition to democracy might be particularly inclined to join a protest. Bottom-up transitions leave vivid and positive memories of collective mobilization. Citizens of new democracies who reached political maturity during these critical moments might feel that it

is their right and duty to participate. Furthermore, the success of the transition is a reminder that ordinary citizens can have a profound impact on politics. The suggestion that exposure to mass mobilization at a young age fosters lifelong participation has never been tested systematically in the context of democratic transitions. Yet, the biographical impact of social movements have long been observed in the US with the cohort of baby boomers involved in the civil rights, anti-Vietnam war, and women's movements (Jennings, 1987; McAdam, 1999). Young protesters in the 1960s and 1970s remained active for their lifetime. For some authors, the stability of activists' political attitudes and participation over time demonstrated that protest functioned as a catalyst in the formation of political generations (Caren et al., 2011; Grasso, 2016; Quaranta, 2016). Although different in nature and in scope, the protests surrounding the collapse of communism and the establishment of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe might have had similar effects.

All three mechanisms presented here are likely to influence political participation in postcommunist European democracies. In this chapter, I propose a research design that specifically targets the last mechanism. The socialization effect of transitional mobilization remains under-researched in the literature. I follow the protest participation of young citizens who experienced the transitions: the 1989 generation. I compare the protest participation of this generation in Central and Eastern Europe with the protest participation by the same generation in Western Europe and explore how previous experiences of mobilization moderate the gap in political involvement between old and new democracies.

5.2 The 1989 Generation: Different Experiences of Mobilization at the Turn of the 1990s

As previously discussed, the literature on political socialization suggests that the age from mid-adolescence to early adulthood—the "impressionable years"—is particularly important for the development of democratic citizenship. In this chapter, I focus on the 1989 generation, which I define as citizens who were aged 17 to 25 years old in 1989, the year when the wave of democratization started in the Eastern Bloc. The types of transition experienced by the young citizens of the 1989 generation varied a lot across countries.

In East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the popular upsurge involved a large share of the population and prompted a rapid implosion of the communist regimes. The extrication from communism was swift and radical. There were also protests in Poland and Hungary, but the

power transfers were negotiated and facilitated through round tables with opposition and communist leaders. In Bulgaria, members of the communist regime initiated a transition from above to prevent the formation of an effective opposition. In the Baltic states and in the Balkans, the collapse of communism was linked to the fight for national independence and involved at times violent confrontations (Ekiert, 2003).

Data from the second wave of the European Values Study, conducted between 1990 and 1993, allows me to get a good grasp on the various levels of protest experienced by citizens during or directly after the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe (EVS, 2015). In a series of questions on political participation, the EVS asked respondents whether they ever had taken part in a demonstration. Given their young age at that time, respondents of the 1989 generation necessarily linked this "ever" to the political context that directly preceded the survey, which, in postcommunist democracies, corresponded to the last years of the communist regimes and the transitional period. Except for the Baltic states, all the selected Central and Eastern European cases had achieved minimal standards of democratic rule before or during the year of the EVS fieldwork, according to data from Boix et al. (2013) (see Table 5.1). Although Estonia and Lithuania did not constitute full democracies at the time, they nonetheless had started implementing important political reforms in the wake of the Singing Revolution.

Table 5.1: EVS fieldwork in Central and Eastern Europe

Country	First year of democracy	EVS data collection period
Bulgaria	1990	08-1990 to 12-1991
Czech Republic	1990 (*Czechoslovakia*)	08-1991 to 10-1991
Estonia	1991	06-1990 to 08-1990
Germany, East	1990 (*Unified Germany*)	05-1990 to 06-1990
Hungary	1990	05-1991 to 06-1991
Lithuania	1992	06-1990 to 08-1990
Poland	1989	05-1990 to 06-1990
Slovakia	1990 (*Czechoslovakia*)	08-1991 to 09-1991
Slovenia	1991	02-1992 to 02-1992

Source: based on data from Boix et al. (2013) and EVS (2015).

Figure 5.1 reports the proportion of respondents of the 1989 generation affirming that they had taken part in demonstration, in 24 European polities. Looking at these results, it seems quite clear that, at the turn of the 1990s, there was no deficit in participation among the citizens of the 1989 generation in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the average proportion of citizens having taken part in a demonstration was higher in Central and Eastern

Europe (0.26) than in Western Europe (0.22). What is striking is the variance between citizens of postcommunist countries. The standard deviation in the sample of new democracies is particularly high at 0.17 compared to 0.08 for old democracies. While almost 60% of the respondents of East Germany from the 1989 generation said that they had taken part in a demonstration, less than 10% had done so in Slovenia and Hungary. This contrast appears to directly relate to the very different paths of extrication from communism taken by these countries.



Figure 5.1: Protest experience of the 1989 generation as measured during the second wave of the European Values Study conducted between 1990 and 1993
Note: Weighted results.
Source: based on data from EVS (2015).

Are these radically different experiences of mobilization during the transition reflected in current levels of participation? According to theories of political socialization, cohorts exposed to high levels of protest at a young age might be more inclined to participate later in their life. Therefore, in countries where mobilization was widespread, the transition might have had a spillover effect on protest in the following years. Two types of spillover effect are

plausible. On the one hand, we might expect a positive and homogeneous effect of early exposure to protest across old and new democracies. As shown in Figure 5.2a, this means that societies that participated more in the past would continue to do so later. In this scenario, the East-West participation gap remains constant, independent of prior levels of protest. On the other hand, the effect of early exposure to protest might have been more important for the 1989 generation in new democracies. In Central and Eastern Europe, cohorts that went through high levels of mobilization during the transition might have been able to compensate for the obstacles to participation faced by postcommunist societies. In this case, East-West participation would be moderated by early exposure to protest, as shown in Figure 5.2b. The hypotheses can be formalized as follows:

Hypothesis 5.1 ($H_{5.1}$): Early exposure to mobilization has the same positive effect in old and new democracies (*constant gap hypothesis*).

Hypothesis 5.2 ($H_{5.2}$): Early exposure to mobilization has a stronger positive effect in new democracies than in old democracies (*moderation hypothesis*).



(a) $H_{5.1}$: Constant gap **(b)** $H_{5.2}$: Moderation

Figure 5.2: The effect of early exposure to protest on the participation gap between old and new European democracies: two hypotheses

5.3 Empirical Strategy

5.3.1 Data

To test these hypotheses, this chapter combines two types of data. First, to follow recent levels of protest in various European democracies, I rely on individual-level data collected over eight rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), from 2002 to 2017 (ESS, 2017). Second, to get an estimation of the intensity of mobilization at the turn of the 1990s, I use an aggregate measure obtained from the second wave of the European Values Study (EVS), conducted between 1990 and 1993 (EVS, 2015). 24 countries (including Eastern Germany as a country) participated in both the second wave of the EVS and at least three rounds of the ESS.

I limit the ESS sample to respondents from the 1989 generation, that is individuals born between 1964 (those who were aged 25 in 1989) and 1972 (those who were aged 17 in 1989). While some authors in the field of political socialization suggest that the early formative years begin at a lower age (Bartels & Jackman, 2014; Neundorf & Smets, 2017), the second wave of the EVS only targeted citizens who had reached the age of majority. Since this survey started in 1990, the youngest citizens for whom data is available were born in 1972. This specification means that I can use the data to track members of the 1989 generation from the age of 30 to 39 in the first round of the ESS to the age of 44 to 53 in the eighth round.

The ESS asked respondents whether they had, during the 12 months preceding the survey, 1) attended a lawful demonstration, 2) signed a petition, or 3) boycotted certain products. As in the other empirical chapters, I apply separate models for the three forms of protest. One interesting avenue of research is to examine whether mobilization at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s had a different spillover effect on more or less disruptive forms of protest.

5.3.2 Old and New European Democracies

The sample includes 9 new democracies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Eastern Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and 15 old democracies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Western Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The Spanish and Portuguese democracies are rather young to be classified as "old democracies," but, at the time when the 1989 generation reached political maturity, they were already securely engaged

on the path of democratic consolidation. Teenagers and young adults in the selected West European democracies came of age in a much more stable and predictable political system than their peers in Central and Eastern Europe. Protest was already deeply rooted within the mechanics of democracy when they became old enough to get involved themselves. Their experience contrasts with the much more contentious and fluid context in which young postcommunist citizens grew up.

5.3.3 Early Exposure to Protest

To measure the exposure to protest of citizens of the 1989 generation during their formative years, I created a variable that aggregates data at the country level from the second wave of the EVS. This variable simply corresponds to the weighted proportion of respondents of the 1989 generation who affirmed, during the EVS fieldwork from 1990 to 1993, that they ever had taken part in a demonstration (as in Figure 5.1). This variable ranges from 0.07 (Hungary) to 0.59 (Eastern Germany). The country average is 0.24.

5.3.4 Control Variables

The analysis includes additional independent variables at different levels. At the individual level, the models incorporate controls for resources (education level, unemployment, work for a party or an organization, union membership, town size, social class[1]) and other sociodemographic controls (gender, age, and migration background[2]). Here, age is measured relative to the other other members of the 1989 generation (from 1 to 9 years). The use of a relative instead of an absolute measure is justified because age is collinear with the year of the survey. A relative measure allows me to control for compositional differences within the 1989 generation in different countries.

At the macro level, the limited number of higher-level units (24 countries and 163 country-waves) restrains the number of controls that can be included. I opted to incorporate the country mean and within-country difference of GDP per capita (constant 2010 USD, logged) and the year of the survey (Arbeitskreis "Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder", 2018; World Bank, 2018). The average GDP per capita reflects economic development, which is known to foster protest participation, whereas the within-country variation of GDP can

[1] Based on Oesch (2006a) and Oesch (2006b).

[2] As in Chapter 4, citizens living in Eastern Germany who were born in Western Germany (and vice versa) are also considered non-native.

account for the impact of economic growth and recession on political participation. The year of the survey might capture both a linear period effect and the effect of the aging of the 1989 generation.

5.3.5 Statistical Approach

The results are based on three-level logistic models with random intercepts. Respondents are nested in country-waves, which are themselves clustered into countries. This specification allows me to disentangle the effects of individual-level, country-variant, and country-invariant predictors of protest participation. Equation 5.1 describes the basic form of the models.

$$
\begin{aligned}
LogitPr(protest_{itk} = 1) &= \beta_{0k} + \beta_{1tk} + \sum_{m=2}^{M} \beta_m x_{mitk} \\
\beta_{0k} &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} newdem_k + \gamma_{02} earlyprotest_k \\
&\quad + \gamma_{03}(newdem_k \cdot earlyprotest_k) \\
&\quad + \sum_{p=4}^{P} \gamma_{0p} z_k + u_{0k} \\
\beta_{1tk} &= \sum_{q=1}^{Q} \gamma_{1q} r_{tk} + u_{1tk} \\
\text{with } u_{0k} &\sim N(0, \sigma^2_{u0k}) \text{ and } u_{1tk} \sim N(0, \sigma^2_{u1tk}) \\
\text{for } i &= 1, 2, ..., N \text{ individuals} \\
\text{for } t &= 1, 2, ..., 163 \text{ country-waves} \\
\text{for } k &= 1, 2, ..., 24 \text{ countries}
\end{aligned}
\tag{5.1}
$$

Here, the logit of the probability of having taken part in a protest activity during the 12 months preceding the survey is obtained by the sum of three terms: the intercept for country j (β_{0k}), the deviation from that country-intercept for a country-wave t (β_{1tk}), and the effects of individual-level variables x_{mitk} (β_m). β_{0k} can be further decomposed into an overall intercept (γ_{00}), the effect of a dummy for new democracies (γ_{01}), the effect of early exposure to protest as measured by the EVS between 1990 and 1993 (γ_{02}), the effect of the interaction of the two previous variables (γ_{03}), the effects of a series of time-invariant country-level

variables z_k (γ_{0p}), and the random intercept of country k (u_{0k}). β_{1tk} is obtained by combining the effects of time-variant country-level variables r_{tk} (γ_{1q}) and the random intercept of country-wave t (u_{1tk}). The inclusion of an interaction term allows me to test whether the gap of participation between citizens of new and old democracies remains constant ($H_{5.1}$) or is moderated by previous exposure to mobilization ($H_{5.2}$).

5.4 Findings

I begin by descriptively examining whether the mobilization at the turn of the 1990s has had a spillover effect on annual participation in protest activities between 2002 and 2017 in Europe. Figure 5.3 displays the proportion of citizens of the 1989 generation in 24 countries who had attended a lawful demonstration, signed a petition, or boycotted certain products in the year preceding each ESS round as a function of the protest level observed in the second wave of the EVS. The lines represent the linear fits for old and new democracies. Consistent with the literature, citizens of Central and Eastern Europe appear to participate less than citizens in Western Europe in all three forms of political participation. The East-West participation gap, however, varies depending on the type of protest and the level of mobilization measured at the beginning of the 1990s. For demonstration attendance, the difference between old and new democracies remains relatively constant, independent of previous levels of mobilization as expected in $H_{5.1}$. In contrast, the moderation hypothesis ($H_{5.2}$) appears to be supported for petition signing and participation in boycotts. For these two types of protest, the East-West participation gap is reduced for countries where protest was more widespread at the moment of the collapse of communism. This moderation effect is not only driven by a higher involvement in new democracies with more protest experience, but also, by a negative effect of early exposure to protest in old democracies. While, in Central and Eastern Europe, the measure of protest obtained from the second wave of the EVS appears to be positively correlated with recent involvement in petitions and boycotts, in Western Europe, there is no apparent diffusion across forms of political participation.

Tables 5.2 to 5.4 display the results of multilevel models applied to the three protest activities. Models 1, 2, and 3 in Table 5.2 include all the individual-level variables and three country-level variables: a dummy for new democracies, the level of protest experienced by the 1989 generation at the time of the EVS fieldwork, and the interaction of the two previous variables. This specification allows me to test the moderation hypothesis presented previously. If protest during the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe has had a spillover



Figure 5.3: Annual participation in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts (2002-2017) as a function of early exposure to protest (1990-1993), aggregated by country
Note: Weighted results.
Source: based on data from ESS (2017) and EVS (2015).

effect on the current political participation of the 1989 generation, we might expect the negative effect of new democracies to be reduced by previous exposure to protest.

The results of these first multilevel models largely reflect the patterns observed in the bivariate graphs. For participation in demonstrations, the inclusion of the interaction term renders the effect of new democracies insignificant. The only macro-level factor that remains significant is early exposure to protest. This means that citizens in countries where protest was widespread at the time of the EVS fieldwork continue to participate more later in both old and new democracies. Participation in petitions and boycotts, however, appears to follow a different pattern. Here, the effect of new democracies continues to be negative and significant, but it is moderated by the level of protest measured by the EVS. These results are in line with the moderation hypothesis ($H_{5.2}$).

Table 5.2: Multilevel models of protest: base models

	(1) Demonstration		(2) Petition		(3) Boycott	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Individual-level predictors						
Woman	−0.08	(0.06)	0.27***	(0.04)	0.13**	(0.04)
Age, relative	−0.00	(0.01)	0.01*	(0.01)	−0.00	(0.01)
Education, Low (ref.)						
Middle	−0.02	(0.07)	0.37***	(0.08)	0.46***	(0.06)
High	0.30***	(0.06)	0.62***	(0.08)	0.86***	(0.05)
Unemployed	0.24*	(0.10)	0.00	(0.07)	0.04	(0.08)
Worked for party or group	1.28***	(0.08)	1.12***	(0.08)	0.80***	(0.07)
Union member	0.62***	(0.09)	0.39***	(0.03)	0.27***	(0.05)
Native	−0.07	(0.14)	0.33***	(0.06)	0.24***	(0.06)
Town size, Home in countryside (ref.)						
Country village	−0.06	(0.09)	−0.04	(0.05)	−0.09	(0.10)
Town or small city	0.17+	(0.10)	0.08	(0.06)	0.06	(0.10)
Outskirts of big city	0.34**	(0.11)	0.09	(0.09)	0.19+	(0.10)
A big city	0.71***	(0.11)	0.27***	(0.07)	0.27*	(0.11)
Social class, Unskilled workers (ref.)						
Skilled workers	0.16*	(0.07)	0.18***	(0.04)	0.09	(0.06)
Small business owners	0.01	(0.10)	0.27***	(0.07)	0.47***	(0.10)
Low service class	0.23**	(0.08)	0.38***	(0.07)	0.38***	(0.07)
Higher service class	0.11	(0.08)	0.36***	(0.06)	0.48***	(0.09)
Macro-level predictors						
New democracy	0.21	(0.58)	−1.86***	(0.36)	−2.17***	(0.39)
Early exp. to protest	5.00*	(2.15)	−0.71	(1.13)	−2.06	(1.62)
New democracy x Early exp. to protest	−3.55	(2.24)	3.71**	(1.27)	4.67*	(1.76)
Intercept	−4.81***	(0.53)	−2.32***	(0.29)	−2.35***	(0.39)
Variance (countries)	0.35	(0.11)	0.15	(0.05)	0.27	(0.08)
Variance (country-waves)	0.12	(0.03)	0.07	(0.01)	0.05	(0.01)
N (countries)	24		24		24	
N (country-waves)	163		163		163	
N (individuals)	43806		43716		43716	

(Significance: $^{+}\ p < 0.1$, $^{*}\ p < 0.05$, $^{**}\ p < 0.01$, $^{***}\ p < 0.001$)

Note: Results with logit estimates and standard errors. The models incorporate available sample weights.
Source: based on individual-level data from ESS (2017) and aggregate data from EVS (2015).

The effects of individual-level variables are consistent with findings in the literature on political participation and remain mostly unchanged with the inclusion of additional macro-level variables. Women are more likely than men to sign petitions and join boycotts. Gender differences are not significant for participation in demonstrations. Education, which fosters the development of civic skills, is positively related to all forms of protest. The effect of unemployment is only positive and significant for demonstration attendance. Working for a party or an organization or being a member of a union are clear predictors of protest participation. Members of these groups are apparently more informed and better networked to take part in contentious forms of political participation. Native citizens tend to be more in-

volved in petitions and boycotts, most probably because they have access to more resources and are better integrated into participation networks. Individuals in big cities also seem to benefit from more effective mobilization structures. Finally, the effect of social classes varies across political actions. In general, members of the service classes are more mobilized than small business owners and workers. The only exception is with boycotts. For this type of political participation, small business owners are also quite active.



Figure 5.4: Predicted probabilities of having taken part in a protest activity in the last 12 months as a function of early exposure to protest in new and old democracies
Note: Results based on Models 1, 2, and 3. The capped spikes represent 95% confidence intervals.
Source: based on individual-level data from ESS (2017) and aggregate data from EVS (2015).

Based on Models 1, 2, and 3, Figure 5.4 reports the predicted probabilities of having attended a lawful demonstration, signed a petition, and joined in boycotts during the year preceding the survey as a function of the level of protest measured at the turn of the 1990s. Looking at demonstration attendance, the predicted probabilities are similar for old and new democracies at low levels of early exposure to protest, but diverge at high levels. The

spillover effect of previous mobilization appears stronger in old democracies, in opposition with the moderation hypothesis. For participation in petitions and boycotts, the two groups of countries converge at higher levels of early exposure to protest. However, full convergence is only attained at levels of previous mobilization beyond those experienced by most countries in the sample.

When using a sample of 24 higher-level units, there is a risk that the effects observed may be driven by an outlier. Eastern Germany is the only case for which more than half of the respondents of the 1989 Generation had taken part in a demonstration at the time of the second wave of the EVS. As reported in the bivariate graphs in Figure 5.3, this higher-level unit might artificially increase the effect of previous mobilization on annual protest participation in new democracies. To control for the influence of Eastern Germany, Models 4, 5, and 6 include an additional dummy for this special case (van der Meer, Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 2010). When it comes to participation in demonstrations, the effect of early exposure to protest remains unchanged when this additional variable is included. Differences between old and new democracies and the interaction with the level of mobilization in 1990–1993 continue to be statistically insignificant. For participation in petitions and boycotts, controlling for the influence of Eastern Germany depresses and renders insignificant the coefficient of the interaction between the indicator of new democracies and the level of protest at the beginning of the 1990s. The moderation effect is only significant at the 0.1 level.

Table 5.3: Multilevel models of protest: base models with dummy for Eastern Germany

	(4) Demonstration		(5) Petition		(6) Boycott	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Macro-level predictors						
New democracy	0.40	(0.58)	-1.72^{***}	(0.38)	-1.92^{***}	(0.38)
Early exp. to protest	5.00^{*}	(2.15)	−0.70	(1.13)	−2.05	(1.62)
New democracy × Early exp. to protest	-4.58^{+}	(2.45)	3.00^{+}	(1.54)	3.31^{+}	(1.94)
Eastern Germany	0.68	(0.52)	0.47	(0.43)	0.90^{+}	(0.51)
Individual-level controls	yes		yes		yes	
Intercept	-4.81^{***}	(0.53)	-2.32^{***}	(0.29)	-2.35^{***}	(0.39)
Variance (countries)	0.34	(0.11)	0.14	(0.05)	0.25	(0.08)
Variance (country-waves)	0.12	(0.03)	0.07	(0.01)	0.05	(0.01)
N (countries)	24		24		24	
N (country-waves)	163		163		163	
N (individuals)	43806		43716		43716	

(Significance: $^{+}\ p < 0.1$, $^{*}\ p < 0.05$, $^{**}\ p < 0.01$, $^{***}\ p < 0.001$)

Note: Results with logit estimates and standard errors. The models incorporate available sample weights.
Source: based on individual-level data from ESS (2017) and aggregate data from EVS (2015).

Table 5.4: Multilevel models of protest: final models

	(7) Demonstration		(8) Petition		(9) Boycott	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Macro-level predictors						
New democracy	−0.12	(0.77)	−1.35^{+}	(0.70)	−1.15^{+}	(0.67)
Early exp. to protest	4.64*	(2.19)	−0.46	(1.23)	−1.66	(1.75)
New democracy × Early exp. to protest	−4.01	(2.56)	2.58	(1.76)	2.32	(2.10)
Eastern Germany	0.77	(0.62)	0.42	(0.42)	0.91^{+}	(0.49)
Year	0.02	(0.01)	−0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
Logged GDP/cap. (mean)	−0.63	(0.67)	0.46	(0.59)	0.94	(0.65)
Logged GDP/cap. (diff.)	−0.42	(0.67)	0.25	(0.57)	0.22	(0.41)
Individual-level controls	yes		yes		yes	
Intercept	1.94	(7.22)	−7.22	(6.63)	−12.63^{+}	(7.06)
Variance (countries)	0.33	(0.10)	0.13	(0.04)	0.24	(0.06)
Variance (country-waves)	0.11	(0.03)	0.07	(0.01)	0.04	(0.01)
N (countries)	24		24		24	
N (country-waves)	163		163		163	
N (individuals)	43806		43716		43716	

(Significance: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$)

Note: Results with logit estimates and standard errors. The models incorporate available sample weights.
Source: based on individual-level data from ESS (2017), aggregate data from EVS (2015), and macro data from Arbeitskreis "Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder" (2018) and World Bank (2018).

The country mean and within-country difference of GDP per capita together with the year of the survey are added as macro-level controls in Models 7, 8, and 9. These predictors are all statistically insignificant. In the full models, the effect of new democracies becomes insignificant at the 0.05 level for participation in petitions and boycotts. The interaction term also remains statistically insignificant. Only for demonstration attendance do we see an enduring effect of previous mobilization. All in all, once the influence of Eastern Germany is controlled for, the results do not confirm that the participation gap between old and new democracies is attenuated by previous experiences of mobilization.

5.5 Conclusions

This chapter has offered a new perspective on the East-West participation gap in Europe by looking at how experiences of mobilization at the time of the collapse of communism have affected political involvement in new and old democracies since the beginning of the 2000s. Inspired by theories of political socialization, I expected that citizens who were exposed to high levels of protest during their formative years might be more inclined to protest later in their life. I examined the protest behaviour of the 1989 generation, the cohort of citizens

who were aged 17 to 25 in 1989. As older teenagers and young adults, these citizens witnessed different types of mobilization in their respective countries. In Central and Eastern Europe, some observed how the "people power" could successfully put an end to decades of autocracy; others were confronted with more top-down political changes.

To connect the current state of political participation of the 1989 generation with experiences of mobilization during the transition, I combined data from the European Values Study and the European Social Survey. The second wave of the EVS, conducted just after the start of the democratization movement in the Eastern Bloc, gave an overview of the mobilization of young citizens at that time in different countries. The eight rounds of the ESS, from 2002 to 2017, allowed me to follow the participation of the 1989 generation as it advanced in age.

The analysis revealed that, at the aggregate level, the protest participation of the 1989 generation in Europe followed two distinct patterns, depending on the form of political participation. On the one hand, participation in demonstrations was correlated with the level of protest experienced by the 1989 generation during its formative years, both in old and new democracies. The participation gap between the two groups of countries was small and remained constant independent of previous levels of mobilization. These results were in line with the "constant gap" hypothesis ($H_{5.1}$). On the other hand, mobilization at the turn of the 1990s appeared to have had a stronger spillover effect on petition signing and participation in boycotts for citizens of Central and Eastern European countries. For these two types of protest, the participation deficit in new democracies appeared to be offset in societies that went through intense periods of mobilization during the transition from communism, therefore supporting the "moderation" hypothesis ($H_{5.2}$). These two patterns were again observed in parsimonious multilevel models. The analysis revealed a somewhat different picture after including additional explanatory variables and, importantly, after controlling for the influence of Eastern Germany. For demonstration attendance, the effect of new democracies was not significant and early exposure to protest continued to be the best macro-level predictor of current participation. For petition signing and participation in boycotts, the moderation effect of previous mobilization on the East-West participation gap continued to be high and positive but lost statistical significance. Overall, I could not confirm that the East-West participation gap is reduced among citizens of the 1989 generation socialized during periods of high mobilization.

Some limitations of the study have to be taken into consideration. First, because of data availability constraints, the analysis presented in this chapter cannot be extended to multiple

cohorts across multiple countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Second, the limited number of countries in the sample (especially new democracies) makes it difficult to disentangle macro-level factors of participation that are correlated with each other. Finally, the EVS fieldwork from 1990 to 1993 was done at different phases of the democratization sequence in different countries. When the survey was conducted, some countries were firmly on the path of democratic consolidation; others, like the Baltic states would need more time to become independent and stabilize their democracies. These differences mean that the aggregate measure of protest derived from the EVS might not fully capture the mobilization during the transition. Some of these concerns might be addressed by extending the set cases to other postcommunist democracies and by combining the EVS data with other sources, for example, reports of protest events in newspaper articles.

In the next chapter, I focus on Eastern Germany and explore why this case turned out to be an outlier in the analysis. I examine how two competing legacies of the past—a legacy of repression and a legacy of transitional mobilization—have influenced East Germans' participation. As a quasi-experimental design, a systematic comparison of East and West Germans' protest behavior across cohorts and time improves our understanding of the role of political socialization in the development of protest in new democracies.

Chapter 6

Between Repression and Revolution: Conflicting Legacies and Their Effects on East Germans' Protest Behavior

Of all postcommunist citizens, East Germans are certainly the ones who experienced the most abrupt and radical political transformation at the turn of the 1990s.[1] During forty years, the rulers of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) implemented a rigid and orthodox version of Soviet socialism. The East German communist regime restricted the private, civil, and political liberties of its citizens. It systematically—and sometimes violently—repressed political dissent. Yet, this regime that seemed immutable collapsed in a matter of weeks during the autumn of 1989. Without firing a gunshot, ordinary people in the streets of Leipzig, Dresden, and Berlin put an end to the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party (SED).

[1] This chapter is adapted from an article published in *Comparative Sociology* entitled "Generations and Protest in Eastern Germany: Between Revolution and Apathy" (Joly, 2018). A few elements in the chapter differ from the original article. The introduction has been revised to improve the coherence of the whole monograph. The theoretical section of the article has been revised and moved to Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 in Chapter 2 of the thesis. The historical section of the article has been expanded for the thesis. The hypotheses, which were originally stated implicitly, are now explicit in the chapter. Some parts of the empirical strategy have been cut out to avoid repetition. Minor differences in the regression tables, which do not change any substantive result, appeared after reversing the ordinal scale of the social class variable and removing miscoded observations in the original ESS datasets. Figures 6.5 and 6.6, which originally appeared in the appendix of the article, have been moved to the main text. The conclusion has been revised to improve the coherence of the whole monograph.

The massive involvement of East German citizens rapidly led to the reopening of the border with West Germany, the first free elections, and reunification.

How did these contrasted political experiences influence the protest behavior of East Germans? From the perspective of political socialization theory, these two historical contexts—the repression under communism and the transitional mobilization—might have left conflicting legacies of political engagement. The repression experienced during the GDR might have fostered apathy among the population. Chapter 4 revealed that the legacy of repression on protest in new democracies is complex. While exposure to civil liberties restrictions tends to increase participation in demonstrations after the transition, the opposite is true for exposure to personal integrity violations. Since the East German communist regime was characterized by a high level of political violence, we might therefore expect the demobilizing effect of exposure to personal integrity violations to dominate over the effect of civil liberties restrictions.

Conversely, the protests for democracy might have boosted participation in the years following the transition. The literature on the biographical impact of social movements suggests that exposure to mobilization at a young age can have a lifelong positive effect on political involvement. The results presented in Chapter 5 revealed that respondents from the 1989 generation in Eastern Germany were by far the most experienced with demonstrations at the turn of the 1990s. The transitional mobilization appears to have had a larger spillover effect in Eastern Germany than in other postcommunist democracies.

This chapter examines how these two conflicting legacies have influenced East Germans' protest behavior across generations and over time. While the previous empirical chapters have examined the overall effect of exposure to repression and mobilization on protest in postcommunist democracies, the analysis presented here investigates what happens when these legacies collide. To do so, I undertake a systematic comparison of the protest participation of East and West Germans. The political participation of West Germans constitutes an interesting benchmark to contrast the effect of radically different experiences of political socialization in Eastern Germany. Previous research has found diverging patterns of protest participation in Eastern and Western Germany (Lahusen & Bleckmann, 2015). Yet, it remains unclear whether these differences are driven by period or cohort effects. The analysis relies on data collected by the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2017. It uses cross-classified random-effects models to disentangle age, period, and cohort (APC) effects on protest participation among East and West Germans.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss how living through autocratic repression and experiencing the Peaceful Revolution might have affected the protest behavior of East Germans who grew up during the Cold War. Second, I consider alternative factors that might have affected East Germans' protest participation beyond political socialization. Third, I detail my empirical strategy. Fourth, I present the results of the APC models and, fifth, I summarize and discuss the findings.

6.1 Eastern Germany: Two Conflicting Legacies

The political trajectory of Eastern Germany illustrates how different contexts of political socialization could have engendered generational differences in protest behavior. Political socialization theory suggests that historical circumstances experienced early in life have a durable impact on people's political orientations. This implies that abrupt regime changes should be associated with generational shifts in protest behavior. In Eastern Germany, we would expect protest shifts to follow the lines of three major generations, each shaped by distinctive formative political experiences over the last century (Neundorf, 2010, 1102). People of the first generation, born before the 1930s, saw their adolescence and early adulthood marked by the failure of the Weimar Republic and the Nazi dictatorship. The generation that followed, that is, the people born during the 1930s, 40s, 50s, and 60s, experienced early political socialization under the socialist regime of the GDR. Finally, younger citizens, who were born in the 1970s and later reached political maturity under a reunified, democratic Germany. While the historical events that formed the first and third generations affected the whole German society, the Cold War generation in the East took a different path from its counterpart in the West. The partition of the country marked a regional rupture in the development of extra-representational political participation. Both the exposure to repression during the communist era and the experience of the transitional mobilization might have had a lasting effect on East Germans' protest participation.

6.1.1 The Legacy of Repression in the GDR

Whereas West Germans experienced the rise of a protest culture alongside the development of new social movements in the post-Second World War era (Rucht, 1998), their fellow citizens in the East faced closed opportunity structures that strictly limited their capacity to express political dissent (Wielgohs, 2008, 114-123). As discussed in Chapter 4, the regime

of the GDR tended to follow a model of "bureaucratic-authoritarian communism" (Kitschelt et al., 1999). Kitschelt and his collaborators (1999, 26) have defined this type of communist rule as "a party state with an all-powerful, rule-guided bureaucratic machine governed by a planning technocracy and a disciplined, hierarchically stratified communist party." As explained by Lohmann (1994, 43), under this regime, "all avenues by which [disaffection] could have been made public, and thereby induced political change, were blocked." Manipulated elections and irregular intraparty competition rendered legal forms of political participation insignificant. At the same time, control of the media and massive surveillance by the Stasi (the Ministry for State Security) blocked the emergence of critical milieus. Even the "exit" option through emigration became nearly impossible after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 (Hirschman, 1993; Lohmann, 1994). In short, during the whole existence of the GDR, the leadership of the SED kept a Marxist-Leninist hardline, avoiding political compromise and tolerating no public protest. The rigid character of the regime was also amplified by its external context. Like other members of the Warsaw Pact, but even more so due to its strategic position at the frontline of the Cold War, the GDR was kept under the tacit control of Soviet forces positioned on its territory. These troops were prepared to react in order to avoid any form of destabilizing political deviation. With the bloody repression of the workers' revolt on June 17, 1953 in Berlin, East Germans witnessed the willingness of Moscow to maintain, at any cost, its grip on its satellite state. This event and the numerous killings at the German inner border are testimonies of the violent character of the repression in the GDR.

Together, the closed internal and external contexts in the GDR "confined [opposition forces] to niches" (Rucht, 2003, 156). For most people in East Germany, disaffection was express mainly in the "public-private sphere" (Oswald & Voronkov, 2004): It developed through dense friendship networks or church communities, that is, small deliberative spaces where a certain freedom of expression existed (Wielgohs, 2008, 121). Political protest was not made public. When a wave of demonstrations erupted in 1989, it occurred spontaneously and did not substantially build up on the activities of preexisting independent groups. Coming back to the theory of political socialization, this would lead one to believe that the Cold War generation in Eastern Germany ought to be less prone to engage in routinized protest. The legacy of repression in the GDR is expected to have translated into apathy after the transition.

6.1.2 The Legacy of the Peaceful Revolution

The protest wave that led to the fall of the communist regime in East Germany was sometimes described as an "ephemeral and fleeting affair" (Rucht, 2003, 173). Yet, although it was short, we should not forget its unprecedented diffusion across the population, its nonviolent character, and its effectiveness in bringing political change. For these reasons, this cycle of contention might have functioned as the crucible for development of extra-representational participation after the *Wende*. The 1989-90 protest wave in the former GDR started with peace prayers held in the St. Nicholas Church (Nikolaikirche), in the city of Leipzig. Over time, these gatherings developed into a series of weekly street demonstrations asking for political liberalization and freedom of movement. The first large Monday demonstration, held on September 25, 1989, brought about 5,000 participants. Two weeks later, the protest had gained momentum and, on October 9, the movement reached a critical point: in Leipzig, 70,000 demonstrators showed up in spite of rumors (later confirmed) that Erich Honecker, the General Secretary of the SED, had opted for a "Chinese solution" to end the protest and instructed security forces to use lethal ammunition if necessary (Lohmann, 1994, 69; Voss, 1995, 19-20). When these orders were not executed and the bloodshed was avoided, the revolution took its course. Protests spread massively throughout the country. According to certain estimations, between September 9 and November 13, 1989, more than 3 million people took the streets, that is, about 20% of the GDR population at the time (Voss, 1995, 19). Demands of protesters—the opening of the borders, the resignation of SED leaders, and, eventually, reunification—were met rapidly, making the East German revolution one of the swiftest and steadiest in history.

The massive involvement of citizens of the former GDR is also highlighted by findings of social surveys. The second wave of the European Values Study conducted in 1990 gives an overview of the protest experience of East and West Germans in the months before reunification (EVS, 2015). When asked whether they "had done," "would," or "would never" take part in a lawful demonstration, East Germans were far more likely than West Germans at that time to declare ever having taken part in a protest. In fact, among the younger cohorts, East Germans were *twice* as likely to ever have taken part in a protest as shown in Figure 6.1. Did the transitional mobilization in Eastern Germany set in motion a protest culture that endured in the post-Cold War era? In light of its achievements, the Peaceful Revolution might have marked a rupture with the legacy of repression in the GDR.



Figure 6.1: Experience with demonstrations across cohorts in East and West Germany in 1990
Note: Adjusted predictions of quadratic growth curves with 95% confidence intervals. Weighted results.
Source: based on data from EVS (2015).

6.1.3 Hypotheses

As we have seen, the repression in the GDR and the Peaceful Revolution might have both left a mark on East Germans' political involvement. We can derive three hypotheses with regards to the long-term effect of these political contexts on East Germans' protest behavior. If exposure to repression did demobilize East Germans, the following hypothesis should be confirmed empirically:

Hypothesis 6.1 ($H_{6.1}$): East Germans of the Cold War generation are *less* likely to take part in protest activities than West Germans of the same generation, after controlling for other individual characteristics.

In contrast, the Peaceful Revolution might have encouraged the adoption of protest as a mode of political expression after the transition. The transitional mobilization might have compensated for the demobilizing effect of repression. We can test this assumption with a second competing research hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6.2 ($H_{6.2}$): East Germans of the Cold War generation have the *same* or a *higher* propensity to take part in protest activities than West Germans of the same generation, after controlling for other individual characteristics.

This hypothesis, however, might need to be qualified. As discussed in Chapter 5, the mobilizing effect of the transitional protest is expected to be more important for people who were in their formative years by the end of the autocratic regime. These are the citizens born at the end of the 1960s. This leads to a third and final hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6.3 ($H_{6.3}$): Among East Germans of the Cold War generation, the *younger* ones are those who have the highest propensity to take part in protest activities, relative to West Germans and after controlling for other individual characteristics.

6.2 Beyond Political Socialization: Opportunity Structures and Resources

In order to present a more contextualized account of generational cleavages in protest among East and West Germans, it is worth considering two complementary explanations. As discussed in Chapter 2, political opportunity structures and resources are often cited as important factors to explain the East-West protest gap in Europe.

With regards to the first factor, this chapter assumes that the institutional convergence after reunification prevents the political opportunity structure from playing a major role in regional differences. Contrary to other postcommunist polities, the former GDR abruptly departed from the model of state socialism (Ekiert & Kubik, 1998, 564). The top-down, Western-led reunification ensured that democratic institutions in the East were rapidly consolidated. The integration in 1990 of the five new German states under an almost unamended Grundgesetz (the German constitutional law), meant that, in principle, opportunities for political participation and legal protection for the rights of expression and assembly were equivalent in the former East and the former West. Also, at the federal level, the political offer was very similar in both regions of Germany right from the early days of national

unity. Already in March 1990, seven months before reunification, the CDU with its "Alliance for Germany" and the SPD had dominated the first (and only) free national elections held in the GDR. With the exception of the former communist SED/PDS (later renamed Die Linke, 'the Left') which remained a significant political actor in the East, the party landscape was rapidly unified after the transition. Therefore, with the same constitutional guarantees, electoral and party systems[2] on both sides of the former wall, the political opportunity structure for protest can essentially be considered constant.

Without being the product of political socialization, cohort differences in protest participation could also appear because resources are unequally distributed in Eastern and Western Germany. The contrasted macro-economic policies implemented on the two sides of the wall and the uneasy monetary, economic, and social union have left distinct socio-economic legacies in Eastern and Western Germany. During the Cold War, West Germany maintained high productivity levels and was more successful in sustaining economic growth. At the same time, East Germany maintained a policy of full employment with low levels of inequality. Childcare and progressive family models allowed women to be more present in the GDR workforce. Both systems—East and West—achieved almost universal literacy rates. At the eve of reunification, the transition to a market economy was felt hard in the East. Swift privatization of East German state-owned companies and, generally, the lack of economic competitiveness in the region led to a sharp increase in unemployment coupled with massive emigration to the West. Since then, economic convergence has progressed, but differences have remained (Brenke, 2014). In 1991, East Germans' disposable income per capita was only 53% of that of West Germans (excluding Berlin from the ratio). In 2017, it reached 85% (Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2019a, 2019b). The unemployment gap remained high until the mid-2000s, but has sharply declined since then (Brenke, 2014). Without downplaying the role of these factors, the strategy employed in this study is to assess East-West generational differences *after* controlling for socio-demographic compositions. As discussed below, the survey data used in the analysis contains information that captures differences in resources between East and West Germans. The objective is to estimate residual cohort differences that subsist after accounting for these sociodemographic factors.

[2]When this chapter was first drafted, the AfD was still playing a relatively minor role in German politics. This has now changed remarkably and the New Länder appear to be the stronghold of the populist party (see Schroeder & Weßels, 2019). Some observers wonder if the rise of the AfD in the East has led to a split in the German party system. More research is necessary to understand the relationship between the rise of the AfD and East-West differences in protest participation.

6.3 Empirical Strategy

6.3.1 Individual-Level Data and Dependent Variables

Examining generational differences in protest participation among East and West Germans requires that we have repeated measures so that people of the same cohort are observed at different stages of their life and at different periods. This chapter pools data collected in Germany during eight rounds of the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2017 (ESS, 2017). To focus on the effect of political socialization and facilitate comparisons between East and West Germans, the chapter excludes citizens who were not born in Germany. As in the other empirical chapters, I examine participation in lawful public demonstrations, petitions, or boycotts. Demonstrations, in comparison to the other activities, are more deeply rooted in the experience of the transition. If the Peaceful Revolution did boost East Germans' participation, we would expect this effect to be more visible for demonstrations. Boycotts, in contrast, were largely absent from the repertoire of the 1989-90 mobilization and, in East Germany, a planned economy made it pretty much impossible to organize or join large-scale boycott campaigns.

6.3.2 Generations, Micro-Cohorts, and Periods

To test the three hypotheses introduced in this chapter we need to set boundaries between political generations in Germany. Following Neundorf (2010, 1102), I define three political generations: 1) the pre-Cold War generation, born before 1929, 2) the Cold War generation, born between 1929 and 1969, and 3) the post-Cold War generation, born after 1969. People born before 1920 are excluded from the analysis because of their limited representation in the dataset. Respondents born after 1989 cannot be included in the analysis because the ESS did not ask them specific questions related to their migration within Germany (see Section 6.3.3 below).

Membership of a political generation is determined by the political context experienced by citizens during their early formative years. Traditional political socialization research situates these years between mid-adolescence and early adulthood. As in Chapter 4, I follow Grasso's suggested range of 15 to 25 years old (Grasso, 2016, 40). Two historical moments separate the three generations: first, the creation of the GDR and the FRG in 1949 and, second, the reunification of Germany in 1990. A citizen is said to be part of a specific generation if he or she has spent the majority of his or her formative years in the political context associ-

ated with that generation. All Germans aged 20 or less in 1949—that is, born after 1929—are part of the Cold War generation since most of their early formative years (at least 6 out of 11 years) were experienced in two separate states. Similarly, citizens aged 20 or less in 1990—that is, born since 1970—were mainly socialized in a unified Germany.

Although these historical circumstances are well defined in time, the exact cut-off points between years of birth remain nonetheless arbitrary. As explained by Neundorf (2010, 1105), "in reality the transitions between pre-, post- and Cold War generations are seamless." For this reason, the three political generations serve mainly as theoretical references in the discussion of the results. When performing the actual multivariate analysis to estimate cohort differences, respondents are classified in 14 five-year birth cohorts ($cohort_{1920}$: 1920–24, ..., $cohort_{1985}$: 1985–89). Defining this type of micro-cohorts makes the identification of trends less sensible to specific generational thresholds (Caren et al., 2011). Finally, periods correspond to each of the two-year rounds of the ESS ($period_{2002}$: 2002–03, ..., $period_{2016}$: 2016–17).

6.3.3 Growing up in Eastern Germany

The main independent variable in this study captures whether respondents were socialized in Eastern or Western Germany. This variable goes beyond coding where the interview took place: it retraces where the respondent grew up, even if he or she moved across regions. By leveraging information provided in the ESS German country-specific dataset, I can control for East-West migration within Germany. I am able to identify the region in which the respondent was socialized by combining responses from three questions in the ESS country-specific questionnaire. A first question, coded by the interviewer, indicates if the interview was conducted in Eastern or Western Germany. A second question asked respondents "Where did you live before 1990?" with two possible answers: "in Eastern Germany / East Berlin" or "in Western Germany / West Berlin." In case of a mismatch between the first two questions, which would indicate that the respondent moved across regions, a follow-up question asked "when did you move to the eastern / western part of Germany?" With these pieces of information, we can know whether a respondent moved across regions and, if so, at what age (given the respondent provided his or her year of birth). A respondent is said to have been socialized in Eastern Germany (coded '1', otherwise '0') if he or she has spent the majority of his or her early formative years (from 15 to 25 years old) in this region.

With this operationalization, the analysis can sort out the latecomers from the "real" East or West Germans.

6.3.4 Control Variables

As discussed previously, both structural legacies and individual circumstances have placed German citizens in various socioeconomic positions with unequal access to resources for mobilization. The effects of these factors have to be isolated from those of socialization. The analysis controls for the gender of respondents, their age (and age squared), their education level, their employment status, the size of their town, their current or previous membership in a labor union, and their social class.[3] I include dummies for the states ("Länder") in which respondents live. Some of the 16 German states might be outliers, with exceptionally high or low levels of protest. State dummies control for structural conditions, such as geography, population density, or economic development, that would not be fully captured by individual-level variables.[4]

6.3.5 Statistical Approach

I follow Yang and Land (2006, 2008) and perform a series of APC analyses with cross-classified random-effects models. Contrary to other studies, this chapter does not focus on period and cohort effects per se but rather on how the effect of one predictor of protest—growing up in Eastern Germany—varies across generations and time. This can be operationalized by specifying not only random intercepts for cohorts and periods, but also a random coefficient for the variable *eastsoc*, which indicates whether a respondent has been socialized in Eastern Germany. We can let this coefficient vary across periods and cohorts to model patterns of convergence and divergence between East and West Germans. Equation 6.1 details the hierarchical logistic models used in this chapter. For each of the three protest activities (demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts), I fit two cross-classified models: one with a random slope at the cohort level and one with a random slope at the period level.

[3] Social classes are based on Oesch's (2006a; 2006b) classification. To remain consistent with the published article on which this chapter is based, I do not control for membership in a party or an organisation. This variable was excluded in the article because it leads to convergence problems in the multilevel analysis.

[4] Since East Germans are defined based on their socialization context and not their place of residence, we still have enough degrees of freedoms to include state dummies. Another source of variation beyond internal migration is the city of Berlin. Here, both East and West Germans live in the same state.

$$LogitPr(protest_{ijt} = 1) = \beta_{0jt} + \beta_{1jt} eastsoc_{ijt} + \beta_2 age_{ijt} + \beta_3 age^2_{ijt} + \sum_{m=4}^{M} \beta_m x_{mijt}$$

Random intercept

$$\beta_{0jt} = \gamma_{00} + \upsilon_{0j} + \nu_{0t} \tag{6.1}$$

Random slope at the cohort level

$$\beta_{1jt} = \beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \upsilon_{1j}$$

Random slope at the period level

$$\beta_{1jt} = \beta_{1t} = \gamma_{10} + \nu_{1t}$$

Here, the logit of the probability of having taken part in a protest activity during the 12 months preceding the survey is a function of the intercept for cohort j and period t (β_{0jt}), the effect of growing up in Eastern Germany (β_{1jt}), the fixed effects of age and age squared (β_2 and β_3), and the fixed effects of covariates (β_m). β_{0jt} can be further decomposed into three components: the overall intercept (γ_{00}), the random intercept of cohort j (υ_{0j}), and the random intercept of period t (ν_{0t}). β_{1jt} is a combination of the main effect of *eastsoc* (γ_{10}), and an additional term: either the variation of this coefficient at the cohort level (υ_{1j}) or the variation of this coefficient at the period level (ν_{1t}).

6.4 Findings

The analysis explores whether the protest behavior of East Germans relative to West Germans is characterized by a legacy of repression or, conversely, by a legacy of transnational mobilization and how this pattern differs across cohorts and periods. Hierarchical APC models estimate, for East and West Germans, the likelihood of having taken part in a protest activity in the 12 months preceding each of the eight ESS rounds conducted between 2002 and 2017.

6.4.1 Fixed Effects

I present full regression tables in Section 6.6, *Supplementary Tables*. Figure 6.2 shows a summary of coefficient sizes with 95% confidence intervals for the fixed part of the models

with a random coefficient at the cohort level (excluding the effects of states). The results for the fixed part of the models with a random coefficient at the period level are nearly identical and therefore not reported.



Figure 6.2: Coefficient plot: fixed effects at the individual level
Note: The figure reports coefficient sizes and 95% confidence intervals. Results are based on age-period-cohort models with random slopes at the cohort level.
Source: based on data from ESS (2017).

For all three political actions, growing up in Eastern Germany has an overall negative effect on protest participation. All other things being equal, the odds ratios of taking part in a demonstration, signing a petition, and joining in a boycott are respectively, 0.75, 0.79, and 0.69 for East Germans in comparison with West Germans. Without further analysis, we can therefore already conclude that the wide diffusion of protest observed in 1989 and 1990 has not been sustained in the 16 years covered by the ESS data. In line with $H_{6.1}$, East Germans tend nowadays to participate less on a yearly basis than their fellow citizens who grew up in the West. Looking at the effect of the other covariates, we see that the assumption that resourceful persons have a higher propensity to protest is mostly supported

in the analysis. The effects of these individual-level controls are consistent with the previous empirical chapters and will not be further discussed here.

6.4.2 Random Effects

We now turn to the random parts of the models. In general, the variance components presented in Tables B1 and B2 in the Appendix indicate that little variation in participation is clustered at the cohort and period levels. Protest measures incorporate a large stochastic variation and part of the intra-cluster correlations has already been explained by individual-level variables. Nonetheless, a look at the random slope of *eastsoc* reveals how much the effect of growing up in Eastern Germany varies across cohorts and periods. Figure 6.3 displays the predicted coefficients of the variable measuring whether a respondent was socialized in Eastern Germany, combining fixed and random effects, across cohorts. The vertical dashed lines delimit the pre-, post-, and Cold War generations.

Across all three forms of political participation, the coefficient of *eastsoc* never passes the '0' threshold. The effect of growing up in Eastern Germany on demonstration attendance barely varies across cohorts and remains significantly negative at around -0.3 (odds ratio $\approx$ 0.7). Generational variation in the eastern participation deficit becomes clearer with petition signing. Although no individual random cohort effect is significantly different from the overall fixed effect, the gap between East and West Germans appears to be maximized for the individuals of the Cold War generation. East Germans socialized in-between two generations, born around 1930 and around 1970, tend to have a slightly smaller protest deficit. A characteristic U-shaped trend in the cohort effects is apparent for participation in boycotts. East Germans of the Cold War generation born between 1930 and 1960 tend to have the lowest propensity to join in boycotts in comparison with West Germans of the same cohorts. For these respondents, the effect of growing up in Eastern Germany reaches up to -0.5 (odds ratio $\approx$ 0.6). The East-West gap is sharply reduced for the post-Cold War generation, especially for the cohort born between 1975 and 1979. In general, the results for petitions and boycotts seem to indicate that East Germans' protest deficit is reduced for the younger members of the Cold War generation, as expected by $H_{6.3}$. However, since this relative difference is not statistically significant, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed.

The results of the models with a random coefficient at the period level do not indicate that the East-West gap is about to be bridged. Quite the contrary, Figure 6.4 shows that, for two of the three protest activities, the eastern deficit in participation has increased over



Figure 6.3: Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on protest participation across cohorts (fixed and random effects)
Note: Vertical dotted lines indicate the separations between the pre-, post-, and Cold War generations. Grey areas show 95% confidence intervals of the predicted random effects.
Source: based on data from ESS (2017).

time. Whereas East Germans tended to participate as much as West Germans in demonstrations at the beginning of the 2000s, a stable participation deficit is apparent since 2008. A similar trend can be observed with petition signing. Here, participation has plunged for East Germans in 2010 and remains low since then. Finally, there is little variation over time in involvement in boycotts: the predicted random effects of the coefficient are nearly indistinguishable from the fixed effect at -0.37 (odds ratio $\approx$ 0.69).

All in all, these results indicate that the massive involvement of citizens of the GDR during the transition was short-lived. The vast protest experience acquired by East Germans from the Cold War generation in 1989 and 1990 has not been translated into day-to-day extra-representational participation. Rather than a legacy of transitional mobilization ($H_{6.2}$), a legacy of repression ($H_{6.1}$) seems to dominate the political landscape in Eastern Germany.



Figure 6.4: Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on protest participation across periods (fixed and random effects)
Note: Grey areas show 95% confidence intervals of the predicted random effects.
Source: based on data from ESS (2017).

6.4.3 Alternative Specification

I validate these findings in a set of alternative fixed-effects models. An interesting aspect of estimating relative instead of absolute cohort and period effects for East and West Germans is that we don't necessarily need to perform full APC models. If we assume that life-cycle effects on protest are the same for people who grew up in Eastern and Western Germany, then we can leave age out of the equations.[5] With only two components—periods and cohorts—fixed-effects models can perform as well, if not better, than the random-effects ones. The conceptual logic behind this specification is similar to a proportional hazards model where

[5]This assumption is not directly testable. Yet, I can verify that generational differences between East and West Germans are not artificially produced by unbalanced age groups. To do this, I fit a linear regression predicting age by socialization in East Germany, cohorts, and periods. The results show that the effect *eastsoc* is not significant, which means that there is no significant compositional difference in age between East and West Germans once we control for cohorts and periods.

a baseline hazard function (here the age effect) remains unspecified but is assumed to be the same across groups.

To estimate convergence or divergence in protest participation between East and West Germans across generations and time, I model the propensity to take part in protest activities with a series of interaction terms: first, between cohorts and the variable measuring whether a respondent was socialized in the East and, second, between periods and the same socialization variable.

$$\begin{aligned} LogitPr(protest_{ijt} = 1) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 eastsoc_{ijt} + \sum_{j=2}^{14} \beta_{2j} cohort_j \\ + \sum_{t=2}^{8} \beta_{3t} period_t + \sum_{j=2}^{14} \beta_{4j} (eastsoc_{ijt} \cdot cohort_j) \\ + \sum_{t=2}^{8} \beta_{5t} (eastsoc_{ijt} \cdot period_t) + \sum_{m=6}^{M} \beta_m x_{mijt} \end{aligned} \tag{6.2}$$

In Equation 6.2, the logit of the probability of having taken part in a protest activity is the combination of an intercept (β_0), the main effect of $eastsoc$ (β_1), the main effect of the cohort of the respondent (β_{2j}), the main effect of the period (β_{3t}), the interaction of $eastsoc$ with the cohort of the respondent (β_{4j}), the interaction of $eastsoc$ with the period (β_{5t}), and a series of covariates excluding age (β_m).

Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show the predicted effect of *eastsoc* across cohorts and periods for each protest activity. The results of the fixed-effects models are similar to those of the random-effects models. One difference, however, is that, while, with the random-effects models the negative effect *eastsoc* is pronounced but varies little around the mean effect across cohorts, with the fixed-effects models we can observe more variability and a clearer inverted bell curve for all the protest activities. The participation deficit of East Germans reaches its maximum for some cohorts in the Cold War generation. The effect of having been socialized in Eastern Germany is not significant for the pre- and post-Cold War generations. The period effects of the fixed-effects models are almost identical to those of the random-effects models except for participation in boycotts, where the East-West gap seems to have widened more over time.



Figure 6.5: Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on protest participation across cohorts (fixed effects)
Note: Results based on fixed-effects model with interaction terms. Grey areas show 95% confidence intervals of the fixed effects. Weighted results.
Source: based on data from ESS (2017).

In brief, these results tend to confirm the observations made earlier. As proposed in $H_{6.1}$, East Germans have a lower propensity to take part in protest activities and, at least for certain forms of protest, this gap is amplified for cohorts of the Cold War generation. It is plausible that, after the 1989-90 mobilization, with diminishing returns on political action, citizens in Eastern Germany rapidly developed a protest fatigue. From there, old patterns of apathy forged during the GDR re-emerged.

6.5 Conclusions

This chapter has examined the effect of political socialization on the protest behavior of East Germans, a group of citizens who experienced both a long, rigid bureaucratic-authoritarian



Figure 6.6: Effect of socialization in Eastern Germany on protest participation across periods (fixed effects)
Note: Results based on fixed-effects model with interaction terms. Grey areas show 95% confidence intervals of the fixed effects. Weighted results.
Source: based on data from ESS (2017).

regime and a massive mobilization during the transition to democracy (Kitschelt et al., 1999). The chapter asked whether the legacy of the Peaceful Revolution in East Germany could compensate for the demobilizing effect of exposure to repression during the communist era.

Using age-period-cohort models with data from the European Social Survey, the analysis compared the participation of East and West Germans in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts, across generations and time. The results indicated that, overall, the 1989-90 mobilization did not have a lasting effect. In line with more traditional theories of political socialization, East Germans appeared to have been less active than West Germans in all three forms of protest between 2002 and 2017. This relative disengagement was particularly visible for cohorts of citizens who grew up during the Cold War. The regime of the GDR appears to have left its mark on political participation in Eastern Germany. Nonetheless, the

magnitude of the East-West participation gap remained modest and, under certain model specifications, East Germans of the post-Cold War generation did not participate significantly less than West Germans of the same cohorts. Apathy, therefore, was not as pervasive as we might have expected among East Germans.

While the previous empirical chapters have given us a broad perspective on the relationship between political socialization and protest in postcommunist democracies, this chapter has increased our analytical leverage. The political trajectories of Eastern and Western Germany represented counterfactual experiences. This quasi-experimental setting has provided strong evidence that differences in protest participation between East and West Germans are not entirely due to differences in resources or opportunity structures. Political socialization has an effect on protest beyond these factors.

The East German experience remains, nonetheless, unique in the postcommunist world. Scholars should therefore be careful when extrapolating these results. While the democratic breakthrough in the German Democratic Republic was mainly driven by internal forces, the reunification process was largely dominated by Western Germany. This top-down process had contradictory effects on civil society in the former GDR. On the one hand, it ensured that East Germans inherited stable democratic institutions, a mature party system, and a large network of established civil society organizations. On the other hand, it left some East Germans with the impression that their revolution had been "lost" (Raabe, 2019). In the early days of the reunification, Eastern Germany's economic and political interests were largely dominated by the West. When the second *Wirtschaftswunder* promised by Helmut Kohl was not delivered in the East (or, at least, not as fast as expected), a lot of East Germans felt disempowered. They perceived themselves as second class citizens in Germany and, as a consequence, many retreated from political life. This suggests that East Germans' perception of political alienation might have amplified the demobilizing effect of the legacy of repression.

Although the dynamic of the reunification is unique to Eastern Germany, other postcommunist democracies went through social and political crises that could have strengthened or weakened the effect of past legacies on protest. More research is necessary to understand how recent political events have interacted with citizens' memories of repression and mobilization to produce the current protest trajectories in Central and Eastern Europe.

6.6 Supplementary Tables

Table 6.1: Age-period-cohort models: random slopes at the cohort level

	(1) Demonstration		(2) Petition		(3) Boycott	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Individual-level variables						
East German	−0.29*	(0.13)	−0.23*	(0.09)	−0.37***	(0.10)
Woman	−0.14**	(0.05)	0.27***	(0.03)	0.28***	(0.03)
Age (10 years)	−0.20	(0.15)	0.38***	(0.08)	0.67***	(0.08)
Age^2	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.05***	(0.01)	−0.08***	(0.01)
Education, Low (ref.)						
Middle	0.23+	(0.13)	0.32***	(0.07)	0.36***	(0.07)
High	0.64***	(0.14)	0.79***	(0.07)	0.79***	(0.08)
Unemployed	0.36***	(0.11)	−0.14+	(0.08)	−0.09	(0.08)
Union member	0.61***	(0.06)	0.31***	(0.04)	0.21***	(0.04)
Town size, Home in countryside (ref.)						
Country village	−0.41+	(0.21)	−0.13	(0.12)	−0.13	(0.12)
Town or small city	−0.00	(0.21)	−0.01	(0.12)	−0.08	(0.12)
Outskirts of big city	0.17	(0.21)	0.08	(0.12)	0.03	(0.13)
A big city	0.49*	(0.21)	0.25*	(0.12)	0.16	(0.13)
Social class, Unskilled workers (ref.)						
Skilled workers	0.13	(0.10)	0.17**	(0.06)	0.13*	(0.06)
Small business owners	0.20	(0.13)	0.34***	(0.07)	0.56***	(0.08)
Low service class	0.42***	(0.11)	0.51***	(0.06)	0.44***	(0.06)
Higher service class	0.55***	(0.11)	0.61***	(0.07)	0.63***	(0.07)

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Table 6.1: continued from previous page

	(1) Demonstration		(2) Petition		(3) Boycott	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
State fixed effects						
Baden-Wuerttemberg (ref.)						
Bayern	−0.16	(0.12)	0.22**	(0.07)	−0.15*	(0.07)
Berlin	0.19	(0.15)	0.20+	(0.11)	−0.35**	(0.11)
Brandenburg	0.47**	(0.17)	0.23*	(0.11)	−0.63***	(0.12)
Bremen	−0.01	(0.28)	−0.07	(0.19)	−0.00	(0.19)
Hamburg	0.10	(0.20)	−0.05	(0.14)	−0.37*	(0.14)
Hessen	−0.11	(0.14)	−0.06	(0.09)	−0.28***	(0.08)
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	0.24	(0.19)	0.07	(0.12)	−0.84***	(0.14)
Niedersachsen	−0.20	(0.13)	−0.19*	(0.08)	−0.40***	(0.08)
Nordrhein-Westfalen	−0.38***	(0.11)	−0.15*	(0.06)	−0.42***	(0.06)
Rheinland-Pfalz	−0.36*	(0.18)	−0.16	(0.10)	−0.40***	(0.10)
Saarland	−0.68+	(0.40)	−0.30	(0.19)	−0.16	(0.18)
Sachsen	0.04	(0.17)	−0.08	(0.11)	−0.63***	(0.12)
Sachsen-Anhalt	−0.16	(0.19)	0.22+	(0.12)	−0.94***	(0.13)
Schleswig-Holstein	0.01	(0.18)	0.18+	(0.11)	−0.28**	(0.11)
Thueringen	0.08	(0.19)	0.22+	(0.12)	−0.63***	(0.13)
Intercept	−1.96***	(0.43)	−2.21***	(0.24)	−2.61***	(0.25)
Variance (period: intercept)	0.01	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.06	(0.03)
Variance (cohort: slope)	0.00	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.03	(0.02)
Variance (cohort: intercept)	0.02	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
BIC	10821.8		23181.1		21377.7	
N (periods)	8		8		8	
N (cohorts)	14		14		14	
N (individuals)	18726		18687		18693	

(Significance: $^{+}\ p < 0.1$, $^{*}\ p < 0.05$, $^{**}\ p < 0.01$, $^{***}\ p < 0.001$)

Note: Results with logit estimates and standard errors.
Source: based on data from ESS (2017).

Table 6.2: Age-period-cohort models: random slopes at the period level

	(4) Demonstration		(5) Petition		(6) Boycott	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
Individual-level variables						
East German	−0.32*	(0.15)	−0.25*	(0.10)	−0.38***	(0.09)
Woman	−0.14**	(0.05)	0.27***	(0.03)	0.28***	(0.03)
Age (10 years)	−0.20	(0.15)	0.35***	(0.07)	0.63***	(0.07)
Age^2	−0.01	(0.01)	−0.05***	(0.01)	−0.07***	(0.01)
Education, Low (ref.)						
Middle	0.22+	(0.13)	0.32***	(0.07)	0.36***	(0.07)
High	0.65***	(0.14)	0.78***	(0.07)	0.79***	(0.08)
Unemployed	0.33**	(0.11)	−0.15*	(0.07)	−0.10	(0.08)
Union member	0.60***	(0.06)	0.30***	(0.04)	0.19***	(0.04)
Town size, Home in countryside (ref.)						
Country village	−0.41*	(0.21)	−0.14	(0.12)	−0.13	(0.12)
Town or small city	−0.01	(0.21)	−0.01	(0.12)	−0.07	(0.12)
Outskirts of big city	0.16	(0.21)	0.08	(0.12)	0.03	(0.13)
A big city	0.49*	(0.21)	0.25*	(0.12)	0.16	(0.13)
Social class, Unskilled workers (ref.)						
Skilled workers	0.13	(0.10)	0.17**	(0.06)	0.13*	(0.06)
Small business owners	0.19	(0.13)	0.33***	(0.07)	0.56***	(0.08)
Low service class	0.41***	(0.11)	0.51***	(0.06)	0.44***	(0.06)
Higher service class	0.54***	(0.11)	0.60***	(0.07)	0.63***	(0.07)

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Table 6.2: continued from previous page

	(4) Demonstration		(5) Petition		(6) Boycott	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE
State fixed effects						
Baden-Wuerttemberg (ref.)						
Bayern	−0.17	(0.12)	0.22**	(0.07)	−0.15*	(0.07)
Berlin	0.20	(0.15)	0.19+	(0.11)	−0.36***	(0.11)
Brandenburg	0.49**	(0.17)	0.25*	(0.11)	−0.63***	(0.12)
Bremen	−0.01	(0.28)	−0.07	(0.19)	0.00	(0.19)
Hamburg	0.09	(0.20)	−0.05	(0.14)	−0.36*	(0.14)
Hessen	−0.11	(0.14)	−0.06	(0.09)	−0.28**	(0.08)
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	0.25	(0.19)	0.08	(0.12)	−0.85***	(0.14)
Niedersachsen	−0.20	(0.13)	−0.19*	(0.08)	−0.40***	(0.08)
Nordrhein-Westfalen	−0.38***	(0.11)	−0.15*	(0.06)	−0.42***	(0.06)
Rheinland-Pfalz	−0.35*	(0.18)	−0.16	(0.10)	−0.40***	(0.10)
Saarland	−0.67+	(0.40)	−0.30	(0.19)	−0.16	(0.18)
Sachsen	0.06	(0.17)	−0.07	(0.11)	−0.63***	(0.12)
Sachsen-Anhalt	−0.15	(0.19)	0.23+	(0.12)	−0.95***	(0.13)
Schleswig-Holstein	0.01	(0.18)	0.17	(0.11)	−0.28**	(0.11)
Thueringen	0.10	(0.19)	0.23+	(0.12)	−0.63***	(0.13)
Intercept	−1.95***	(0.43)	−2.13***	(0.22)	−2.48***	(0.24)
Variance (cohort: intercept)	0.02	(0.01)	0.00	(0.00)	0.00	(0.00)
Variance (period: slope)	0.05	(0.04)	0.02	(0.01)	0.00	(0.01)
Variance (period: intercept)	0.01	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)	0.07	(0.04)
BIC	10811.5		23177.8		21385.4	
N (cohorts)	14		14		14	
N (periods)	8		8		8	
N (individuals)	18726		18687		18693	

(Significance: $^{+}\ p < 0.1$, $^{*}\ p < 0.05$, $^{**}\ p < 0.01$, $^{***}\ p < 0.001$)

Note: Results with logit estimates and standard errors.
Source: based on data from ESS (2017).

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Nonviolent protest is an integral part of a "strong democracy" (Barber, 1984). Legal extra-representational activities such as demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts extend citizens' repertoire of political participation beyond the domain of elections and party politics. They give people a way to react to policy-making as it is unfolding and bring attention to issues that might otherwise be ignored by political elites. They are key instruments used by civil society to keep government in check.

Over the last two decades, many studies have reported a persistent (and possibly increasing) protest gap between Central and East European citizens and their peers in Western Europe (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007; Hooghe & Quintelier, 2014; Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002; Kostelka, 2014). Given the importance of protest for democracy, the demobilization observed in Central and Eastern Europe might be detrimental to the process of democratic consolidation in the region. Political apathy decreases the legitimacy of democratic institutions and impinges on the accountability of public officials. Most importantly, the hollowing-out of postcommunist democracies might facilitate the resurgence of strongman rule, a process already initiated in certain countries like Hungary and Poland.

In this context, this project has shed new light on the determinants of protest in post-communist countries. While previous studies have focused on current structural conditions when seeking to explain mass mobilization in Central and Eastern Europe, this thesis has argued that *legacies of the past* have constrained the development of protest in the region. Drawing on political socialization theory, I have suggested that protest in Central and Eastern Europe reflects the political context experienced by different cohorts of citizens during their early formative years. Postcommunist democracies have inherited two legacies that

might have influenced the participation of their citizens: a legacy of repression and a legacy of transitional mobilization. I expected citizens who had been exposed to intense and, especially, violent repression during their youth to participate less in protest activities afterward. Conversely, I postulated that early exposure to mobilization during the transition to democracy might have pushed individuals who were young at that time to keep on protesting as they advanced in age.

To test these theoretical expectations, I assembled a large longitudinal and nationally representative dataset consisting of eight rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) in 28 new and old European democracies from 2002 to 2017. From this master dataset, I selected subsamples to test specific hypotheses in the empirical chapters. The thesis proposed new techniques to examine the effects of early exposure to repression and transitional mobilization on protest participation using age-period-cohort (APC) models. I applied these approaches in three empirical chapters, consisting of two cross-national studies and a comparison of East and West Germans.

In this chapter, I summarize the findings of the thesis and, moving back from the micro to the macro, explore their implications for the development of civil society in postcommunist democracies. I then highlight the main contributions of this study, note its limitations, and suggest directions for future research.

7.1 Summary of the Findings

The results of the three empirical chapters have demonstrated that political socialization does play a role in postcommunist citizens' protest behavior. Yet, the magnitude and, sometimes, the direction of the socialization effect suggest that we should qualify some of the hypotheses formulated in this thesis.

7.1.1 The Micro-Level Effects of Exposure to Repression

In Chapter 4, I examined the impact of early exposure to repression on protest in postcommunist democracies. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy project, I developed new measures to capture early exposure to civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity violations. I tested their effects on protest in multilevel APC models with country-fixed effects using a sample of 10 postcommunist democracies. The results indicated that early exposure to repression had an effect on demonstration attendance, but not on petition signing nor

on participation in boycotts. With regards to demonstrations, the findings suggested that citizens reacted differently depending on whether they were exposed to civil liberties restrictions or to personal integrity violations. In the first case, they participated more while, in the second, they participated less.

The two forms of repression, therefore, appear to have had qualitatively different effects. The statistically positive influence of exposure to civil liberties restrictions on demonstrations hinted at a liberation effect. After experiencing restrictions under autocracy, citizens might have been particularly keen to express their dissent when the political and economic changes they hoped for did not come as expected. The negative effect of exposure to personal integrity violations, in contrast, suggested that political violence biases citizens' risk assessment. I noted that political killings and torture, in comparison with other forms of repression, create memories that are both more easily available and dread-inducing. In line with the literature on the availability and affect heuristics in psychology (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987; Slovic et al., 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), this might explain why citizens exposed to political violence might have overestimated the risk of taking part in demonstrations.

7.1.2 The Micro-Level Effects of Exposure to Transitional Mobilization

Chapter 5 examined whether the protest deficit observed in postcommunist democracies was attenuated in countries that experienced an "eventful" transition (della Porta, 2016, 346). The analysis focused on the 1989 generation, which is composed of citizens who were at the peak of their political sensitivity at the turn of the 1990s. I relied on data from the second wave of the European Values Study (EVS) to measure the early protest experience of this generation. Using longitudinal multilevel models, I examined whether the 1989 generation's early mobilization had a spillover effect on current participation and, if so, whether the size of this effect varied between old and new European democracies. Based on the results of this chapter, there is little evidence that the transitional mobilization has moderated the East-West protest gap. With regards to involvement in petitions and boycotts, the Eastern participation deficit was lower in countries that experienced higher levels of protest during the collapse of communism. Yet, this result was partially driven by the inclusion of Eastern Germany, an influential case. Early exposure to protest did not have a moderating effect on demonstration attendance among citizens of the 1989 generation.

7.1.3 The Combined Effects of Exposure to Repression and Transitional Mobilization

In Chapter 6, I looked more closely at the protest behavior of East Germans. Citizens who grew up in East Germany during the Cold War experienced two political contexts with potentially conflicting long-term effects on protest: the repression during the GDR and the Peaceful Revolution. Using West Germans' protest participation as a benchmark, I examined how these conflicting legacies interacted in shaping East Germans' current protest behavior accross cohorts and over time. The results revealed that East Germans participated less than West Germans in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts after controlling for relevant individual-level characteristics. Over a period of 16 years, this protest gap remained stable or even increased for certain forms of protest. This indicated that the legacy of transitional mobilization did not compensate for the legacy of (violent) repression in Eastern Germany. Yet, the magnitude of the cohort effect varied depending on the model specification and the type of protest. The disengagement of East Germans of the Cold War generation, in comparison with older and younger cohorts, was most apparent for participation in petitions and boycotts, especially in the fixed-effect models.

The empirical chapters have shed new light on the micro effects of early exposure to repression and transitional mobilization in postcommunist democracies. The results have shown that early exposure to repression does not affect all protest activities equally. In addition, the analysis has demonstrated that it is not just the intensity but also the kind of repression experienced by citizens that influences their participation. Finally, there is little empirical support for the hypothesis according to which mobilization during collapse of communism has shaped a highly active transitional generation in the East.

7.2 Moving Back from the Micro to the Macro

How do these findings translate at the macro level? In this section, I look at the effect of political socialization on protest in old and new European democracies from a broader perspective. I consider the possible implications of individual exposure to repression and transitional mobilization for mass mobilization at the country level. My aim here is not to show that political socialization is *the* main factor behind differences in protest participation between countries—competing explanations are too numerous and confounded for that—but

to start a discussion about the wider impact of repression and transitional mobilization on political involvement in new democracies.

7.2.1 The Macro-Level Effects of Exposure to Repression

With regards to the effect of exposure to repression, the scatterplots in Figure 7.1 report the average proportion of citizens who had taken part in a demonstration, a petition, or a boycott as a function of the mean exposure to civil liberties restrictions by country. Figure 7.2 shows the relationship between participation in these three protest activities and the average exposure to personal integrity violations. One striking observation is that postcommunist democracies are in a different class when it comes to the average exposure to repression. In fact, at the country level, the correlation between an indicator for postcommunist countries and the average exposure to civil liberties restrictions is 0.92. The correlation between this indicator and the average exposure to personal integrity violations is 0.78. Statistically, at least, exposure to repression explains the difference between East and West European countries almost perfectly. While this is not entirely surprising given that postcommunist democracies have a more recent autocratic past, the clear demarcation between the two groups of countries is nonetheless remarkable.

Moreover, in both figures, we see that the relationship between participation in protest activities and exposure to repression is not linear but logarithmic: Changes in the average exposure to repression have a larger effect at lower levels of exposure to repression. In other words, the incremental effect of exposure to repression on protest becomes increasingly negligible at higher levels of repression. Countries of Southern Europe, for example, fall in the middle of the spectrum in terms of exposure to repression, but their level of protest is closer to the one of postccomunist democracies than the one of Northwestern European countries. Furthermore, the strength of the association between repression and protest participation depends on the type of protest. While the effect on demonstration is weak and statistically nonsignificant,[1] it is large and statistically significant for petitions and boycotts. These observations at the country level suggest that repression might have other long-term *systemic* consequences for participation that might not be fully captured by individual measures within countries. These negative consequences appear to kick-in at low levels of average exposure to repression and might endure for a long period.

[1] An outlier here is Spain. Spanish citizens were very active during the European debt crisis. Excluding this case turns the relationship significant.



Figure 7.1: Participation in protest activities by average early exposure to civil liberties restrictions (CLR)
Note: weighted results.
Source: based on data from Coppedge et al. (2019b) and ESS (2017).

7.2.2 The Macro-Level Effects of Exposure to Transitional Mobilization

Exploring the country-level effect of exposure to transitional mobilization is more difficult since we do not have data about the participation of the overall population during the collapse of communism. As explained in Chapter 5, the EVS only gives an accurate estimate of the protest participation of young citizens at that time. According to political socialization theory, this cohort is the one that should have been the most affected by the political context during the transition to democracy. Yet, the results of Chapter 5 have shown that, even for this cohort, the exposure to transitional mobilization did not compensate for the protest deficit in postcommunist countries—at least, not in rigorous statistical models with appropriate controls. It would be surprising if the mobilization during the collapse of communism moderated the East-West protest gap at the country level.



Figure 7.2: Participation in protest activities by average early exposure to personal integrity violations (PIV)
Note: weighted results.
Source: based on data from Coppedge et al. (2019b) and ESS (2017).

Despite these data limitations, I present here a simple exploratory analysis. To get a sense of the possible moderating effect of transitional mobilization, I regress the average participation in each protest activity at the country level on the two variables measuring the average exposure to civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity violations. I then calculate the residuals of these regressions and plot them against the early exposure to protest of the 1989 generation in postcommunist democracies, assuming that the protest level of this cohort did not diverge too much from the rest of the population at the turn of the 1990s. The scatterplots in Figure 7.3 show the difference between the protest levels predicted on the basis of exposure to repression and the actual protest levels in Central and East European countries as a function of the 1989 generation's early protest experience. Based on this figure, countries that went through a period of intense mobilization during the collapse of



Figure 7.3: Residuals of a model predicting protest by exposure to repression plotted against the early exposure to protest of the 1989 generation in postcommunist democracies
Source: based on data from Coppedge et al. (2019b), ESS (2017), and EVS (2015).

communism might participate slightly more than expected. Yet, this effect appears mostly driven by Eastern Germany and is not statistically significant.

7.2.3 The Constraining Effects of Mobilizing Networks

Like the results of the empirical chapters, the findings in this section suggest that repression has left a mark on protest in postcommunist democracies and that popular mobilization during the transition from communism did not compensate for the lower level of protest in Central and Eastern Europe. There are nonetheless differences with the previous findings. In contrast with the results in Chapter 4, repression appears to have had, at the country level, a larger effect on petition signing and on participation in boycotts than on demonstration attendance.

The discrepancy between the results at the micro and the macro levels might be explained by mobilizing networks. Beyond political socialization, one important factor behind political participation is recruitment. In their book *Voice and Equality*, Verba et al. (1995) conclude that being asked to take action is often a prerequisite for political participation (see also Schussman & Soule, 2005; Walgrave & Wouters, 2014). When it comes to protest, recruitment is usually done by labor unions, civil society organizations, and parties. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, mobilizing networks have remained weak as a result of the restrictions during communism and the economic restructuring after the transition. Labor union density has declined sharply since the 1990s (Bohle & Greskovits, 2006) and membership of civil society organizations and parties is still low.[2] Thus, even if younger citizens in new democracies have a higher protest potential than older generations, this potential might remain latent as long as no one appeals to it. This might be particularly true for low-cost activities such as petitions and boycotts that do not only attract inveterate activists but also more casual participants. Until mobilizing networks become denser in postcommunist democracies—a process that will take more than a generation—the spread of these forms of political participation will remain limited.

All in all, the micro-level results in the empirical chapters and the tentative macro-level findings in this conclusion do not indicate that the East-West protest gap is about to be bridged. Generational replacement does not necessarily foster convergence between old and new European democracies since the effect of political socialization varies depending on the type of protest activity and the type of repression experienced by citizens. At the same time, deep structural legacies, such as weak mobilizing networks, further limit the spread of protest in postcommunist democracies.

7.3 Main Contributions to the Literature

This thesis has offered a series of contributions to three distinct literatures: the literature on protest in democratization processes, the literature on protest normalization, and the literature on historical legacies in postcommunist countries. First, this project has shown that, far from disrupting democratization processes, the spread of nonviolent protest might be a symptom of democratic consolidation. Yet, the widespread adoption of ordinary forms of

[2]The data assembled for this thesis shows that the average percentage of respondents having worked for an organization or a party in the year preceding the ESS surveys is 8% in postcommunist democracies compared to 21% in West European democracies.

protest by citizens of new democracies cannot be taken for granted. As we have seen, protest remains a rather marginal form of political participation in Central and Eastern Europe.

Second, the project has demonstrated the limits of the normalization of protest. While some authors have suggested that "the rise of protest politics is by no means confined to postindustrial societies and established democracies" (Norris, 2002, 198), there is no solid evidence that this process is under way in postcommunist democracies. Most importantly, it remains unclear what factors drive the normalization of protest. Beyond the conflicting effects of generational replacement, which have been discussed previously, time-variant country-level factors perform poorly in explaining changes in the level of protest over time within countries. In all the models presented in Chapters 4 and 5, I only found one instance where a country-wave-level variable clearly affected participation in protest. The results in Chapter 4 have shown that a decrease in the lagged Electoral Democracy Index boosts participation in demonstrations (see Model 1 in Table 4.1). In countries like Ukraine, citizens protested to prevent further abuses of power by their political leaders. This demonstrates that mass mobilization is a bulwark against democratic backsliding. Yet, it does not signal a normalization of protest—quite the opposite.[3] These results call into question the ubiquity of protest normalization in democracies.

Third, the thesis has contributed to the growing literature on micro legacies in postcommunist countries (Mishler & Rose, 2007; Neundorf, 2010; Neundorf et al., 2020; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2017). While most studies in this field have focused on political attitudes, this thesis has looked at protest, a complex and more unstable political behavior. By integrating insights from studies on political socialization, comparative authoritarianism, risk perception, and the biographical impact of social movements, I have formulated hypotheses about the role of exposure to repression and transitional mobilization in shaping citizens' lifelong protest behavior. I have combined these theoretical propositions in a coherent framework and discussed how political socialization mediates the translation of political grievances into protest through two mechanisms: the evaluation of appropriate response and the evaluation of efficacy. Despite the complex causal chain linking political socialization to protest, I have demonstrated empirically that early exposure to repression has an effect on demonstration attendance in postcommunist democracies. People who were exposed to violent repression during their youth are less likely to take part in street protests. Furthermore, differences

[3] Supplementary analyses, which are not reported here, show that the effect of the lagged Electoral Democracy Index is not symmetric. Declines in the quality of democracy increase participation while, conversely, improvements in the quality of democracy do not decrease participation.

in participation between East and West Germans also suggest that repression during the GDR has demobilized citizens in Eastern Germany. One unexpected finding that deserves more attention is the statistically positive effect of exposure to civil liberties restrictions on demonstration attendance in postcommunist democracies. I have interpreted this result as a liberation effect. This highlights that the effect of early exposure to repression might not be fixed but instead serves as a benchmark against which citizens evaluate the current conditions for protest. In brief, the thesis has contributed to studies on micro legacies in postcommunist countries by examining a broad range of political contexts experienced by Central and East European citizens throughout the twentieth century and by testing their lasting effects on an underresearched outcome, protest.

The thesis has also offered empirical and methodological contributions that may be relevant beyond the three fields of research mentioned above. In particular, the measures of early exposure to repression and transitional mobilization developed in this thesis and the statistical approaches used to test their long-term effect could have wider applications. The measures of early exposure to civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity violations introduced in Chapter 4 have innovated by explicitly defining the limits and the weights of the early formative years. As our understanding of the developmental and cognitive mechanisms behind political socialization improves, it will be possible to adapt the parameters of these measures. This theory-driven approach could be used in a variety of domains well beyond the subject of micro legacies in new democracies. To my knowledge, the analysis presented in Chapter 5 is the first one to measure and test the effect of exposure to protest at the cohort level using nationally representative data. Other studies, like McAdam's (1989) research on the Mississippi Freedom Summer project, have tracked the participation of smaller groups of protesters over time. Yet, they have not tested the wider, national effect of exposure to protest. If it was extended to other cohorts, the approach proposed in Chapter 5 might help to explain generational differences in extra-representational participation that have been observed in the United States and Western Europe (Caren et al., 2011; Grasso, 2014). Finally, Chapter 6 has proposed techniques to measure differences between East and West Germans across cohorts and over time. These methods could be applied to explore other social, economic, and political differences between East and West Germans.

7.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

This thesis is, in many ways, a beginning more than an end. More research is necessary to understand how the past has shaped the political behavior of citizens in new democracies. In this last section of the conclusion, I wish to note some limitations of this research and propose ideas for continuing the work started with this project.

First, it is important to recall that the thesis relied on cross-sectional data. The analysis could not track the same respondents' participation over time as would be the case with panel data. Instead, I used repeated measures at the cohort level. Relevant questions, such as those on the long-term effect of personal experiences of repression and mobilization, could not be answered with the current research design. One way to address this problem might be to obtain retrospective information about citizens' exposure to repression and mobilization. Asking citizens to reflect on their past might help to better understand the individual-level impact of exposure to repression and transitional mobilization. Although incorrect recall is an issue with this type of data, it might still be the best approach to uncover variance within cohorts. Many studies have used qualitative biographical interviews to explore the role of memories in social movements (e.g., della Porta, Andretta, Fernandes, Romanos, & Vogiatzoglou, 2018). Integrating retrospective questions in nationally representative surveys would help to connect the mostly quantitative literature on micro legacies in postcommunist countries with insights from social movement research.

Second, the period of 16 years covered by the ESS might be too short to fully assess the effect of political socialization on protest. The birth cohorts observed in this study only partially overlapped in terms of age. This is not optimal for APC models. Other large survey projects, like the European Values Study and the World Values Survey, have asked questions about protest participation since the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 3, they have focused on protest potential and protest experience, not on recent protest. As of now, the ESS remains the most valuable source of data for the kind of analysis done in this thesis. The results of this research will need to be reevaluated as new ESS rounds become available.

Third, an interesting avenue for future research might be to examine how citizens' past experiences have affected individual determinants of protest. Instead of measuring the direct effects of early exposure to repression and transitional mobilization on protest, we might instead examine their indirect effects through other individual-level drivers of protest. A good example of this approach is a recent study by Borbáth and Gessler (2020). The authors have

demonstrated that, in Eastern Europe, exposure to communism decreases the likelihood of taking part in protests for citizens on the left. Conversely, citizens who were historically in opposition to the former regime (those on the right of the ideological spectrum) are now more mobilized. The same reasoning could be applied to the relationship between exposure to repression and social class as a driver of protest. As an economic and political system, communism was built on a strong working class. In comparison with the current class structure, workers were structurally advantaged and potentially faced less repression than other citizens.[4] This thesis could be extended by looking at how exposure to repression has influenced the relationship between social class and protest for citizens of different cohorts in postcommunist democracies.[5]

Fourth, because of data limitations, the analysis in Chapter 5 only covered a single cohort, the 1989 generation. To examine the effect of exposure to transitional mobilization on a broader scale, future studies could develop measures of mobilization at the country level using protest event data collected from newspaper articles. Protest event analysis has been criticized because its sources are subject to two types of bias. First, newspapers report only a fraction of all protest events in a given territory (selection bias) and second, they might provide erroneous information about the characteristics of protest events, such as the number of participants (description bias) (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, & Soule, 2004; Hutter, 2014). Yet, protest event data also has obvious advantages over survey data. It allows for a precise examination of temporal variations in the frequency of protest events and provides more information about the form, demands, and targets of the protest events. Another key advantage for the kind of research conducted in this thesis is that it offers researchers the possibility to go back in time and explore protest trends using archival data. Powerful synergies could be achieved by combining protest event data with survey data to examine how citizens' exposure to protest at a young age has influenced their participation later in life.

Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic might offer an opportunity for scholars to better understand the relationship between exposure to state coercion and protest. The spread of the coronavirus and the state response it triggered might be the largest (and one of the most tragic) natural experiment on the effects of civil liberties restrictions in the modern era. This

[4]There are obvious exceptions to this, for one, the Solidarity movement in Poland.

[5]Neundorf et al. (2020) took a similar approach to estimate the relationship between social class and satisfaction with democracy. They found that postcommunist citizens who grew up in working class families during communism are now less satisfied with democracy than citizens from the same generation but from a different class background. They are also less satisfied with democracy than citizens who grew up in working class families after the transition.

is a critical moment for civil society in Central and Eastern Europe. As demonstrated by Viktor Orbán's emergency powers during the lockdown in Hungary (Novak, 2020), the pandemic might give semi-authoritarian leaders a pretext to expand their powers and further erode the foundations of democracy. While justified from a public health perspective, the confinement might have long-term consequences for citizens' political involvement in the region. The next years will show whether civil society is able to recover from this stress test or, conversely, if postcommunist democracies have to cope with another legacy of demobilization.

Appendix A: Country Codes

Table A.1: Codes of the countries included in the dataset

New democracies		*Old democracies*	
Code	Name	Code	Name
BGR	Bulgaria	AUT	Austria
CZE	Czech Republic	BEL	Belgium
DEE	Eastern Germany	CHE	Switzerland
EST	Estonia	CYP	Cyprus
HUN	Hungary	DEW	Western Germany
LTU	Lithuania	DNK	Denmark
POL	Poland	ESP	Spain
SVK	Slovakia	FIN	Finland
SVN	Slovenia	FRA	France
UKR	Ukraine	GBR	United Kingdom
		GRC	Greece
		IRL	Ireland
		ISL	Iceland
		ITA	Italy
		NLD	Netherlands
		NOR	Norway
		PRT	Portugal
		SWE	Sweden

Appendix B: Protest Trends by Country



Figure B.1: Participation in three protest activities in 10 new democracies over time
Source: based on data from ESS (2017).

Figure B.2: Participation in three protest activities in 18 old democracies over time
Source: based on data from ESS (2017).

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